remove crypt_blowfish
This commit is contained in:
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29
deps/crypt_blowfish/LINKS
vendored
29
deps/crypt_blowfish/LINKS
vendored
@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
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New versions of this package (crypt_blowfish):
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http://www.openwall.com/crypt/
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A paper on the algorithm that explains its design decisions:
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http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/provos.html
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Unix Seventh Edition Manual, Volume 2: the password scheme (1978):
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http://plan9.bell-labs.com/7thEdMan/vol2/password
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The Openwall GNU/*/Linux (Owl) tcb suite implementing the alternative
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password shadowing scheme. This includes a PAM module which
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supersedes pam_unix and uses the password hashing framework provided
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with crypt_blowfish when setting new passwords.
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http://www.openwall.com/tcb/
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pam_passwdqc, a password strength checking and policy enforcement
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module for PAM-aware password changing programs:
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http://www.openwall.com/passwdqc/
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John the Ripper password cracker:
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http://www.openwall.com/john/
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$Owl: Owl/packages/glibc/crypt_blowfish/LINKS,v 1.4 2005/11/16 13:09:47 solar Exp $
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77
deps/crypt_blowfish/Makefile
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77
deps/crypt_blowfish/Makefile
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@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
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#
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# Written and revised by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011.
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# No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
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# domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
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# in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
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# Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
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# general public under the following terms:
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#
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# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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# modification, are permitted.
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#
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# There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
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#
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# See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
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#
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CC = gcc
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AS = $(CC)
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LD = $(CC)
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RM = rm -f
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CFLAGS = -W -Wall -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wcast-qual -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wshadow -Wundef -Wpointer-arith -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -funroll-loops
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ASFLAGS = -c
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LDFLAGS = -s
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BLOWFISH_OBJS = \
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crypt_blowfish.o x86.o
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CRYPT_OBJS = \
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$(BLOWFISH_OBJS) crypt_gensalt.o wrapper.o
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TEST_OBJS = \
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$(BLOWFISH_OBJS) crypt_gensalt.o crypt_test.o
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TEST_THREADS_OBJS = \
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$(BLOWFISH_OBJS) crypt_gensalt.o crypt_test_threads.o
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EXTRA_MANS = \
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crypt_r.3 crypt_rn.3 crypt_ra.3 \
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crypt_gensalt.3 crypt_gensalt_rn.3 crypt_gensalt_ra.3
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all: $(CRYPT_OBJS) man
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check: crypt_test
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./crypt_test
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crypt_test: $(TEST_OBJS)
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$(LD) $(LDFLAGS) $(TEST_OBJS) -o $@
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crypt_test.o: wrapper.c ow-crypt.h crypt_blowfish.h crypt_gensalt.h
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$(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) wrapper.c -DTEST -o $@
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check_threads: crypt_test_threads
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./crypt_test_threads
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crypt_test_threads: $(TEST_THREADS_OBJS)
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$(LD) $(LDFLAGS) $(TEST_THREADS_OBJS) -lpthread -o $@
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crypt_test_threads.o: wrapper.c ow-crypt.h crypt_blowfish.h crypt_gensalt.h
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$(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) wrapper.c -DTEST -DTEST_THREADS=4 -o $@
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man: $(EXTRA_MANS)
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$(EXTRA_MANS):
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echo '.so man3/crypt.3' > $@
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crypt_blowfish.o: crypt_blowfish.h
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crypt_gensalt.o: crypt_gensalt.h
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wrapper.o: crypt.h ow-crypt.h crypt_blowfish.h crypt_gensalt.h
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.c.o:
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$(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) $*.c
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.S.o:
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$(AS) $(ASFLAGS) $*.S
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clean:
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$(RM) crypt_test crypt_test_threads *.o $(EXTRA_MANS) core
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30
deps/crypt_blowfish/PERFORMANCE
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30
deps/crypt_blowfish/PERFORMANCE
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@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
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These numbers are for 32 iterations ("$2a$05"):
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OpenBSD 3.0 bcrypt(*) crypt_blowfish 0.4.4
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Pentium III, 840 MHz 99 c/s 121 c/s (+22%)
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Alpha 21164PC, 533 MHz 55.5 c/s 76.9 c/s (+38%)
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UltraSparc IIi, 400 MHz 49.9 c/s 52.5 c/s (+5%)
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Pentium, 120 MHz 8.8 c/s 20.1 c/s (+128%)
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PA-RISC 7100LC, 80 MHz 8.5 c/s 16.3 c/s (+92%)
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(*) built with -fomit-frame-pointer -funroll-loops, which I don't
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think happens for libcrypt.
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Starting with version 1.1 released in June 2011, default builds of
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crypt_blowfish invoke a quick self-test on every hash computation.
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This has roughly a 4.8% performance impact at "$2a$05", but only a 0.6%
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impact at a more typical setting of "$2a$08".
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The large speedup for the original Pentium is due to the assembly
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code and the weird optimizations this processor requires.
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The numbers for password cracking are 2 to 10% higher than those for
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crypt_blowfish as certain things may be done out of the loop and the
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code doesn't need to be reentrant.
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Recent versions of John the Ripper (1.6.25-dev and newer) achieve an
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additional 15% speedup on the Pentium Pro family of processors (which
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includes Pentium III) with a separate version of the assembly code and
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run-time CPU detection.
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$Owl: Owl/packages/glibc/crypt_blowfish/PERFORMANCE,v 1.6 2011/06/21 12:09:20 solar Exp $
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68
deps/crypt_blowfish/README
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68
deps/crypt_blowfish/README
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@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
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This is an implementation of a password hashing method, provided via the
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crypt(3) and a reentrant interface. It is fully compatible with
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OpenBSD's bcrypt.c for prefix "$2b$", originally by Niels Provos and
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David Mazieres. (Please refer to the included crypt(3) man page for
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information on minor compatibility issues for other bcrypt prefixes.)
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I've placed this code in the public domain, with fallback to a
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permissive license. Please see the comment in crypt_blowfish.c for
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more information.
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You can use the provided routines in your own packages, or link them
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into a C library. I've provided hooks for linking into GNU libc, but
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it shouldn't be too hard to get this into another C library. Note
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that simply adding this code into your libc is probably not enough to
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make your system use the new password hashing algorithm. Changes to
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passwd(1), PAM modules, or whatever else your system uses will likely
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be needed as well. These are not a part of this package, but see
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LINKS for a pointer to our tcb suite.
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Instructions on using the routines in one of the two common ways are
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given below. It is recommended that you test the routines on your
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system before you start. Type "make check" or "make check_threads"
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(if you have the POSIX threads library), then "make clean".
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1. Using the routines in your programs.
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The available interfaces are in ow-crypt.h, and this is the file you
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should include. You won't need crypt.h. When linking, add all of the
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C files and x86.S (you can compile and link it even on a non-x86, it
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will produce no code in this case).
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2. Building the routines into GNU C library.
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For versions 2.13 and 2.14 (and likely other nearby ones), extract the
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library sources as usual. Apply the patch for glibc 2.14 provided in
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this package. Enter crypt/ and rename crypt.h to gnu-crypt.h within
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that directory. Copy the C sources, header, and assembly (x86.S) files
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from this package in there as well (but be sure you don't overwrite the
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Makefile). Configure, build, and install the library as usual.
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For versions 2.2 to 2.3.6 (and likely also for some newer ones),
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extract the library sources and maybe its optional add-ons as usual.
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Apply the patch for glibc 2.3.6 provided in this package. Enter
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crypt/ and rename crypt.h to gnu-crypt.h within that directory. Copy
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the C sources, header, and assembly (x86.S) files from this package in
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there as well (but be sure you don't overwrite the Makefile).
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Configure, build, and install the library as usual.
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For versions 2.1 to 2.1.3, extract the library sources and the crypt
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and linuxthreads add-ons as usual. Apply the patch for glibc 2.1.3
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provided in this package. Enter crypt/sysdeps/unix/, and rename
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crypt.h to gnu-crypt.h within that directory. Copy C sources, header,
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and assembly (x86.S) files from this package in there as well (but be
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sure you don't overwrite the Makefile). Configure, build, and install
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the library as usual.
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Programs that want to use the provided interfaces will need to include
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crypt.h (but not ow-crypt.h directly). By default, prototypes for the
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new routines aren't defined (but the extra functionality of crypt(3)
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is indeed available). You need to define _OW_SOURCE to obtain the new
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routines as well.
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--
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Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com>
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$Owl: Owl/packages/glibc/crypt_blowfish/README,v 1.10 2014/07/07 15:19:04 solar Exp $
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575
deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt.3
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575
deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt.3
vendored
@ -1,575 +0,0 @@
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.\" Written and revised by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011.
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.\" No copyright is claimed, and this man page is hereby placed in the public
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.\" domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the man page
|
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.\" in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the man page is
|
||||
.\" Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
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.\" general public under the following terms:
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.\"
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.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
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.\" modification, are permitted.
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.\"
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.\" There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
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.\"
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.\" This manual page in its current form is intended for use on systems
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.\" based on the GNU C Library with crypt_blowfish patched into libcrypt.
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.\"
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.TH CRYPT 3 "July 7, 2014" "Openwall Project" "Library functions"
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.ad l
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.\" No macros in NAME to keep makewhatis happy.
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.SH NAME
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\fBcrypt\fR, \fBcrypt_r\fR, \fBcrypt_rn\fR, \fBcrypt_ra\fR,
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\fBcrypt_gensalt\fR, \fBcrypt_gensalt_rn\fR, \fBcrypt_gensalt_ra\fR
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\- password hashing
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.SH SYNOPSIS
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.B #define _XOPEN_SOURCE
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.br
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.B #include <unistd.h>
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.sp
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.in +8
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.ti -8
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.BI "char *crypt(const char *" key ", const char *" setting );
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.in -8
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.sp
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.B #define _GNU_SOURCE
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.br
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.B #include <crypt.h>
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.sp
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.in +8
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.ti -8
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.BI "char *crypt_r(const char *" key ", const char *" setting ", struct crypt_data *" data );
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.in -8
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.sp
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.B #define _OW_SOURCE
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.br
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.B #include <crypt.h>
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.sp
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.in +8
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.ti -8
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.BI "char *crypt_rn(const char *" key ", const char *" setting ", void *" data ", int " size );
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.ti -8
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.BI "char *crypt_ra(const char *" key ", const char *" setting ", void **" data ", int *" size );
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.ti -8
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.BI "char *crypt_gensalt(const char *" prefix ", unsigned long " count ", const char *" input ", int " size );
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.ti -8
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.BI "char *crypt_gensalt_rn(const char *" prefix ", unsigned long " count ", const char *" input ", int " size ", char *" output ", int " output_size );
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.ti -8
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.BI "char *crypt_gensalt_ra(const char *" prefix ", unsigned long " count ", const char *" input ", int " size );
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.ad b
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.de crypt
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.BR crypt ,
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.BR crypt_r ,
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.BR crypt_rn ", \\$1"
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.ie "\\$2"" .B crypt_ra
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.el .BR crypt_ra "\\$2"
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..
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.de crypt_gensalt
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.BR crypt_gensalt ,
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.BR crypt_gensalt_rn ", \\$1"
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.ie "\\$2"" .B crypt_gensalt_ra
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.el .BR crypt_gensalt_ra "\\$2"
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..
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.SH DESCRIPTION
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The
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.crypt and
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functions calculate a cryptographic hash function of
|
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.I key
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with one of a number of supported methods as requested with
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.IR setting ,
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which is also used to pass a salt and possibly other parameters to
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the chosen method.
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The hashing methods are explained below.
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.PP
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Unlike
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.BR crypt ,
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the functions
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.BR crypt_r ,
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.BR crypt_rn " and"
|
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.B crypt_ra
|
||||
are reentrant.
|
||||
They place their result and possibly their private data in a
|
||||
.I data
|
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area of
|
||||
.I size
|
||||
bytes as passed to them by an application and/or in memory they
|
||||
allocate dynamically. Some hashing algorithms may use the data area to
|
||||
cache precomputed intermediate values across calls. Thus, applications
|
||||
must properly initialize the data area before its first use.
|
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.B crypt_r
|
||||
requires that only
|
||||
.I data->initialized
|
||||
be reset to zero;
|
||||
.BR crypt_rn " and " crypt_ra
|
||||
require that either the entire data area is zeroed or, in the case of
|
||||
.BR crypt_ra ,
|
||||
.I *data
|
||||
is NULL. When called with a NULL
|
||||
.I *data
|
||||
or insufficient
|
||||
.I *size
|
||||
for the requested hashing algorithm,
|
||||
.B crypt_ra
|
||||
uses
|
||||
.BR realloc (3)
|
||||
to allocate the required amount of memory dynamically. Thus,
|
||||
.B crypt_ra
|
||||
has the additional requirement that
|
||||
.IR *data ,
|
||||
when non-NULL, must point to an area allocated either with a previous
|
||||
call to
|
||||
.B crypt_ra
|
||||
or with a
|
||||
.BR malloc (3)
|
||||
family call.
|
||||
The memory allocated by
|
||||
.B crypt_ra
|
||||
should be freed with
|
||||
.BR free "(3)."
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
The
|
||||
.crypt_gensalt and
|
||||
functions compile a string for use as
|
||||
.I setting
|
||||
\- with the given
|
||||
.I prefix
|
||||
(used to choose a hashing method), the iteration
|
||||
.I count
|
||||
(if supported by the chosen method) and up to
|
||||
.I size
|
||||
cryptographically random
|
||||
.I input
|
||||
bytes for use as the actual salt.
|
||||
If
|
||||
.I count
|
||||
is 0, a low default will be picked.
|
||||
The random bytes may be obtained from
|
||||
.BR /dev/urandom .
|
||||
Unlike
|
||||
.BR crypt_gensalt ,
|
||||
the functions
|
||||
.BR crypt_gensalt_rn " and " crypt_gensalt_ra
|
||||
are reentrant.
|
||||
.B crypt_gensalt_rn
|
||||
places its result in the
|
||||
.I output
|
||||
buffer of
|
||||
.I output_size
|
||||
bytes.
|
||||
.B crypt_gensalt_ra
|
||||
allocates memory for its result dynamically. The memory should be
|
||||
freed with
|
||||
.BR free "(3)."
|
||||
.SH RETURN VALUE
|
||||
Upon successful completion, the functions
|
||||
.crypt and
|
||||
return a pointer to a string containing the setting that was actually used
|
||||
and a printable encoding of the hash function value.
|
||||
The entire string is directly usable as
|
||||
.I setting
|
||||
with other calls to
|
||||
.crypt and
|
||||
and as
|
||||
.I prefix
|
||||
with calls to
|
||||
.crypt_gensalt and .
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
The behavior of
|
||||
.B crypt
|
||||
on errors isn't well standardized. Some implementations simply can't fail
|
||||
(unless the process dies, in which case they obviously can't return),
|
||||
others return NULL or a fixed string. Most implementations don't set
|
||||
.IR errno ,
|
||||
but some do. SUSv2 specifies only returning NULL and setting
|
||||
.I errno
|
||||
as a valid behavior, and defines only one possible error
|
||||
.RB "(" ENOSYS ,
|
||||
"The functionality is not supported on this implementation.")
|
||||
Unfortunately, most existing applications aren't prepared to handle
|
||||
NULL returns from
|
||||
.BR crypt .
|
||||
The description below corresponds to this implementation of
|
||||
.BR crypt " and " crypt_r
|
||||
only, and to
|
||||
.BR crypt_rn " and " crypt_ra .
|
||||
The behavior may change to match standards, other implementations or
|
||||
existing applications.
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
.BR crypt " and " crypt_r
|
||||
may only fail (and return) when passed an invalid or unsupported
|
||||
.IR setting ,
|
||||
in which case they return a pointer to a magic string that is
|
||||
shorter than 13 characters and is guaranteed to differ from
|
||||
.IR setting .
|
||||
This behavior is safe for older applications which assume that
|
||||
.B crypt
|
||||
can't fail, when both setting new passwords and authenticating against
|
||||
existing password hashes.
|
||||
.BR crypt_rn " and " crypt_ra
|
||||
return NULL to indicate failure. All four functions set
|
||||
.I errno
|
||||
when they fail.
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
The functions
|
||||
.crypt_gensalt and
|
||||
return a pointer to the compiled string for
|
||||
.IR setting ,
|
||||
or NULL on error in which case
|
||||
.I errno
|
||||
is set.
|
||||
.SH ERRORS
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
.B EINVAL
|
||||
.crypt "" :
|
||||
.I setting
|
||||
is invalid or not supported by this implementation;
|
||||
.sp
|
||||
.crypt_gensalt "" :
|
||||
.I prefix
|
||||
is invalid or not supported by this implementation;
|
||||
.I count
|
||||
is invalid for the requested
|
||||
.IR prefix ;
|
||||
the input
|
||||
.I size
|
||||
is insufficient for the smallest valid salt with the requested
|
||||
.IR prefix ;
|
||||
.I input
|
||||
is NULL.
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
.B ERANGE
|
||||
.BR crypt_rn :
|
||||
the provided data area
|
||||
.I size
|
||||
is insufficient for the requested hashing algorithm;
|
||||
.sp
|
||||
.BR crypt_gensalt_rn :
|
||||
.I output_size
|
||||
is too small to hold the compiled
|
||||
.I setting
|
||||
string.
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
.B ENOMEM
|
||||
.B crypt
|
||||
(original glibc only):
|
||||
failed to allocate memory for the output buffer (which subsequent calls
|
||||
would re-use);
|
||||
.sp
|
||||
.BR crypt_ra :
|
||||
.I *data
|
||||
is NULL or
|
||||
.I *size
|
||||
is insufficient for the requested hashing algorithm and
|
||||
.BR realloc (3)
|
||||
failed;
|
||||
.sp
|
||||
.BR crypt_gensalt_ra :
|
||||
failed to allocate memory for the compiled
|
||||
.I setting
|
||||
string.
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
.B ENOSYS
|
||||
.B crypt
|
||||
(SUSv2):
|
||||
the functionality is not supported on this implementation;
|
||||
.sp
|
||||
.BR crypt ,
|
||||
.B crypt_r
|
||||
(glibc 2.0 to 2.0.1 only):
|
||||
.de no-crypt-add-on
|
||||
the crypt add-on is not compiled in and
|
||||
.I setting
|
||||
requests something other than the MD5-based algorithm.
|
||||
..
|
||||
.no-crypt-add-on
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
.B EOPNOTSUPP
|
||||
.BR crypt ,
|
||||
.B crypt_r
|
||||
(glibc 2.0.2 to 2.1.3 only):
|
||||
.no-crypt-add-on
|
||||
.SH HASHING METHODS
|
||||
The implemented hashing methods are intended specifically for processing
|
||||
user passwords for storage and authentication;
|
||||
they are at best inefficient for most other purposes.
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
It is important to understand that password hashing is not a replacement
|
||||
for strong passwords.
|
||||
It is always possible for an attacker with access to password hashes
|
||||
to try guessing candidate passwords against the hashes.
|
||||
There are, however, certain properties a password hashing method may have
|
||||
which make these key search attacks somewhat harder.
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
All of the hashing methods use salts such that the same
|
||||
.I key
|
||||
may produce many possible hashes.
|
||||
Proper use of salts may defeat a number of attacks, including:
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
1.
|
||||
The ability to try candidate passwords against multiple hashes at the
|
||||
price of one.
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
2.
|
||||
The use of pre-hashed lists of candidate passwords.
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
3.
|
||||
The ability to determine whether two users (or two accounts of one user)
|
||||
have the same or different passwords without actually having to guess
|
||||
one of the passwords.
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
The key search attacks depend on computing hashes of large numbers of
|
||||
candidate passwords.
|
||||
Thus, the computational cost of a good password hashing method must be
|
||||
high \- but of course not too high to render it impractical.
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
All hashing methods implemented within the
|
||||
.crypt and
|
||||
interfaces use multiple iterations of an underlying cryptographic
|
||||
primitive specifically in order to increase the cost of trying a
|
||||
candidate password.
|
||||
Unfortunately, due to hardware improvements, the hashing methods which
|
||||
have a fixed cost become increasingly less secure over time.
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
In addition to salts, modern password hashing methods accept a variable
|
||||
iteration
|
||||
.IR count .
|
||||
This makes it possible to adapt their cost to the hardware improvements
|
||||
while still maintaining compatibility.
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
The following hashing methods are or may be implemented within the
|
||||
described interfaces:
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
.de hash
|
||||
.ad l
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
.I prefix
|
||||
.ie "\\$1"" \{\
|
||||
"" (empty string);
|
||||
.br
|
||||
a string matching ^[./0-9A-Za-z]{2} (see
|
||||
.BR regex (7))
|
||||
.\}
|
||||
.el "\\$1"
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
.B Encoding syntax
|
||||
\\$2
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
.B Maximum password length
|
||||
\\$3 (uses \\$4-bit characters)
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
.B Effective key size
|
||||
.ie "\\$5"" limited by the hash size only
|
||||
.el up to \\$5 bits
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
.B Hash size
|
||||
\\$6 bits
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
.B Salt size
|
||||
\\$7 bits
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
.B Iteration count
|
||||
\\$8
|
||||
.ad b
|
||||
..
|
||||
.ti -2
|
||||
.B Traditional DES-based
|
||||
.br
|
||||
This method is supported by almost all implementations of
|
||||
.BR crypt .
|
||||
Unfortunately, it no longer offers adequate security because of its many
|
||||
limitations.
|
||||
Thus, it should not be used for new passwords unless you absolutely have
|
||||
to be able to migrate the password hashes to other systems.
|
||||
.hash "" "[./0-9A-Za-z]{13}" 8 7 56 64 12 25
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
.ti -2
|
||||
.B Extended BSDI-style DES-based
|
||||
.br
|
||||
This method is used on BSDI and is also available on at least NetBSD,
|
||||
OpenBSD, and FreeBSD due to the use of David Burren's FreeSec library.
|
||||
.hash _ "_[./0-9A-Za-z]{19}" unlimited 7 56 64 24 "1 to 2**24-1 (must be odd)"
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
.ti -2
|
||||
.B FreeBSD-style MD5-based
|
||||
.br
|
||||
This is Poul-Henning Kamp's MD5-based password hashing method originally
|
||||
developed for FreeBSD.
|
||||
It is currently supported on many free Unix-like systems, on Solaris 10
|
||||
and newer, and it is part of the official glibc.
|
||||
Its main disadvantage is the fixed iteration count, which is already
|
||||
too low for the currently available hardware.
|
||||
.hash "$1$" "\e$1\e$[^$]{1,8}\e$[./0-9A-Za-z]{22}" unlimited 8 "" 128 "6 to 48" 1000
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
.ti -2
|
||||
.BR "OpenBSD-style Blowfish-based" " (" bcrypt )
|
||||
.br
|
||||
.B bcrypt
|
||||
was originally developed by Niels Provos and David Mazieres for OpenBSD
|
||||
and is also supported on recent versions of FreeBSD and NetBSD,
|
||||
on Solaris 10 and newer, and on several GNU/*/Linux distributions.
|
||||
It is, however, not part of the official glibc.
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
While both
|
||||
.B bcrypt
|
||||
and the BSDI-style DES-based hashing offer a variable iteration count,
|
||||
.B bcrypt
|
||||
may scale to even faster hardware, doesn't allow for certain optimizations
|
||||
specific to password cracking only, doesn't have the effective key size
|
||||
limitation, and uses 8-bit characters in passwords.
|
||||
.hash "$2b$" "\e$2[abxy]\e$[0-9]{2}\e$[./A-Za-z0-9]{53}" 72 8 "" 184 128 "2**4 to 2**99 (current implementations are limited to 2**31 iterations)"
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
With
|
||||
.BR bcrypt ,
|
||||
the
|
||||
.I count
|
||||
passed to
|
||||
.crypt_gensalt and
|
||||
is the base-2 logarithm of the actual iteration count.
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
.B bcrypt
|
||||
hashes used the "$2a$" prefix since 1997.
|
||||
However, in 2011 an implementation bug was discovered in crypt_blowfish
|
||||
(versions up to 1.0.4 inclusive) affecting handling of password characters with
|
||||
the 8th bit set.
|
||||
Besides fixing the bug,
|
||||
to provide for upgrade strategies for existing systems, two new prefixes were
|
||||
introduced: "$2x$", which fully re-introduces the bug, and "$2y$", which
|
||||
guarantees correct handling of both 7- and 8-bit characters.
|
||||
OpenBSD 5.5 introduced the "$2b$" prefix for behavior that exactly matches
|
||||
crypt_blowfish's "$2y$", and current crypt_blowfish supports it as well.
|
||||
Unfortunately, the behavior of "$2a$" on password characters with the 8th bit
|
||||
set has to be considered system-specific.
|
||||
When generating new password hashes, the "$2b$" or "$2y$" prefix should be used.
|
||||
(If such hashes ever need to be migrated to a system that does not yet support
|
||||
these new prefixes, the prefix in migrated copies of the already-generated
|
||||
hashes may be changed to "$2a$".)
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
.crypt_gensalt and
|
||||
support the "$2b$", "$2y$", and "$2a$" prefixes (the latter for legacy programs
|
||||
or configurations), but not "$2x$" (which must not be used for new hashes).
|
||||
.crypt and
|
||||
support all four of these prefixes.
|
||||
.SH PORTABILITY NOTES
|
||||
Programs using any of these functions on a glibc 2.x system must be
|
||||
linked against
|
||||
.BR libcrypt .
|
||||
However, many Unix-like operating systems and older versions of the
|
||||
GNU C Library include the
|
||||
.BR crypt " function in " libc .
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
The
|
||||
.BR crypt_r ,
|
||||
.BR crypt_rn ,
|
||||
.BR crypt_ra ,
|
||||
.crypt_gensalt and
|
||||
functions are very non-portable.
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
The set of supported hashing methods is implementation-dependent.
|
||||
.SH CONFORMING TO
|
||||
The
|
||||
.B crypt
|
||||
function conforms to SVID, X/OPEN, and is available on BSD 4.3.
|
||||
The strings returned by
|
||||
.B crypt
|
||||
are not required to be portable among conformant systems.
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
.B crypt_r
|
||||
is a GNU extension.
|
||||
There's also a
|
||||
.B crypt_r
|
||||
function on HP-UX and MKS Toolkit, but the prototypes and semantics differ.
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
.B crypt_gensalt
|
||||
is an Openwall extension.
|
||||
There's also a
|
||||
.B crypt_gensalt
|
||||
function on Solaris 10 and newer, but the prototypes and semantics differ.
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
.BR crypt_rn ,
|
||||
.BR crypt_ra ,
|
||||
.BR crypt_gensalt_rn ,
|
||||
and
|
||||
.B crypt_gensalt_ra
|
||||
are Openwall extensions.
|
||||
.SH HISTORY
|
||||
A rotor-based
|
||||
.B crypt
|
||||
function appeared in Version 6 AT&T UNIX.
|
||||
The "traditional"
|
||||
.B crypt
|
||||
first appeared in Version 7 AT&T UNIX.
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
The
|
||||
.B crypt_r
|
||||
function was introduced during glibc 2.0 development.
|
||||
.SH BUGS
|
||||
The return values of
|
||||
.BR crypt " and " crypt_gensalt
|
||||
point to static buffers that are overwritten by subsequent calls.
|
||||
These functions are not thread-safe.
|
||||
.RB ( crypt
|
||||
on recent versions of Solaris uses thread-specific data and actually is
|
||||
thread-safe.)
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
The strings returned by certain other implementations of
|
||||
.B crypt
|
||||
on error may be stored in read-only locations or only initialized once,
|
||||
which makes it unsafe to always attempt to zero out the buffer normally
|
||||
pointed to by the
|
||||
.B crypt
|
||||
return value as it would otherwise be preferable for security reasons.
|
||||
The problem could be avoided with the use of
|
||||
.BR crypt_r ,
|
||||
.BR crypt_rn ,
|
||||
or
|
||||
.B crypt_ra
|
||||
where the application has full control over output buffers of these functions
|
||||
(and often over some of their private data as well).
|
||||
Unfortunately, the functions aren't (yet?) available on platforms where
|
||||
.B crypt
|
||||
has this undesired property.
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
Applications using the thread-safe
|
||||
.B crypt_r
|
||||
need to allocate address space for the large (over 128 KB)
|
||||
.I struct crypt_data
|
||||
structure. Each thread needs a separate instance of the structure. The
|
||||
.B crypt_r
|
||||
interface makes it impossible to implement a hashing algorithm which
|
||||
would need to keep an even larger amount of private data, without breaking
|
||||
binary compatibility.
|
||||
.B crypt_ra
|
||||
allows for dynamically increasing the allocation size as required by the
|
||||
hashing algorithm that is actually used. Unfortunately,
|
||||
.B crypt_ra
|
||||
is even more non-portable than
|
||||
.BR crypt_r .
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
Multi-threaded applications or library functions which are meant to be
|
||||
thread-safe should use
|
||||
.BR crypt_gensalt_rn " or " crypt_gensalt_ra
|
||||
rather than
|
||||
.BR crypt_gensalt .
|
||||
.SH SEE ALSO
|
||||
.BR login (1),
|
||||
.BR passwd (1),
|
||||
.BR crypto (3),
|
||||
.BR encrypt (3),
|
||||
.BR free (3),
|
||||
.BR getpass (3),
|
||||
.BR getpwent (3),
|
||||
.BR malloc (3),
|
||||
.BR realloc (3),
|
||||
.BR shadow (3),
|
||||
.BR passwd (5),
|
||||
.BR shadow (5),
|
||||
.BR regex (7),
|
||||
.BR pam (8)
|
||||
.sp
|
||||
Niels Provos and David Mazieres. A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme.
|
||||
Proceedings of the 1999 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, June 1999.
|
||||
.br
|
||||
http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/provos.html
|
||||
.sp
|
||||
Robert Morris and Ken Thompson. Password Security: A Case History.
|
||||
Unix Seventh Edition Manual, Volume 2, April 1978.
|
||||
.br
|
||||
http://plan9.bell-labs.com/7thEdMan/vol2/password
|
||||
24
deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt.h
vendored
24
deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt.h
vendored
@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2002.
|
||||
* No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
|
||||
* domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
|
||||
* in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
|
||||
* general public under the following terms:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
||||
* modification, are permitted.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <gnu-crypt.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(_OW_SOURCE) || defined(__USE_OW)
|
||||
#define __SKIP_GNU
|
||||
#undef __SKIP_OW
|
||||
#include <ow-crypt.h>
|
||||
#undef __SKIP_GNU
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
907
deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.c
vendored
907
deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.c
vendored
@ -1,907 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The crypt_blowfish homepage is:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* http://www.openwall.com/crypt/
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This code comes from John the Ripper password cracker, with reentrant
|
||||
* and crypt(3) interfaces added, but optimizations specific to password
|
||||
* cracking removed.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 1998-2014.
|
||||
* No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
|
||||
* domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
|
||||
* in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 1998-2014 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
|
||||
* general public under the following terms:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
||||
* modification, are permitted.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* It is my intent that you should be able to use this on your system,
|
||||
* as part of a software package, or anywhere else to improve security,
|
||||
* ensure compatibility, or for any other purpose. I would appreciate
|
||||
* it if you give credit where it is due and keep your modifications in
|
||||
* the public domain as well, but I don't require that in order to let
|
||||
* you place this code and any modifications you make under a license
|
||||
* of your choice.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This implementation is fully compatible with OpenBSD's bcrypt.c for prefix
|
||||
* "$2b$", originally by Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>, and it uses
|
||||
* some of his ideas. The password hashing algorithm was designed by David
|
||||
* Mazieres <dm at lcs.mit.edu>. For information on the level of
|
||||
* compatibility for bcrypt hash prefixes other than "$2b$", please refer to
|
||||
* the comments in BF_set_key() below and to the included crypt(3) man page.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* There's a paper on the algorithm that explains its design decisions:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/provos.html
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Some of the tricks in BF_ROUND might be inspired by Eric Young's
|
||||
* Blowfish library (I can't be sure if I would think of something if I
|
||||
* hadn't seen his code).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <errno.h>
|
||||
#ifndef __set_errno
|
||||
#define __set_errno(val) errno = (val)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* Just to make sure the prototypes match the actual definitions */
|
||||
#include "crypt_blowfish.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef __i386__
|
||||
#define BF_ASM 1
|
||||
#define BF_SCALE 1
|
||||
#elif defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__alpha__) || defined(__hppa__)
|
||||
#define BF_ASM 0
|
||||
#define BF_SCALE 1
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#define BF_ASM 0
|
||||
#define BF_SCALE 0
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
typedef unsigned int BF_word;
|
||||
typedef signed int BF_word_signed;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Number of Blowfish rounds, this is also hardcoded into a few places */
|
||||
#define BF_N 16
|
||||
|
||||
typedef BF_word BF_key[BF_N + 2];
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct {
|
||||
BF_word S[4][0x100];
|
||||
BF_key P;
|
||||
} BF_ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Magic IV for 64 Blowfish encryptions that we do at the end.
|
||||
* The string is "OrpheanBeholderScryDoubt" on big-endian.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static BF_word BF_magic_w[6] = {
|
||||
0x4F727068, 0x65616E42, 0x65686F6C,
|
||||
0x64657253, 0x63727944, 0x6F756274
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* P-box and S-box tables initialized with digits of Pi.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static BF_ctx BF_init_state = {
|
||||
{
|
||||
{
|
||||
0xd1310ba6, 0x98dfb5ac, 0x2ffd72db, 0xd01adfb7,
|
||||
0xb8e1afed, 0x6a267e96, 0xba7c9045, 0xf12c7f99,
|
||||
0x24a19947, 0xb3916cf7, 0x0801f2e2, 0x858efc16,
|
||||
0x636920d8, 0x71574e69, 0xa458fea3, 0xf4933d7e,
|
||||
0x0d95748f, 0x728eb658, 0x718bcd58, 0x82154aee,
|
||||
0x7b54a41d, 0xc25a59b5, 0x9c30d539, 0x2af26013,
|
||||
0xc5d1b023, 0x286085f0, 0xca417918, 0xb8db38ef,
|
||||
0x8e79dcb0, 0x603a180e, 0x6c9e0e8b, 0xb01e8a3e,
|
||||
0xd71577c1, 0xbd314b27, 0x78af2fda, 0x55605c60,
|
||||
0xe65525f3, 0xaa55ab94, 0x57489862, 0x63e81440,
|
||||
0x55ca396a, 0x2aab10b6, 0xb4cc5c34, 0x1141e8ce,
|
||||
0xa15486af, 0x7c72e993, 0xb3ee1411, 0x636fbc2a,
|
||||
0x2ba9c55d, 0x741831f6, 0xce5c3e16, 0x9b87931e,
|
||||
0xafd6ba33, 0x6c24cf5c, 0x7a325381, 0x28958677,
|
||||
0x3b8f4898, 0x6b4bb9af, 0xc4bfe81b, 0x66282193,
|
||||
0x61d809cc, 0xfb21a991, 0x487cac60, 0x5dec8032,
|
||||
0xef845d5d, 0xe98575b1, 0xdc262302, 0xeb651b88,
|
||||
0x23893e81, 0xd396acc5, 0x0f6d6ff3, 0x83f44239,
|
||||
0x2e0b4482, 0xa4842004, 0x69c8f04a, 0x9e1f9b5e,
|
||||
0x21c66842, 0xf6e96c9a, 0x670c9c61, 0xabd388f0,
|
||||
0x6a51a0d2, 0xd8542f68, 0x960fa728, 0xab5133a3,
|
||||
0x6eef0b6c, 0x137a3be4, 0xba3bf050, 0x7efb2a98,
|
||||
0xa1f1651d, 0x39af0176, 0x66ca593e, 0x82430e88,
|
||||
0x8cee8619, 0x456f9fb4, 0x7d84a5c3, 0x3b8b5ebe,
|
||||
0xe06f75d8, 0x85c12073, 0x401a449f, 0x56c16aa6,
|
||||
0x4ed3aa62, 0x363f7706, 0x1bfedf72, 0x429b023d,
|
||||
0x37d0d724, 0xd00a1248, 0xdb0fead3, 0x49f1c09b,
|
||||
0x075372c9, 0x80991b7b, 0x25d479d8, 0xf6e8def7,
|
||||
0xe3fe501a, 0xb6794c3b, 0x976ce0bd, 0x04c006ba,
|
||||
0xc1a94fb6, 0x409f60c4, 0x5e5c9ec2, 0x196a2463,
|
||||
0x68fb6faf, 0x3e6c53b5, 0x1339b2eb, 0x3b52ec6f,
|
||||
0x6dfc511f, 0x9b30952c, 0xcc814544, 0xaf5ebd09,
|
||||
0xbee3d004, 0xde334afd, 0x660f2807, 0x192e4bb3,
|
||||
0xc0cba857, 0x45c8740f, 0xd20b5f39, 0xb9d3fbdb,
|
||||
0x5579c0bd, 0x1a60320a, 0xd6a100c6, 0x402c7279,
|
||||
0x679f25fe, 0xfb1fa3cc, 0x8ea5e9f8, 0xdb3222f8,
|
||||
0x3c7516df, 0xfd616b15, 0x2f501ec8, 0xad0552ab,
|
||||
0x323db5fa, 0xfd238760, 0x53317b48, 0x3e00df82,
|
||||
0x9e5c57bb, 0xca6f8ca0, 0x1a87562e, 0xdf1769db,
|
||||
0xd542a8f6, 0x287effc3, 0xac6732c6, 0x8c4f5573,
|
||||
0x695b27b0, 0xbbca58c8, 0xe1ffa35d, 0xb8f011a0,
|
||||
0x10fa3d98, 0xfd2183b8, 0x4afcb56c, 0x2dd1d35b,
|
||||
0x9a53e479, 0xb6f84565, 0xd28e49bc, 0x4bfb9790,
|
||||
0xe1ddf2da, 0xa4cb7e33, 0x62fb1341, 0xcee4c6e8,
|
||||
0xef20cada, 0x36774c01, 0xd07e9efe, 0x2bf11fb4,
|
||||
0x95dbda4d, 0xae909198, 0xeaad8e71, 0x6b93d5a0,
|
||||
0xd08ed1d0, 0xafc725e0, 0x8e3c5b2f, 0x8e7594b7,
|
||||
0x8ff6e2fb, 0xf2122b64, 0x8888b812, 0x900df01c,
|
||||
0x4fad5ea0, 0x688fc31c, 0xd1cff191, 0xb3a8c1ad,
|
||||
0x2f2f2218, 0xbe0e1777, 0xea752dfe, 0x8b021fa1,
|
||||
0xe5a0cc0f, 0xb56f74e8, 0x18acf3d6, 0xce89e299,
|
||||
0xb4a84fe0, 0xfd13e0b7, 0x7cc43b81, 0xd2ada8d9,
|
||||
0x165fa266, 0x80957705, 0x93cc7314, 0x211a1477,
|
||||
0xe6ad2065, 0x77b5fa86, 0xc75442f5, 0xfb9d35cf,
|
||||
0xebcdaf0c, 0x7b3e89a0, 0xd6411bd3, 0xae1e7e49,
|
||||
0x00250e2d, 0x2071b35e, 0x226800bb, 0x57b8e0af,
|
||||
0x2464369b, 0xf009b91e, 0x5563911d, 0x59dfa6aa,
|
||||
0x78c14389, 0xd95a537f, 0x207d5ba2, 0x02e5b9c5,
|
||||
0x83260376, 0x6295cfa9, 0x11c81968, 0x4e734a41,
|
||||
0xb3472dca, 0x7b14a94a, 0x1b510052, 0x9a532915,
|
||||
0xd60f573f, 0xbc9bc6e4, 0x2b60a476, 0x81e67400,
|
||||
0x08ba6fb5, 0x571be91f, 0xf296ec6b, 0x2a0dd915,
|
||||
0xb6636521, 0xe7b9f9b6, 0xff34052e, 0xc5855664,
|
||||
0x53b02d5d, 0xa99f8fa1, 0x08ba4799, 0x6e85076a
|
||||
}, {
|
||||
0x4b7a70e9, 0xb5b32944, 0xdb75092e, 0xc4192623,
|
||||
0xad6ea6b0, 0x49a7df7d, 0x9cee60b8, 0x8fedb266,
|
||||
0xecaa8c71, 0x699a17ff, 0x5664526c, 0xc2b19ee1,
|
||||
0x193602a5, 0x75094c29, 0xa0591340, 0xe4183a3e,
|
||||
0x3f54989a, 0x5b429d65, 0x6b8fe4d6, 0x99f73fd6,
|
||||
0xa1d29c07, 0xefe830f5, 0x4d2d38e6, 0xf0255dc1,
|
||||
0x4cdd2086, 0x8470eb26, 0x6382e9c6, 0x021ecc5e,
|
||||
0x09686b3f, 0x3ebaefc9, 0x3c971814, 0x6b6a70a1,
|
||||
0x687f3584, 0x52a0e286, 0xb79c5305, 0xaa500737,
|
||||
0x3e07841c, 0x7fdeae5c, 0x8e7d44ec, 0x5716f2b8,
|
||||
0xb03ada37, 0xf0500c0d, 0xf01c1f04, 0x0200b3ff,
|
||||
0xae0cf51a, 0x3cb574b2, 0x25837a58, 0xdc0921bd,
|
||||
0xd19113f9, 0x7ca92ff6, 0x94324773, 0x22f54701,
|
||||
0x3ae5e581, 0x37c2dadc, 0xc8b57634, 0x9af3dda7,
|
||||
0xa9446146, 0x0fd0030e, 0xecc8c73e, 0xa4751e41,
|
||||
0xe238cd99, 0x3bea0e2f, 0x3280bba1, 0x183eb331,
|
||||
0x4e548b38, 0x4f6db908, 0x6f420d03, 0xf60a04bf,
|
||||
0x2cb81290, 0x24977c79, 0x5679b072, 0xbcaf89af,
|
||||
0xde9a771f, 0xd9930810, 0xb38bae12, 0xdccf3f2e,
|
||||
0x5512721f, 0x2e6b7124, 0x501adde6, 0x9f84cd87,
|
||||
0x7a584718, 0x7408da17, 0xbc9f9abc, 0xe94b7d8c,
|
||||
0xec7aec3a, 0xdb851dfa, 0x63094366, 0xc464c3d2,
|
||||
0xef1c1847, 0x3215d908, 0xdd433b37, 0x24c2ba16,
|
||||
0x12a14d43, 0x2a65c451, 0x50940002, 0x133ae4dd,
|
||||
0x71dff89e, 0x10314e55, 0x81ac77d6, 0x5f11199b,
|
||||
0x043556f1, 0xd7a3c76b, 0x3c11183b, 0x5924a509,
|
||||
0xf28fe6ed, 0x97f1fbfa, 0x9ebabf2c, 0x1e153c6e,
|
||||
0x86e34570, 0xeae96fb1, 0x860e5e0a, 0x5a3e2ab3,
|
||||
0x771fe71c, 0x4e3d06fa, 0x2965dcb9, 0x99e71d0f,
|
||||
0x803e89d6, 0x5266c825, 0x2e4cc978, 0x9c10b36a,
|
||||
0xc6150eba, 0x94e2ea78, 0xa5fc3c53, 0x1e0a2df4,
|
||||
0xf2f74ea7, 0x361d2b3d, 0x1939260f, 0x19c27960,
|
||||
0x5223a708, 0xf71312b6, 0xebadfe6e, 0xeac31f66,
|
||||
0xe3bc4595, 0xa67bc883, 0xb17f37d1, 0x018cff28,
|
||||
0xc332ddef, 0xbe6c5aa5, 0x65582185, 0x68ab9802,
|
||||
0xeecea50f, 0xdb2f953b, 0x2aef7dad, 0x5b6e2f84,
|
||||
0x1521b628, 0x29076170, 0xecdd4775, 0x619f1510,
|
||||
0x13cca830, 0xeb61bd96, 0x0334fe1e, 0xaa0363cf,
|
||||
0xb5735c90, 0x4c70a239, 0xd59e9e0b, 0xcbaade14,
|
||||
0xeecc86bc, 0x60622ca7, 0x9cab5cab, 0xb2f3846e,
|
||||
0x648b1eaf, 0x19bdf0ca, 0xa02369b9, 0x655abb50,
|
||||
0x40685a32, 0x3c2ab4b3, 0x319ee9d5, 0xc021b8f7,
|
||||
0x9b540b19, 0x875fa099, 0x95f7997e, 0x623d7da8,
|
||||
0xf837889a, 0x97e32d77, 0x11ed935f, 0x16681281,
|
||||
0x0e358829, 0xc7e61fd6, 0x96dedfa1, 0x7858ba99,
|
||||
0x57f584a5, 0x1b227263, 0x9b83c3ff, 0x1ac24696,
|
||||
0xcdb30aeb, 0x532e3054, 0x8fd948e4, 0x6dbc3128,
|
||||
0x58ebf2ef, 0x34c6ffea, 0xfe28ed61, 0xee7c3c73,
|
||||
0x5d4a14d9, 0xe864b7e3, 0x42105d14, 0x203e13e0,
|
||||
0x45eee2b6, 0xa3aaabea, 0xdb6c4f15, 0xfacb4fd0,
|
||||
0xc742f442, 0xef6abbb5, 0x654f3b1d, 0x41cd2105,
|
||||
0xd81e799e, 0x86854dc7, 0xe44b476a, 0x3d816250,
|
||||
0xcf62a1f2, 0x5b8d2646, 0xfc8883a0, 0xc1c7b6a3,
|
||||
0x7f1524c3, 0x69cb7492, 0x47848a0b, 0x5692b285,
|
||||
0x095bbf00, 0xad19489d, 0x1462b174, 0x23820e00,
|
||||
0x58428d2a, 0x0c55f5ea, 0x1dadf43e, 0x233f7061,
|
||||
0x3372f092, 0x8d937e41, 0xd65fecf1, 0x6c223bdb,
|
||||
0x7cde3759, 0xcbee7460, 0x4085f2a7, 0xce77326e,
|
||||
0xa6078084, 0x19f8509e, 0xe8efd855, 0x61d99735,
|
||||
0xa969a7aa, 0xc50c06c2, 0x5a04abfc, 0x800bcadc,
|
||||
0x9e447a2e, 0xc3453484, 0xfdd56705, 0x0e1e9ec9,
|
||||
0xdb73dbd3, 0x105588cd, 0x675fda79, 0xe3674340,
|
||||
0xc5c43465, 0x713e38d8, 0x3d28f89e, 0xf16dff20,
|
||||
0x153e21e7, 0x8fb03d4a, 0xe6e39f2b, 0xdb83adf7
|
||||
}, {
|
||||
0xe93d5a68, 0x948140f7, 0xf64c261c, 0x94692934,
|
||||
0x411520f7, 0x7602d4f7, 0xbcf46b2e, 0xd4a20068,
|
||||
0xd4082471, 0x3320f46a, 0x43b7d4b7, 0x500061af,
|
||||
0x1e39f62e, 0x97244546, 0x14214f74, 0xbf8b8840,
|
||||
0x4d95fc1d, 0x96b591af, 0x70f4ddd3, 0x66a02f45,
|
||||
0xbfbc09ec, 0x03bd9785, 0x7fac6dd0, 0x31cb8504,
|
||||
0x96eb27b3, 0x55fd3941, 0xda2547e6, 0xabca0a9a,
|
||||
0x28507825, 0x530429f4, 0x0a2c86da, 0xe9b66dfb,
|
||||
0x68dc1462, 0xd7486900, 0x680ec0a4, 0x27a18dee,
|
||||
0x4f3ffea2, 0xe887ad8c, 0xb58ce006, 0x7af4d6b6,
|
||||
0xaace1e7c, 0xd3375fec, 0xce78a399, 0x406b2a42,
|
||||
0x20fe9e35, 0xd9f385b9, 0xee39d7ab, 0x3b124e8b,
|
||||
0x1dc9faf7, 0x4b6d1856, 0x26a36631, 0xeae397b2,
|
||||
0x3a6efa74, 0xdd5b4332, 0x6841e7f7, 0xca7820fb,
|
||||
0xfb0af54e, 0xd8feb397, 0x454056ac, 0xba489527,
|
||||
0x55533a3a, 0x20838d87, 0xfe6ba9b7, 0xd096954b,
|
||||
0x55a867bc, 0xa1159a58, 0xcca92963, 0x99e1db33,
|
||||
0xa62a4a56, 0x3f3125f9, 0x5ef47e1c, 0x9029317c,
|
||||
0xfdf8e802, 0x04272f70, 0x80bb155c, 0x05282ce3,
|
||||
0x95c11548, 0xe4c66d22, 0x48c1133f, 0xc70f86dc,
|
||||
0x07f9c9ee, 0x41041f0f, 0x404779a4, 0x5d886e17,
|
||||
0x325f51eb, 0xd59bc0d1, 0xf2bcc18f, 0x41113564,
|
||||
0x257b7834, 0x602a9c60, 0xdff8e8a3, 0x1f636c1b,
|
||||
0x0e12b4c2, 0x02e1329e, 0xaf664fd1, 0xcad18115,
|
||||
0x6b2395e0, 0x333e92e1, 0x3b240b62, 0xeebeb922,
|
||||
0x85b2a20e, 0xe6ba0d99, 0xde720c8c, 0x2da2f728,
|
||||
0xd0127845, 0x95b794fd, 0x647d0862, 0xe7ccf5f0,
|
||||
0x5449a36f, 0x877d48fa, 0xc39dfd27, 0xf33e8d1e,
|
||||
0x0a476341, 0x992eff74, 0x3a6f6eab, 0xf4f8fd37,
|
||||
0xa812dc60, 0xa1ebddf8, 0x991be14c, 0xdb6e6b0d,
|
||||
0xc67b5510, 0x6d672c37, 0x2765d43b, 0xdcd0e804,
|
||||
0xf1290dc7, 0xcc00ffa3, 0xb5390f92, 0x690fed0b,
|
||||
0x667b9ffb, 0xcedb7d9c, 0xa091cf0b, 0xd9155ea3,
|
||||
0xbb132f88, 0x515bad24, 0x7b9479bf, 0x763bd6eb,
|
||||
0x37392eb3, 0xcc115979, 0x8026e297, 0xf42e312d,
|
||||
0x6842ada7, 0xc66a2b3b, 0x12754ccc, 0x782ef11c,
|
||||
0x6a124237, 0xb79251e7, 0x06a1bbe6, 0x4bfb6350,
|
||||
0x1a6b1018, 0x11caedfa, 0x3d25bdd8, 0xe2e1c3c9,
|
||||
0x44421659, 0x0a121386, 0xd90cec6e, 0xd5abea2a,
|
||||
0x64af674e, 0xda86a85f, 0xbebfe988, 0x64e4c3fe,
|
||||
0x9dbc8057, 0xf0f7c086, 0x60787bf8, 0x6003604d,
|
||||
0xd1fd8346, 0xf6381fb0, 0x7745ae04, 0xd736fccc,
|
||||
0x83426b33, 0xf01eab71, 0xb0804187, 0x3c005e5f,
|
||||
0x77a057be, 0xbde8ae24, 0x55464299, 0xbf582e61,
|
||||
0x4e58f48f, 0xf2ddfda2, 0xf474ef38, 0x8789bdc2,
|
||||
0x5366f9c3, 0xc8b38e74, 0xb475f255, 0x46fcd9b9,
|
||||
0x7aeb2661, 0x8b1ddf84, 0x846a0e79, 0x915f95e2,
|
||||
0x466e598e, 0x20b45770, 0x8cd55591, 0xc902de4c,
|
||||
0xb90bace1, 0xbb8205d0, 0x11a86248, 0x7574a99e,
|
||||
0xb77f19b6, 0xe0a9dc09, 0x662d09a1, 0xc4324633,
|
||||
0xe85a1f02, 0x09f0be8c, 0x4a99a025, 0x1d6efe10,
|
||||
0x1ab93d1d, 0x0ba5a4df, 0xa186f20f, 0x2868f169,
|
||||
0xdcb7da83, 0x573906fe, 0xa1e2ce9b, 0x4fcd7f52,
|
||||
0x50115e01, 0xa70683fa, 0xa002b5c4, 0x0de6d027,
|
||||
0x9af88c27, 0x773f8641, 0xc3604c06, 0x61a806b5,
|
||||
0xf0177a28, 0xc0f586e0, 0x006058aa, 0x30dc7d62,
|
||||
0x11e69ed7, 0x2338ea63, 0x53c2dd94, 0xc2c21634,
|
||||
0xbbcbee56, 0x90bcb6de, 0xebfc7da1, 0xce591d76,
|
||||
0x6f05e409, 0x4b7c0188, 0x39720a3d, 0x7c927c24,
|
||||
0x86e3725f, 0x724d9db9, 0x1ac15bb4, 0xd39eb8fc,
|
||||
0xed545578, 0x08fca5b5, 0xd83d7cd3, 0x4dad0fc4,
|
||||
0x1e50ef5e, 0xb161e6f8, 0xa28514d9, 0x6c51133c,
|
||||
0x6fd5c7e7, 0x56e14ec4, 0x362abfce, 0xddc6c837,
|
||||
0xd79a3234, 0x92638212, 0x670efa8e, 0x406000e0
|
||||
}, {
|
||||
0x3a39ce37, 0xd3faf5cf, 0xabc27737, 0x5ac52d1b,
|
||||
0x5cb0679e, 0x4fa33742, 0xd3822740, 0x99bc9bbe,
|
||||
0xd5118e9d, 0xbf0f7315, 0xd62d1c7e, 0xc700c47b,
|
||||
0xb78c1b6b, 0x21a19045, 0xb26eb1be, 0x6a366eb4,
|
||||
0x5748ab2f, 0xbc946e79, 0xc6a376d2, 0x6549c2c8,
|
||||
0x530ff8ee, 0x468dde7d, 0xd5730a1d, 0x4cd04dc6,
|
||||
0x2939bbdb, 0xa9ba4650, 0xac9526e8, 0xbe5ee304,
|
||||
0xa1fad5f0, 0x6a2d519a, 0x63ef8ce2, 0x9a86ee22,
|
||||
0xc089c2b8, 0x43242ef6, 0xa51e03aa, 0x9cf2d0a4,
|
||||
0x83c061ba, 0x9be96a4d, 0x8fe51550, 0xba645bd6,
|
||||
0x2826a2f9, 0xa73a3ae1, 0x4ba99586, 0xef5562e9,
|
||||
0xc72fefd3, 0xf752f7da, 0x3f046f69, 0x77fa0a59,
|
||||
0x80e4a915, 0x87b08601, 0x9b09e6ad, 0x3b3ee593,
|
||||
0xe990fd5a, 0x9e34d797, 0x2cf0b7d9, 0x022b8b51,
|
||||
0x96d5ac3a, 0x017da67d, 0xd1cf3ed6, 0x7c7d2d28,
|
||||
0x1f9f25cf, 0xadf2b89b, 0x5ad6b472, 0x5a88f54c,
|
||||
0xe029ac71, 0xe019a5e6, 0x47b0acfd, 0xed93fa9b,
|
||||
0xe8d3c48d, 0x283b57cc, 0xf8d56629, 0x79132e28,
|
||||
0x785f0191, 0xed756055, 0xf7960e44, 0xe3d35e8c,
|
||||
0x15056dd4, 0x88f46dba, 0x03a16125, 0x0564f0bd,
|
||||
0xc3eb9e15, 0x3c9057a2, 0x97271aec, 0xa93a072a,
|
||||
0x1b3f6d9b, 0x1e6321f5, 0xf59c66fb, 0x26dcf319,
|
||||
0x7533d928, 0xb155fdf5, 0x03563482, 0x8aba3cbb,
|
||||
0x28517711, 0xc20ad9f8, 0xabcc5167, 0xccad925f,
|
||||
0x4de81751, 0x3830dc8e, 0x379d5862, 0x9320f991,
|
||||
0xea7a90c2, 0xfb3e7bce, 0x5121ce64, 0x774fbe32,
|
||||
0xa8b6e37e, 0xc3293d46, 0x48de5369, 0x6413e680,
|
||||
0xa2ae0810, 0xdd6db224, 0x69852dfd, 0x09072166,
|
||||
0xb39a460a, 0x6445c0dd, 0x586cdecf, 0x1c20c8ae,
|
||||
0x5bbef7dd, 0x1b588d40, 0xccd2017f, 0x6bb4e3bb,
|
||||
0xdda26a7e, 0x3a59ff45, 0x3e350a44, 0xbcb4cdd5,
|
||||
0x72eacea8, 0xfa6484bb, 0x8d6612ae, 0xbf3c6f47,
|
||||
0xd29be463, 0x542f5d9e, 0xaec2771b, 0xf64e6370,
|
||||
0x740e0d8d, 0xe75b1357, 0xf8721671, 0xaf537d5d,
|
||||
0x4040cb08, 0x4eb4e2cc, 0x34d2466a, 0x0115af84,
|
||||
0xe1b00428, 0x95983a1d, 0x06b89fb4, 0xce6ea048,
|
||||
0x6f3f3b82, 0x3520ab82, 0x011a1d4b, 0x277227f8,
|
||||
0x611560b1, 0xe7933fdc, 0xbb3a792b, 0x344525bd,
|
||||
0xa08839e1, 0x51ce794b, 0x2f32c9b7, 0xa01fbac9,
|
||||
0xe01cc87e, 0xbcc7d1f6, 0xcf0111c3, 0xa1e8aac7,
|
||||
0x1a908749, 0xd44fbd9a, 0xd0dadecb, 0xd50ada38,
|
||||
0x0339c32a, 0xc6913667, 0x8df9317c, 0xe0b12b4f,
|
||||
0xf79e59b7, 0x43f5bb3a, 0xf2d519ff, 0x27d9459c,
|
||||
0xbf97222c, 0x15e6fc2a, 0x0f91fc71, 0x9b941525,
|
||||
0xfae59361, 0xceb69ceb, 0xc2a86459, 0x12baa8d1,
|
||||
0xb6c1075e, 0xe3056a0c, 0x10d25065, 0xcb03a442,
|
||||
0xe0ec6e0e, 0x1698db3b, 0x4c98a0be, 0x3278e964,
|
||||
0x9f1f9532, 0xe0d392df, 0xd3a0342b, 0x8971f21e,
|
||||
0x1b0a7441, 0x4ba3348c, 0xc5be7120, 0xc37632d8,
|
||||
0xdf359f8d, 0x9b992f2e, 0xe60b6f47, 0x0fe3f11d,
|
||||
0xe54cda54, 0x1edad891, 0xce6279cf, 0xcd3e7e6f,
|
||||
0x1618b166, 0xfd2c1d05, 0x848fd2c5, 0xf6fb2299,
|
||||
0xf523f357, 0xa6327623, 0x93a83531, 0x56cccd02,
|
||||
0xacf08162, 0x5a75ebb5, 0x6e163697, 0x88d273cc,
|
||||
0xde966292, 0x81b949d0, 0x4c50901b, 0x71c65614,
|
||||
0xe6c6c7bd, 0x327a140a, 0x45e1d006, 0xc3f27b9a,
|
||||
0xc9aa53fd, 0x62a80f00, 0xbb25bfe2, 0x35bdd2f6,
|
||||
0x71126905, 0xb2040222, 0xb6cbcf7c, 0xcd769c2b,
|
||||
0x53113ec0, 0x1640e3d3, 0x38abbd60, 0x2547adf0,
|
||||
0xba38209c, 0xf746ce76, 0x77afa1c5, 0x20756060,
|
||||
0x85cbfe4e, 0x8ae88dd8, 0x7aaaf9b0, 0x4cf9aa7e,
|
||||
0x1948c25c, 0x02fb8a8c, 0x01c36ae4, 0xd6ebe1f9,
|
||||
0x90d4f869, 0xa65cdea0, 0x3f09252d, 0xc208e69f,
|
||||
0xb74e6132, 0xce77e25b, 0x578fdfe3, 0x3ac372e6
|
||||
}
|
||||
}, {
|
||||
0x243f6a88, 0x85a308d3, 0x13198a2e, 0x03707344,
|
||||
0xa4093822, 0x299f31d0, 0x082efa98, 0xec4e6c89,
|
||||
0x452821e6, 0x38d01377, 0xbe5466cf, 0x34e90c6c,
|
||||
0xc0ac29b7, 0xc97c50dd, 0x3f84d5b5, 0xb5470917,
|
||||
0x9216d5d9, 0x8979fb1b
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static unsigned char BF_itoa64[64 + 1] =
|
||||
"./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789";
|
||||
|
||||
static unsigned char BF_atoi64[0x60] = {
|
||||
64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 0, 1,
|
||||
54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64,
|
||||
64, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
|
||||
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64,
|
||||
64, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42,
|
||||
43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
#define BF_safe_atoi64(dst, src) \
|
||||
{ \
|
||||
tmp = (unsigned char)(src); \
|
||||
if ((unsigned int)(tmp -= 0x20) >= 0x60) return -1; \
|
||||
tmp = BF_atoi64[tmp]; \
|
||||
if (tmp > 63) return -1; \
|
||||
(dst) = tmp; \
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int BF_decode(BF_word *dst, const char *src, int size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned char *dptr = (unsigned char *)dst;
|
||||
unsigned char *end = dptr + size;
|
||||
const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *)src;
|
||||
unsigned int tmp, c1, c2, c3, c4;
|
||||
|
||||
do {
|
||||
BF_safe_atoi64(c1, *sptr++);
|
||||
BF_safe_atoi64(c2, *sptr++);
|
||||
*dptr++ = (c1 << 2) | ((c2 & 0x30) >> 4);
|
||||
if (dptr >= end) break;
|
||||
|
||||
BF_safe_atoi64(c3, *sptr++);
|
||||
*dptr++ = ((c2 & 0x0F) << 4) | ((c3 & 0x3C) >> 2);
|
||||
if (dptr >= end) break;
|
||||
|
||||
BF_safe_atoi64(c4, *sptr++);
|
||||
*dptr++ = ((c3 & 0x03) << 6) | c4;
|
||||
} while (dptr < end);
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void BF_encode(char *dst, const BF_word *src, int size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *)src;
|
||||
const unsigned char *end = sptr + size;
|
||||
unsigned char *dptr = (unsigned char *)dst;
|
||||
unsigned int c1, c2;
|
||||
|
||||
do {
|
||||
c1 = *sptr++;
|
||||
*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1 >> 2];
|
||||
c1 = (c1 & 0x03) << 4;
|
||||
if (sptr >= end) {
|
||||
*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1];
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c2 = *sptr++;
|
||||
c1 |= c2 >> 4;
|
||||
*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1];
|
||||
c1 = (c2 & 0x0f) << 2;
|
||||
if (sptr >= end) {
|
||||
*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1];
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c2 = *sptr++;
|
||||
c1 |= c2 >> 6;
|
||||
*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1];
|
||||
*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c2 & 0x3f];
|
||||
} while (sptr < end);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void BF_swap(BF_word *x, int count)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static int endianness_check = 1;
|
||||
char *is_little_endian = (char *)&endianness_check;
|
||||
BF_word tmp;
|
||||
|
||||
if (*is_little_endian)
|
||||
do {
|
||||
tmp = *x;
|
||||
tmp = (tmp << 16) | (tmp >> 16);
|
||||
*x++ = ((tmp & 0x00FF00FF) << 8) | ((tmp >> 8) & 0x00FF00FF);
|
||||
} while (--count);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if BF_SCALE
|
||||
/* Architectures which can shift addresses left by 2 bits with no extra cost */
|
||||
#define BF_ROUND(L, R, N) \
|
||||
tmp1 = L & 0xFF; \
|
||||
tmp2 = L >> 8; \
|
||||
tmp2 &= 0xFF; \
|
||||
tmp3 = L >> 16; \
|
||||
tmp3 &= 0xFF; \
|
||||
tmp4 = L >> 24; \
|
||||
tmp1 = data.ctx.S[3][tmp1]; \
|
||||
tmp2 = data.ctx.S[2][tmp2]; \
|
||||
tmp3 = data.ctx.S[1][tmp3]; \
|
||||
tmp3 += data.ctx.S[0][tmp4]; \
|
||||
tmp3 ^= tmp2; \
|
||||
R ^= data.ctx.P[N + 1]; \
|
||||
tmp3 += tmp1; \
|
||||
R ^= tmp3;
|
||||
#else
|
||||
/* Architectures with no complicated addressing modes supported */
|
||||
#define BF_INDEX(S, i) \
|
||||
(*((BF_word *)(((unsigned char *)S) + (i))))
|
||||
#define BF_ROUND(L, R, N) \
|
||||
tmp1 = L & 0xFF; \
|
||||
tmp1 <<= 2; \
|
||||
tmp2 = L >> 6; \
|
||||
tmp2 &= 0x3FC; \
|
||||
tmp3 = L >> 14; \
|
||||
tmp3 &= 0x3FC; \
|
||||
tmp4 = L >> 22; \
|
||||
tmp4 &= 0x3FC; \
|
||||
tmp1 = BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[3], tmp1); \
|
||||
tmp2 = BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[2], tmp2); \
|
||||
tmp3 = BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[1], tmp3); \
|
||||
tmp3 += BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[0], tmp4); \
|
||||
tmp3 ^= tmp2; \
|
||||
R ^= data.ctx.P[N + 1]; \
|
||||
tmp3 += tmp1; \
|
||||
R ^= tmp3;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Encrypt one block, BF_N is hardcoded here.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#define BF_ENCRYPT \
|
||||
L ^= data.ctx.P[0]; \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(L, R, 0); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(R, L, 1); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(L, R, 2); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(R, L, 3); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(L, R, 4); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(R, L, 5); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(L, R, 6); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(R, L, 7); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(L, R, 8); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(R, L, 9); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(L, R, 10); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(R, L, 11); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(L, R, 12); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(R, L, 13); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(L, R, 14); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(R, L, 15); \
|
||||
tmp4 = R; \
|
||||
R = L; \
|
||||
L = tmp4 ^ data.ctx.P[BF_N + 1];
|
||||
|
||||
#if BF_ASM
|
||||
#define BF_body() \
|
||||
_BF_body_r(&data.ctx);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#define BF_body() \
|
||||
L = R = 0; \
|
||||
ptr = data.ctx.P; \
|
||||
do { \
|
||||
ptr += 2; \
|
||||
BF_ENCRYPT; \
|
||||
*(ptr - 2) = L; \
|
||||
*(ptr - 1) = R; \
|
||||
} while (ptr < &data.ctx.P[BF_N + 2]); \
|
||||
\
|
||||
ptr = data.ctx.S[0]; \
|
||||
do { \
|
||||
ptr += 2; \
|
||||
BF_ENCRYPT; \
|
||||
*(ptr - 2) = L; \
|
||||
*(ptr - 1) = R; \
|
||||
} while (ptr < &data.ctx.S[3][0xFF]);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
static void BF_set_key(const char *key, BF_key expanded, BF_key initial,
|
||||
unsigned char flags)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const char *ptr = key;
|
||||
unsigned int bug, i, j;
|
||||
BF_word safety, sign, diff, tmp[2];
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* There was a sign extension bug in older revisions of this function. While
|
||||
* we would have liked to simply fix the bug and move on, we have to provide
|
||||
* a backwards compatibility feature (essentially the bug) for some systems and
|
||||
* a safety measure for some others. The latter is needed because for certain
|
||||
* multiple inputs to the buggy algorithm there exist easily found inputs to
|
||||
* the correct algorithm that produce the same hash. Thus, we optionally
|
||||
* deviate from the correct algorithm just enough to avoid such collisions.
|
||||
* While the bug itself affected the majority of passwords containing
|
||||
* characters with the 8th bit set (although only a percentage of those in a
|
||||
* collision-producing way), the anti-collision safety measure affects
|
||||
* only a subset of passwords containing the '\xff' character (not even all of
|
||||
* those passwords, just some of them). This character is not found in valid
|
||||
* UTF-8 sequences and is rarely used in popular 8-bit character encodings.
|
||||
* Thus, the safety measure is unlikely to cause much annoyance, and is a
|
||||
* reasonable tradeoff to use when authenticating against existing hashes that
|
||||
* are not reliably known to have been computed with the correct algorithm.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* We use an approach that tries to minimize side-channel leaks of password
|
||||
* information - that is, we mostly use fixed-cost bitwise operations instead
|
||||
* of branches or table lookups. (One conditional branch based on password
|
||||
* length remains. It is not part of the bug aftermath, though, and is
|
||||
* difficult and possibly unreasonable to avoid given the use of C strings by
|
||||
* the caller, which results in similar timing leaks anyway.)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* For actual implementation, we set an array index in the variable "bug"
|
||||
* (0 means no bug, 1 means sign extension bug emulation) and a flag in the
|
||||
* variable "safety" (bit 16 is set when the safety measure is requested).
|
||||
* Valid combinations of settings are:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Prefix "$2a$": bug = 0, safety = 0x10000
|
||||
* Prefix "$2b$": bug = 0, safety = 0
|
||||
* Prefix "$2x$": bug = 1, safety = 0
|
||||
* Prefix "$2y$": bug = 0, safety = 0
|
||||
*/
|
||||
bug = (unsigned int)flags & 1;
|
||||
safety = ((BF_word)flags & 2) << 15;
|
||||
|
||||
sign = diff = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i++) {
|
||||
tmp[0] = tmp[1] = 0;
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
|
||||
tmp[0] <<= 8;
|
||||
tmp[0] |= (unsigned char)*ptr; /* correct */
|
||||
tmp[1] <<= 8;
|
||||
tmp[1] |= (BF_word_signed)(signed char)*ptr; /* bug */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Sign extension in the first char has no effect - nothing to overwrite yet,
|
||||
* and those extra 24 bits will be fully shifted out of the 32-bit word. For
|
||||
* chars 2, 3, 4 in each four-char block, we set bit 7 of "sign" if sign
|
||||
* extension in tmp[1] occurs. Once this flag is set, it remains set.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (j)
|
||||
sign |= tmp[1] & 0x80;
|
||||
if (!*ptr)
|
||||
ptr = key;
|
||||
else
|
||||
ptr++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff |= tmp[0] ^ tmp[1]; /* Non-zero on any differences */
|
||||
|
||||
expanded[i] = tmp[bug];
|
||||
initial[i] = BF_init_state.P[i] ^ tmp[bug];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* At this point, "diff" is zero iff the correct and buggy algorithms produced
|
||||
* exactly the same result. If so and if "sign" is non-zero, which indicates
|
||||
* that there was a non-benign sign extension, this means that we have a
|
||||
* collision between the correctly computed hash for this password and a set of
|
||||
* passwords that could be supplied to the buggy algorithm. Our safety measure
|
||||
* is meant to protect from such many-buggy to one-correct collisions, by
|
||||
* deviating from the correct algorithm in such cases. Let's check for this.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
diff |= diff >> 16; /* still zero iff exact match */
|
||||
diff &= 0xffff; /* ditto */
|
||||
diff += 0xffff; /* bit 16 set iff "diff" was non-zero (on non-match) */
|
||||
sign <<= 9; /* move the non-benign sign extension flag to bit 16 */
|
||||
sign &= ~diff & safety; /* action needed? */
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If we have determined that we need to deviate from the correct algorithm,
|
||||
* flip bit 16 in initial expanded key. (The choice of 16 is arbitrary, but
|
||||
* let's stick to it now. It came out of the approach we used above, and it's
|
||||
* not any worse than any other choice we could make.)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* It is crucial that we don't do the same to the expanded key used in the main
|
||||
* Eksblowfish loop. By doing it to only one of these two, we deviate from a
|
||||
* state that could be directly specified by a password to the buggy algorithm
|
||||
* (and to the fully correct one as well, but that's a side-effect).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
initial[0] ^= sign;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const unsigned char flags_by_subtype[26] =
|
||||
{2, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
|
||||
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 4, 0};
|
||||
|
||||
static char *BF_crypt(const char *key, const char *setting,
|
||||
char *output, int size,
|
||||
BF_word min)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#if BF_ASM
|
||||
extern void _BF_body_r(BF_ctx *ctx);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
struct {
|
||||
BF_ctx ctx;
|
||||
BF_key expanded_key;
|
||||
union {
|
||||
BF_word salt[4];
|
||||
BF_word output[6];
|
||||
} binary;
|
||||
} data;
|
||||
BF_word L, R;
|
||||
BF_word tmp1, tmp2, tmp3, tmp4;
|
||||
BF_word *ptr;
|
||||
BF_word count;
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
|
||||
if (size < 7 + 22 + 31 + 1) {
|
||||
__set_errno(ERANGE);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (setting[0] != '$' ||
|
||||
setting[1] != '2' ||
|
||||
setting[2] < 'a' || setting[2] > 'z' ||
|
||||
!flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a'] ||
|
||||
setting[3] != '$' ||
|
||||
setting[4] < '0' || setting[4] > '3' ||
|
||||
setting[5] < '0' || setting[5] > '9' ||
|
||||
(setting[4] == '3' && setting[5] > '1') ||
|
||||
setting[6] != '$') {
|
||||
__set_errno(EINVAL);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
count = (BF_word)1 << ((setting[4] - '0') * 10 + (setting[5] - '0'));
|
||||
if (count < min || BF_decode(data.binary.salt, &setting[7], 16)) {
|
||||
__set_errno(EINVAL);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
BF_swap(data.binary.salt, 4);
|
||||
|
||||
BF_set_key(key, data.expanded_key, data.ctx.P,
|
||||
flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a']);
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(data.ctx.S, BF_init_state.S, sizeof(data.ctx.S));
|
||||
|
||||
L = R = 0;
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i += 2) {
|
||||
L ^= data.binary.salt[i & 2];
|
||||
R ^= data.binary.salt[(i & 2) + 1];
|
||||
BF_ENCRYPT;
|
||||
data.ctx.P[i] = L;
|
||||
data.ctx.P[i + 1] = R;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ptr = data.ctx.S[0];
|
||||
do {
|
||||
ptr += 4;
|
||||
L ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 2) & 3];
|
||||
R ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 3) & 3];
|
||||
BF_ENCRYPT;
|
||||
*(ptr - 4) = L;
|
||||
*(ptr - 3) = R;
|
||||
|
||||
L ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 4) & 3];
|
||||
R ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 5) & 3];
|
||||
BF_ENCRYPT;
|
||||
*(ptr - 2) = L;
|
||||
*(ptr - 1) = R;
|
||||
} while (ptr < &data.ctx.S[3][0xFF]);
|
||||
|
||||
do {
|
||||
int done;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i += 2) {
|
||||
data.ctx.P[i] ^= data.expanded_key[i];
|
||||
data.ctx.P[i + 1] ^= data.expanded_key[i + 1];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
done = 0;
|
||||
do {
|
||||
BF_body();
|
||||
if (done)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
done = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
tmp1 = data.binary.salt[0];
|
||||
tmp2 = data.binary.salt[1];
|
||||
tmp3 = data.binary.salt[2];
|
||||
tmp4 = data.binary.salt[3];
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < BF_N; i += 4) {
|
||||
data.ctx.P[i] ^= tmp1;
|
||||
data.ctx.P[i + 1] ^= tmp2;
|
||||
data.ctx.P[i + 2] ^= tmp3;
|
||||
data.ctx.P[i + 3] ^= tmp4;
|
||||
}
|
||||
data.ctx.P[16] ^= tmp1;
|
||||
data.ctx.P[17] ^= tmp2;
|
||||
} while (1);
|
||||
} while (--count);
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 6; i += 2) {
|
||||
L = BF_magic_w[i];
|
||||
R = BF_magic_w[i + 1];
|
||||
|
||||
count = 64;
|
||||
do {
|
||||
BF_ENCRYPT;
|
||||
} while (--count);
|
||||
|
||||
data.binary.output[i] = L;
|
||||
data.binary.output[i + 1] = R;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(output, setting, 7 + 22 - 1);
|
||||
output[7 + 22 - 1] = BF_itoa64[(int)
|
||||
BF_atoi64[(int)setting[7 + 22 - 1] - 0x20] & 0x30];
|
||||
|
||||
/* This has to be bug-compatible with the original implementation, so
|
||||
* only encode 23 of the 24 bytes. :-) */
|
||||
BF_swap(data.binary.output, 6);
|
||||
BF_encode(&output[7 + 22], data.binary.output, 23);
|
||||
output[7 + 22 + 31] = '\0';
|
||||
|
||||
return output;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int _crypt_output_magic(const char *setting, char *output, int size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (size < 3)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
output[0] = '*';
|
||||
output[1] = '0';
|
||||
output[2] = '\0';
|
||||
|
||||
if (setting[0] == '*' && setting[1] == '0')
|
||||
output[1] = '1';
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Please preserve the runtime self-test. It serves two purposes at once:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 1. We really can't afford the risk of producing incompatible hashes e.g.
|
||||
* when there's something like gcc bug 26587 again, whereas an application or
|
||||
* library integrating this code might not also integrate our external tests or
|
||||
* it might not run them after every build. Even if it does, the miscompile
|
||||
* might only occur on the production build, but not on a testing build (such
|
||||
* as because of different optimization settings). It is painful to recover
|
||||
* from incorrectly-computed hashes - merely fixing whatever broke is not
|
||||
* enough. Thus, a proactive measure like this self-test is needed.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 2. We don't want to leave sensitive data from our actual password hash
|
||||
* computation on the stack or in registers. Previous revisions of the code
|
||||
* would do explicit cleanups, but simply running the self-test after hash
|
||||
* computation is more reliable.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The performance cost of this quick self-test is around 0.6% at the "$2a$08"
|
||||
* setting.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
char *_crypt_blowfish_rn(const char *key, const char *setting,
|
||||
char *output, int size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const char *test_key = "8b \xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8";
|
||||
const char *test_setting = "$2a$00$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuu";
|
||||
static const char * const test_hashes[2] =
|
||||
{"i1D709vfamulimlGcq0qq3UvuUasvEa\0\x55", /* 'a', 'b', 'y' */
|
||||
"VUrPmXD6q/nVSSp7pNDhCR9071IfIRe\0\x55"}; /* 'x' */
|
||||
const char *test_hash = test_hashes[0];
|
||||
char *retval;
|
||||
const char *p;
|
||||
int save_errno, ok;
|
||||
struct {
|
||||
char s[7 + 22 + 1];
|
||||
char o[7 + 22 + 31 + 1 + 1 + 1];
|
||||
} buf;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Hash the supplied password */
|
||||
_crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size);
|
||||
retval = BF_crypt(key, setting, output, size, 16);
|
||||
save_errno = errno;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Do a quick self-test. It is important that we make both calls to BF_crypt()
|
||||
* from the same scope such that they likely use the same stack locations,
|
||||
* which makes the second call overwrite the first call's sensitive data on the
|
||||
* stack and makes it more likely that any alignment related issues would be
|
||||
* detected by the self-test.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
memcpy(buf.s, test_setting, sizeof(buf.s));
|
||||
if (retval) {
|
||||
unsigned int flags = flags_by_subtype[
|
||||
(unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a'];
|
||||
test_hash = test_hashes[flags & 1];
|
||||
buf.s[2] = setting[2];
|
||||
}
|
||||
memset(buf.o, 0x55, sizeof(buf.o));
|
||||
buf.o[sizeof(buf.o) - 1] = 0;
|
||||
p = BF_crypt(test_key, buf.s, buf.o, sizeof(buf.o) - (1 + 1), 1);
|
||||
|
||||
ok = (p == buf.o &&
|
||||
!memcmp(p, buf.s, 7 + 22) &&
|
||||
!memcmp(p + (7 + 22), test_hash, 31 + 1 + 1 + 1));
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
const char *k = "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345";
|
||||
BF_key ae, ai, ye, yi;
|
||||
BF_set_key(k, ae, ai, 2); /* $2a$ */
|
||||
BF_set_key(k, ye, yi, 4); /* $2y$ */
|
||||
ai[0] ^= 0x10000; /* undo the safety (for comparison) */
|
||||
ok = ok && ai[0] == 0xdb9c59bc && ye[17] == 0x33343500 &&
|
||||
!memcmp(ae, ye, sizeof(ae)) &&
|
||||
!memcmp(ai, yi, sizeof(ai));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
__set_errno(save_errno);
|
||||
if (ok)
|
||||
return retval;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Should not happen */
|
||||
_crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size);
|
||||
__set_errno(EINVAL); /* pretend we don't support this hash type */
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
char *_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
|
||||
const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (size < 16 || output_size < 7 + 22 + 1 ||
|
||||
(count && (count < 4 || count > 31)) ||
|
||||
prefix[0] != '$' || prefix[1] != '2' ||
|
||||
(prefix[2] != 'a' && prefix[2] != 'b' && prefix[2] != 'y')) {
|
||||
if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0';
|
||||
__set_errno((output_size < 7 + 22 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!count) count = 5;
|
||||
|
||||
output[0] = '$';
|
||||
output[1] = '2';
|
||||
output[2] = prefix[2];
|
||||
output[3] = '$';
|
||||
output[4] = '0' + count / 10;
|
||||
output[5] = '0' + count % 10;
|
||||
output[6] = '$';
|
||||
|
||||
BF_encode(&output[7], (const BF_word *)input, 16);
|
||||
output[7 + 22] = '\0';
|
||||
|
||||
return output;
|
||||
}
|
||||
27
deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.h
vendored
27
deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.h
vendored
@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011.
|
||||
* No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
|
||||
* domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
|
||||
* in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
|
||||
* general public under the following terms:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
||||
* modification, are permitted.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef _CRYPT_BLOWFISH_H
|
||||
#define _CRYPT_BLOWFISH_H
|
||||
|
||||
extern int _crypt_output_magic(const char *setting, char *output, int size);
|
||||
extern char *_crypt_blowfish_rn(const char *key, const char *setting,
|
||||
char *output, int size);
|
||||
extern char *_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(const char *prefix,
|
||||
unsigned long count,
|
||||
const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
|
||||
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
124
deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_gensalt.c
vendored
124
deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_gensalt.c
vendored
@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011.
|
||||
* No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
|
||||
* domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
|
||||
* in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
|
||||
* general public under the following terms:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
||||
* modification, are permitted.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This file contains salt generation functions for the traditional and
|
||||
* other common crypt(3) algorithms, except for bcrypt which is defined
|
||||
* entirely in crypt_blowfish.c.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <errno.h>
|
||||
#ifndef __set_errno
|
||||
#define __set_errno(val) errno = (val)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* Just to make sure the prototypes match the actual definitions */
|
||||
#include "crypt_gensalt.h"
|
||||
|
||||
unsigned char _crypt_itoa64[64 + 1] =
|
||||
"./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
|
||||
|
||||
char *_crypt_gensalt_traditional_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
|
||||
const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
(void) prefix;
|
||||
|
||||
if (size < 2 || output_size < 2 + 1 || (count && count != 25)) {
|
||||
if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0';
|
||||
__set_errno((output_size < 2 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
output[0] = _crypt_itoa64[(unsigned int)input[0] & 0x3f];
|
||||
output[1] = _crypt_itoa64[(unsigned int)input[1] & 0x3f];
|
||||
output[2] = '\0';
|
||||
|
||||
return output;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
char *_crypt_gensalt_extended_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
|
||||
const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned long value;
|
||||
|
||||
(void) prefix;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Even iteration counts make it easier to detect weak DES keys from a look
|
||||
* at the hash, so they should be avoided */
|
||||
if (size < 3 || output_size < 1 + 4 + 4 + 1 ||
|
||||
(count && (count > 0xffffff || !(count & 1)))) {
|
||||
if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0';
|
||||
__set_errno((output_size < 1 + 4 + 4 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!count) count = 725;
|
||||
|
||||
output[0] = '_';
|
||||
output[1] = _crypt_itoa64[count & 0x3f];
|
||||
output[2] = _crypt_itoa64[(count >> 6) & 0x3f];
|
||||
output[3] = _crypt_itoa64[(count >> 12) & 0x3f];
|
||||
output[4] = _crypt_itoa64[(count >> 18) & 0x3f];
|
||||
value = (unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[0] |
|
||||
((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[1] << 8) |
|
||||
((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[2] << 16);
|
||||
output[5] = _crypt_itoa64[value & 0x3f];
|
||||
output[6] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 6) & 0x3f];
|
||||
output[7] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 12) & 0x3f];
|
||||
output[8] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 18) & 0x3f];
|
||||
output[9] = '\0';
|
||||
|
||||
return output;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
char *_crypt_gensalt_md5_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
|
||||
const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned long value;
|
||||
|
||||
(void) prefix;
|
||||
|
||||
if (size < 3 || output_size < 3 + 4 + 1 || (count && count != 1000)) {
|
||||
if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0';
|
||||
__set_errno((output_size < 3 + 4 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
output[0] = '$';
|
||||
output[1] = '1';
|
||||
output[2] = '$';
|
||||
value = (unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[0] |
|
||||
((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[1] << 8) |
|
||||
((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[2] << 16);
|
||||
output[3] = _crypt_itoa64[value & 0x3f];
|
||||
output[4] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 6) & 0x3f];
|
||||
output[5] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 12) & 0x3f];
|
||||
output[6] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 18) & 0x3f];
|
||||
output[7] = '\0';
|
||||
|
||||
if (size >= 6 && output_size >= 3 + 4 + 4 + 1) {
|
||||
value = (unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[3] |
|
||||
((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[4] << 8) |
|
||||
((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[5] << 16);
|
||||
output[7] = _crypt_itoa64[value & 0x3f];
|
||||
output[8] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 6) & 0x3f];
|
||||
output[9] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 12) & 0x3f];
|
||||
output[10] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 18) & 0x3f];
|
||||
output[11] = '\0';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return output;
|
||||
}
|
||||
30
deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_gensalt.h
vendored
30
deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_gensalt.h
vendored
@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011.
|
||||
* No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
|
||||
* domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
|
||||
* in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
|
||||
* general public under the following terms:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
||||
* modification, are permitted.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef _CRYPT_GENSALT_H
|
||||
#define _CRYPT_GENSALT_H
|
||||
|
||||
extern unsigned char _crypt_itoa64[];
|
||||
extern char *_crypt_gensalt_traditional_rn(const char *prefix,
|
||||
unsigned long count,
|
||||
const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
|
||||
extern char *_crypt_gensalt_extended_rn(const char *prefix,
|
||||
unsigned long count,
|
||||
const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
|
||||
extern char *_crypt_gensalt_md5_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
|
||||
const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
|
||||
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
53
deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.1.3-crypt.diff
vendored
53
deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.1.3-crypt.diff
vendored
@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
|
||||
--- glibc-2.1.3.orig/crypt/sysdeps/unix/Makefile 1997-03-05 00:33:59 +0000
|
||||
+++ glibc-2.1.3/crypt/sysdeps/unix/Makefile 2000-06-11 03:13:41 +0000
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
ifeq ($(subdir),md5-crypt)
|
||||
-libcrypt-routines += crypt crypt_util
|
||||
-dont_distribute += crypt.c crypt_util.c
|
||||
+libcrypt-routines += crypt crypt_util crypt_blowfish x86 crypt_gensalt wrapper
|
||||
+dont_distribute += crypt.c crypt_util.c crypt_blowfish.c x86.S crypt_gensalt.c wrapper.c
|
||||
endif
|
||||
--- glibc-2.1.3.orig/crypt/sysdeps/unix/crypt-entry.c 1998-12-10 12:49:04 +0000
|
||||
+++ glibc-2.1.3/crypt/sysdeps/unix/crypt-entry.c 2000-06-11 03:14:57 +0000
|
||||
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ extern struct crypt_data _ufc_foobar;
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
char *
|
||||
-__crypt_r (key, salt, data)
|
||||
+__des_crypt_r (key, salt, data)
|
||||
const char *key;
|
||||
const char *salt;
|
||||
struct crypt_data * __restrict data;
|
||||
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ __crypt_r (key, salt, data)
|
||||
_ufc_output_conversion_r (res[0], res[1], salt, data);
|
||||
return data->crypt_3_buf;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#if 0
|
||||
weak_alias (__crypt_r, crypt_r)
|
||||
|
||||
char *
|
||||
@@ -147,3 +148,4 @@ __fcrypt (key, salt)
|
||||
return crypt (key, salt);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
--- glibc-2.1.3.orig/md5-crypt/Makefile 1998-07-02 22:46:47 +0000
|
||||
+++ glibc-2.1.3/md5-crypt/Makefile 2000-06-11 03:12:34 +0000
|
||||
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
|
||||
#
|
||||
subdir := md5-crypt
|
||||
|
||||
-headers := crypt.h
|
||||
+headers := crypt.h gnu-crypt.h ow-crypt.h
|
||||
|
||||
distribute := md5.h
|
||||
|
||||
--- glibc-2.1.3.orig/md5-crypt/Versions 1998-07-02 22:32:07 +0000
|
||||
+++ glibc-2.1.3/md5-crypt/Versions 2000-06-11 09:11:03 +0000
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
|
||||
libcrypt {
|
||||
GLIBC_2.0 {
|
||||
crypt; crypt_r; encrypt; encrypt_r; fcrypt; setkey; setkey_r;
|
||||
+ crypt_rn; crypt_ra; crypt_gensalt; crypt_gensalt_rn; crypt_gensalt_ra;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
55
deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.14-crypt.diff
vendored
55
deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.14-crypt.diff
vendored
@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -urp glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/Makefile glibc-2.14/crypt/Makefile
|
||||
--- glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/Makefile 2011-05-31 04:12:33 +0000
|
||||
+++ glibc-2.14/crypt/Makefile 2011-07-16 21:40:56 +0000
|
||||
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
|
||||
subdir := crypt
|
||||
|
||||
headers := crypt.h
|
||||
+headers += gnu-crypt.h ow-crypt.h
|
||||
|
||||
extra-libs := libcrypt
|
||||
extra-libs-others := $(extra-libs)
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +30,8 @@ extra-libs-others := $(extra-libs)
|
||||
libcrypt-routines := crypt-entry md5-crypt sha256-crypt sha512-crypt crypt \
|
||||
crypt_util
|
||||
|
||||
+libcrypt-routines += crypt_blowfish x86 crypt_gensalt wrapper
|
||||
+
|
||||
tests := cert md5c-test sha256c-test sha512c-test
|
||||
|
||||
distribute := ufc-crypt.h crypt-private.h ufc.c speeds.c README.ufc-crypt \
|
||||
diff -urp glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/Versions glibc-2.14/crypt/Versions
|
||||
--- glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/Versions 2011-05-31 04:12:33 +0000
|
||||
+++ glibc-2.14/crypt/Versions 2011-07-16 21:40:56 +0000
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
|
||||
libcrypt {
|
||||
GLIBC_2.0 {
|
||||
crypt; crypt_r; encrypt; encrypt_r; fcrypt; setkey; setkey_r;
|
||||
+ crypt_rn; crypt_ra; crypt_gensalt; crypt_gensalt_rn; crypt_gensalt_ra;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff -urp glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/crypt-entry.c glibc-2.14/crypt/crypt-entry.c
|
||||
--- glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/crypt-entry.c 2011-05-31 04:12:33 +0000
|
||||
+++ glibc-2.14/crypt/crypt-entry.c 2011-07-16 21:40:56 +0000
|
||||
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ extern struct crypt_data _ufc_foobar;
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
char *
|
||||
-__crypt_r (key, salt, data)
|
||||
+__des_crypt_r (key, salt, data)
|
||||
const char *key;
|
||||
const char *salt;
|
||||
struct crypt_data * __restrict data;
|
||||
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ __crypt_r (key, salt, data)
|
||||
_ufc_output_conversion_r (res[0], res[1], salt, data);
|
||||
return data->crypt_3_buf;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#if 0
|
||||
weak_alias (__crypt_r, crypt_r)
|
||||
|
||||
char *
|
||||
@@ -177,3 +178,4 @@ __fcrypt (key, salt)
|
||||
return crypt (key, salt);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
52
deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.3.6-crypt.diff
vendored
52
deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.3.6-crypt.diff
vendored
@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
|
||||
--- glibc-2.3.6.orig/crypt/Makefile 2001-07-06 04:54:45 +0000
|
||||
+++ glibc-2.3.6/crypt/Makefile 2004-02-27 00:23:48 +0000
|
||||
@@ -21,14 +21,14 @@
|
||||
#
|
||||
subdir := crypt
|
||||
|
||||
-headers := crypt.h
|
||||
+headers := crypt.h gnu-crypt.h ow-crypt.h
|
||||
|
||||
distribute := md5.h
|
||||
|
||||
extra-libs := libcrypt
|
||||
extra-libs-others := $(extra-libs)
|
||||
|
||||
-libcrypt-routines := crypt-entry md5-crypt md5 crypt crypt_util
|
||||
+libcrypt-routines := crypt-entry md5-crypt md5 crypt crypt_util crypt_blowfish x86 crypt_gensalt wrapper
|
||||
|
||||
tests = cert md5test md5c-test
|
||||
|
||||
--- glibc-2.3.6.orig/crypt/Versions 2000-03-04 00:47:30 +0000
|
||||
+++ glibc-2.3.6/crypt/Versions 2004-02-27 00:25:15 +0000
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
|
||||
libcrypt {
|
||||
GLIBC_2.0 {
|
||||
crypt; crypt_r; encrypt; encrypt_r; fcrypt; setkey; setkey_r;
|
||||
+ crypt_rn; crypt_ra; crypt_gensalt; crypt_gensalt_rn; crypt_gensalt_ra;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
--- glibc-2.3.6.orig/crypt/crypt-entry.c 2001-07-06 05:18:49 +0000
|
||||
+++ glibc-2.3.6/crypt/crypt-entry.c 2004-02-27 00:12:32 +0000
|
||||
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ extern struct crypt_data _ufc_foobar;
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
char *
|
||||
-__crypt_r (key, salt, data)
|
||||
+__des_crypt_r (key, salt, data)
|
||||
const char *key;
|
||||
const char *salt;
|
||||
struct crypt_data * __restrict data;
|
||||
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ __crypt_r (key, salt, data)
|
||||
_ufc_output_conversion_r (res[0], res[1], salt, data);
|
||||
return data->crypt_3_buf;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#if 0
|
||||
weak_alias (__crypt_r, crypt_r)
|
||||
|
||||
char *
|
||||
@@ -147,3 +148,4 @@ __fcrypt (key, salt)
|
||||
return crypt (key, salt);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
43
deps/crypt_blowfish/ow-crypt.h
vendored
43
deps/crypt_blowfish/ow-crypt.h
vendored
@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011.
|
||||
* No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
|
||||
* domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
|
||||
* in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
|
||||
* general public under the following terms:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
||||
* modification, are permitted.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef _OW_CRYPT_H
|
||||
#define _OW_CRYPT_H
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef __GNUC__
|
||||
#undef __const
|
||||
#define __const const
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef __SKIP_GNU
|
||||
extern char *crypt(__const char *key, __const char *setting);
|
||||
extern char *crypt_r(__const char *key, __const char *setting, void *data);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef __SKIP_OW
|
||||
extern char *crypt_rn(__const char *key, __const char *setting,
|
||||
void *data, int size);
|
||||
extern char *crypt_ra(__const char *key, __const char *setting,
|
||||
void **data, int *size);
|
||||
extern char *crypt_gensalt(__const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
|
||||
__const char *input, int size);
|
||||
extern char *crypt_gensalt_rn(__const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
|
||||
__const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
|
||||
extern char *crypt_gensalt_ra(__const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
|
||||
__const char *input, int size);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
551
deps/crypt_blowfish/wrapper.c
vendored
551
deps/crypt_blowfish/wrapper.c
vendored
@ -1,551 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2014.
|
||||
* No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
|
||||
* domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
|
||||
* in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2000-2014 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
|
||||
* general public under the following terms:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
||||
* modification, are permitted.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <errno.h>
|
||||
#ifndef __set_errno
|
||||
#define __set_errno(val) errno = (val)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef TEST
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include <unistd.h>
|
||||
#include <signal.h>
|
||||
#include <time.h>
|
||||
#include <sys/time.h>
|
||||
#include <sys/times.h>
|
||||
#ifdef TEST_THREADS
|
||||
#include <pthread.h>
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#define CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE (7 + 22 + 31 + 1)
|
||||
#define CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE (7 + 22 + 1)
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC)
|
||||
#define __SKIP_GNU
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#include "ow-crypt.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include "crypt_blowfish.h"
|
||||
#include "crypt_gensalt.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC)
|
||||
/* crypt.h from glibc-crypt-2.1 will define struct crypt_data for us */
|
||||
#include "crypt.h"
|
||||
extern char *__md5_crypt_r(const char *key, const char *salt,
|
||||
char *buffer, int buflen);
|
||||
/* crypt-entry.c needs to be patched to define __des_crypt_r rather than
|
||||
* __crypt_r, and not define crypt_r and crypt at all */
|
||||
extern char *__des_crypt_r(const char *key, const char *salt,
|
||||
struct crypt_data *data);
|
||||
extern struct crypt_data _ufc_foobar;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
static int _crypt_data_alloc(void **data, int *size, int need)
|
||||
{
|
||||
void *updated;
|
||||
|
||||
if (*data && *size >= need) return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
updated = realloc(*data, need);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!updated) {
|
||||
#ifndef __GLIBC__
|
||||
/* realloc(3) on glibc sets errno, so we don't need to bother */
|
||||
__set_errno(ENOMEM);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC)
|
||||
if (need >= sizeof(struct crypt_data))
|
||||
((struct crypt_data *)updated)->initialized = 0;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
*data = updated;
|
||||
*size = need;
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static char *_crypt_retval_magic(char *retval, const char *setting,
|
||||
char *output, int size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (retval)
|
||||
return retval;
|
||||
|
||||
if (_crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size))
|
||||
return NULL; /* shouldn't happen */
|
||||
|
||||
return output;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Applications may re-use the same instance of struct crypt_data without
|
||||
* resetting the initialized field in order to let crypt_r() skip some of
|
||||
* its initialization code. Thus, it is important that our multiple hashing
|
||||
* algorithms either don't conflict with each other in their use of the
|
||||
* data area or reset the initialized field themselves whenever required.
|
||||
* Currently, the hashing algorithms simply have no conflicts: the first
|
||||
* field of struct crypt_data is the 128-byte large DES key schedule which
|
||||
* __des_crypt_r() calculates each time it is called while the two other
|
||||
* hashing algorithms use less than 128 bytes of the data area.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
char *__crypt_rn(__const char *key, __const char *setting,
|
||||
void *data, int size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '2')
|
||||
return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)data, size);
|
||||
if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '1')
|
||||
return __md5_crypt_r(key, setting, (char *)data, size);
|
||||
if (setting[0] == '$' || setting[0] == '_') {
|
||||
__set_errno(EINVAL);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (size >= sizeof(struct crypt_data))
|
||||
return __des_crypt_r(key, setting, (struct crypt_data *)data);
|
||||
__set_errno(ERANGE);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
char *__crypt_ra(__const char *key, __const char *setting,
|
||||
void **data, int *size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '2') {
|
||||
if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE))
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)*data, *size);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '1') {
|
||||
if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE))
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
return __md5_crypt_r(key, setting, (char *)*data, *size);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (setting[0] == '$' || setting[0] == '_') {
|
||||
__set_errno(EINVAL);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, sizeof(struct crypt_data)))
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
return __des_crypt_r(key, setting, (struct crypt_data *)*data);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
char *__crypt_r(__const char *key, __const char *setting,
|
||||
struct crypt_data *data)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return _crypt_retval_magic(
|
||||
__crypt_rn(key, setting, data, sizeof(*data)),
|
||||
setting, (char *)data, sizeof(*data));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
char *__crypt(__const char *key, __const char *setting)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return _crypt_retval_magic(
|
||||
__crypt_rn(key, setting, &_ufc_foobar, sizeof(_ufc_foobar)),
|
||||
setting, (char *)&_ufc_foobar, sizeof(_ufc_foobar));
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
char *crypt_rn(const char *key, const char *setting, void *data, int size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)data, size);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
char *crypt_ra(const char *key, const char *setting,
|
||||
void **data, int *size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE))
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)*data, *size);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
char *crypt_r(const char *key, const char *setting, void *data)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return _crypt_retval_magic(
|
||||
crypt_rn(key, setting, data, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE),
|
||||
setting, (char *)data, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
char *crypt(const char *key, const char *setting)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static char output[CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE];
|
||||
|
||||
return _crypt_retval_magic(
|
||||
crypt_rn(key, setting, output, sizeof(output)),
|
||||
setting, output, sizeof(output));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define __crypt_gensalt_rn crypt_gensalt_rn
|
||||
#define __crypt_gensalt_ra crypt_gensalt_ra
|
||||
#define __crypt_gensalt crypt_gensalt
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
char *__crypt_gensalt_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
|
||||
const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
char *(*use)(const char *_prefix, unsigned long _count,
|
||||
const char *_input, int _size,
|
||||
char *_output, int _output_size);
|
||||
|
||||
/* This may be supported on some platforms in the future */
|
||||
if (!input) {
|
||||
__set_errno(EINVAL);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!strncmp(prefix, "$2a$", 4) || !strncmp(prefix, "$2b$", 4) ||
|
||||
!strncmp(prefix, "$2y$", 4))
|
||||
use = _crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn;
|
||||
else
|
||||
if (!strncmp(prefix, "$1$", 3))
|
||||
use = _crypt_gensalt_md5_rn;
|
||||
else
|
||||
if (prefix[0] == '_')
|
||||
use = _crypt_gensalt_extended_rn;
|
||||
else
|
||||
if (!prefix[0] ||
|
||||
(prefix[0] && prefix[1] &&
|
||||
memchr(_crypt_itoa64, prefix[0], 64) &&
|
||||
memchr(_crypt_itoa64, prefix[1], 64)))
|
||||
use = _crypt_gensalt_traditional_rn;
|
||||
else {
|
||||
__set_errno(EINVAL);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return use(prefix, count, input, size, output, output_size);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
char *__crypt_gensalt_ra(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
|
||||
const char *input, int size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
char output[CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE];
|
||||
char *retval;
|
||||
|
||||
retval = __crypt_gensalt_rn(prefix, count,
|
||||
input, size, output, sizeof(output));
|
||||
|
||||
if (retval) {
|
||||
retval = strdup(retval);
|
||||
#ifndef __GLIBC__
|
||||
/* strdup(3) on glibc sets errno, so we don't need to bother */
|
||||
if (!retval)
|
||||
__set_errno(ENOMEM);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return retval;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
char *__crypt_gensalt(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
|
||||
const char *input, int size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static char output[CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE];
|
||||
|
||||
return __crypt_gensalt_rn(prefix, count,
|
||||
input, size, output, sizeof(output));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC)
|
||||
weak_alias(__crypt_rn, crypt_rn)
|
||||
weak_alias(__crypt_ra, crypt_ra)
|
||||
weak_alias(__crypt_r, crypt_r)
|
||||
weak_alias(__crypt, crypt)
|
||||
weak_alias(__crypt_gensalt_rn, crypt_gensalt_rn)
|
||||
weak_alias(__crypt_gensalt_ra, crypt_gensalt_ra)
|
||||
weak_alias(__crypt_gensalt, crypt_gensalt)
|
||||
weak_alias(crypt, fcrypt)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef TEST
|
||||
static const char *tests[][3] = {
|
||||
{"$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.E5YPO9kmyuRGyh0XouQYb4YMJKvyOeW",
|
||||
"U*U"},
|
||||
{"$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.VGOzA784oUp/Z0DY336zx7pLYAy0lwK",
|
||||
"U*U*"},
|
||||
{"$2a$05$XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXOAcXxm9kjPGEMsLznoKqmqw7tc8WCx4a",
|
||||
"U*U*U"},
|
||||
{"$2a$05$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuu5s2v8.iXieOjg/.AySBTTZIIVFJeBui",
|
||||
"0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
|
||||
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
|
||||
"chars after 72 are ignored"},
|
||||
{"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e",
|
||||
"\xa3"},
|
||||
{"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e",
|
||||
"\xff\xff\xa3"},
|
||||
{"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e",
|
||||
"\xff\xff\xa3"},
|
||||
{"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nqd1wy.pTMdcvrRWxyiGL2eMz.2a85.",
|
||||
"\xff\xff\xa3"},
|
||||
{"$2b$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e",
|
||||
"\xff\xff\xa3"},
|
||||
{"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.Sa7shbm4.OzKpvFnX1pQLmQW96oUlCq",
|
||||
"\xa3"},
|
||||
{"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.Sa7shbm4.OzKpvFnX1pQLmQW96oUlCq",
|
||||
"\xa3"},
|
||||
{"$2b$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.Sa7shbm4.OzKpvFnX1pQLmQW96oUlCq",
|
||||
"\xa3"},
|
||||
{"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi",
|
||||
"1\xa3" "345"},
|
||||
{"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi",
|
||||
"\xff\xa3" "345"},
|
||||
{"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi",
|
||||
"\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"},
|
||||
{"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi",
|
||||
"\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"},
|
||||
{"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.ZC1JEJ8Z4gPfpe1JOr/oyPXTWl9EFd.",
|
||||
"\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"},
|
||||
{"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nRht2l/HRhr6zmCp9vYUvvsqynflf9e",
|
||||
"\xff\xa3" "345"},
|
||||
{"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nRht2l/HRhr6zmCp9vYUvvsqynflf9e",
|
||||
"\xff\xa3" "345"},
|
||||
{"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS",
|
||||
"\xa3" "ab"},
|
||||
{"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS",
|
||||
"\xa3" "ab"},
|
||||
{"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS",
|
||||
"\xa3" "ab"},
|
||||
{"$2x$05$6bNw2HLQYeqHYyBfLMsv/OiwqTymGIGzFsA4hOTWebfehXHNprcAS",
|
||||
"\xd1\x91"},
|
||||
{"$2x$05$6bNw2HLQYeqHYyBfLMsv/O9LIGgn8OMzuDoHfof8AQimSGfcSWxnS",
|
||||
"\xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8"},
|
||||
{"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.swQOIzjOiJ9GHEPuhEkvqrUyvWhEMx6",
|
||||
"\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
|
||||
"\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
|
||||
"\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
|
||||
"\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
|
||||
"\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
|
||||
"\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa"
|
||||
"chars after 72 are ignored as usual"},
|
||||
{"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.R9xrDjiycxMbQE2bp.vgqlYpW5wx2yy",
|
||||
"\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"
|
||||
"\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"
|
||||
"\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"
|
||||
"\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"
|
||||
"\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"
|
||||
"\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"},
|
||||
{"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.9tQZzcJfm3uj2NvJ/n5xkhpqLrMpWCe",
|
||||
"\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"
|
||||
"\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"
|
||||
"\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"
|
||||
"\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"
|
||||
"\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"
|
||||
"\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"},
|
||||
{"$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.7uG0VCzI2bS7j6ymqJi9CdcdxiRTWNy",
|
||||
""},
|
||||
{"*0", "", "$2a$03$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
|
||||
{"*0", "", "$2a$32$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
|
||||
{"*0", "", "$2c$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
|
||||
{"*0", "", "$2z$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
|
||||
{"*0", "", "$2`$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
|
||||
{"*0", "", "$2{$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."},
|
||||
{"*1", "", "*0"},
|
||||
{NULL}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
#define which tests[0]
|
||||
|
||||
static volatile sig_atomic_t running;
|
||||
|
||||
static void handle_timer(int signum)
|
||||
{
|
||||
(void) signum;
|
||||
running = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void *run(void *arg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned long count = 0;
|
||||
int i = 0;
|
||||
void *data = NULL;
|
||||
int size = 0x12345678;
|
||||
|
||||
do {
|
||||
const char *hash = tests[i][0];
|
||||
const char *key = tests[i][1];
|
||||
const char *setting = tests[i][2];
|
||||
|
||||
if (!tests[++i][0])
|
||||
i = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (setting && strlen(hash) < 30) /* not for benchmark */
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
|
||||
if (strcmp(crypt_ra(key, hash, &data, &size), hash)) {
|
||||
printf("%d: FAILED (crypt_ra/%d/%lu)\n",
|
||||
(int)((char *)arg - (char *)0), i, count);
|
||||
free(data);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
count++;
|
||||
} while (running);
|
||||
|
||||
free(data);
|
||||
return count + (char *)0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int main(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct itimerval it;
|
||||
struct tms buf;
|
||||
clock_t clk_tck, start_real, start_virtual, end_real, end_virtual;
|
||||
unsigned long count;
|
||||
void *data;
|
||||
int size;
|
||||
char *setting1, *setting2;
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
#ifdef TEST_THREADS
|
||||
pthread_t t[TEST_THREADS];
|
||||
void *t_retval;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
data = NULL;
|
||||
size = 0x12345678;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; tests[i][0]; i++) {
|
||||
const char *hash = tests[i][0];
|
||||
const char *key = tests[i][1];
|
||||
const char *setting = tests[i][2];
|
||||
const char *p;
|
||||
int ok = !setting || strlen(hash) >= 30;
|
||||
int o_size;
|
||||
char s_buf[30], o_buf[61];
|
||||
if (!setting) {
|
||||
memcpy(s_buf, hash, sizeof(s_buf) - 1);
|
||||
s_buf[sizeof(s_buf) - 1] = 0;
|
||||
setting = s_buf;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
__set_errno(0);
|
||||
p = crypt(key, setting);
|
||||
if ((!ok && !errno) || strcmp(p, hash)) {
|
||||
printf("FAILED (crypt/%d)\n", i);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (ok && strcmp(crypt(key, hash), hash)) {
|
||||
printf("FAILED (crypt/%d)\n", i);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (o_size = -1; o_size <= (int)sizeof(o_buf); o_size++) {
|
||||
int ok_n = ok && o_size == (int)sizeof(o_buf);
|
||||
const char *x = "abc";
|
||||
strcpy(o_buf, x);
|
||||
if (o_size >= 3) {
|
||||
x = "*0";
|
||||
if (setting[0] == '*' && setting[1] == '0')
|
||||
x = "*1";
|
||||
}
|
||||
__set_errno(0);
|
||||
p = crypt_rn(key, setting, o_buf, o_size);
|
||||
if ((ok_n && (!p || strcmp(p, hash))) ||
|
||||
(!ok_n && (!errno || p || strcmp(o_buf, x)))) {
|
||||
printf("FAILED (crypt_rn/%d)\n", i);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
__set_errno(0);
|
||||
p = crypt_ra(key, setting, &data, &size);
|
||||
if ((ok && (!p || strcmp(p, hash))) ||
|
||||
(!ok && (!errno || p || strcmp((char *)data, hash)))) {
|
||||
printf("FAILED (crypt_ra/%d)\n", i);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
setting1 = crypt_gensalt(which[0], 12, data, size);
|
||||
if (!setting1 || strncmp(setting1, "$2a$12$", 7)) {
|
||||
puts("FAILED (crypt_gensalt)\n");
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
setting2 = crypt_gensalt_ra(setting1, 12, data, size);
|
||||
if (strcmp(setting1, setting2)) {
|
||||
puts("FAILED (crypt_gensalt_ra/1)\n");
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
(*(char *)data)++;
|
||||
setting1 = crypt_gensalt_ra(setting2, 12, data, size);
|
||||
if (!strcmp(setting1, setting2)) {
|
||||
puts("FAILED (crypt_gensalt_ra/2)\n");
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
free(setting1);
|
||||
free(setting2);
|
||||
free(data);
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(_SC_CLK_TCK) || !defined(CLK_TCK)
|
||||
clk_tck = sysconf(_SC_CLK_TCK);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
clk_tck = CLK_TCK;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
running = 1;
|
||||
signal(SIGALRM, handle_timer);
|
||||
|
||||
memset(&it, 0, sizeof(it));
|
||||
it.it_value.tv_sec = 5;
|
||||
setitimer(ITIMER_REAL, &it, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
start_real = times(&buf);
|
||||
start_virtual = buf.tms_utime + buf.tms_stime;
|
||||
|
||||
count = (char *)run((char *)0) - (char *)0;
|
||||
|
||||
end_real = times(&buf);
|
||||
end_virtual = buf.tms_utime + buf.tms_stime;
|
||||
if (end_virtual == start_virtual) end_virtual++;
|
||||
|
||||
printf("%.1f c/s real, %.1f c/s virtual\n",
|
||||
(float)count * clk_tck / (end_real - start_real),
|
||||
(float)count * clk_tck / (end_virtual - start_virtual));
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef TEST_THREADS
|
||||
running = 1;
|
||||
it.it_value.tv_sec = 60;
|
||||
setitimer(ITIMER_REAL, &it, NULL);
|
||||
start_real = times(&buf);
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < TEST_THREADS; i++)
|
||||
if (pthread_create(&t[i], NULL, run, i + (char *)0)) {
|
||||
perror("pthread_create");
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < TEST_THREADS; i++) {
|
||||
if (pthread_join(t[i], &t_retval)) {
|
||||
perror("pthread_join");
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!t_retval) continue;
|
||||
count = (char *)t_retval - (char *)0;
|
||||
end_real = times(&buf);
|
||||
printf("%d: %.1f c/s real\n", i,
|
||||
(float)count * clk_tck / (end_real - start_real));
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
203
deps/crypt_blowfish/x86.S
vendored
203
deps/crypt_blowfish/x86.S
vendored
@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 1998-2010.
|
||||
* No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
|
||||
* domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
|
||||
* in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 1998-2010 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
|
||||
* general public under the following terms:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
||||
* modification, are permitted.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef __i386__
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__ELF__)
|
||||
#define UNDERSCORES
|
||||
#define ALIGN_LOG
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(__CYGWIN32__) || defined(__MINGW32__)
|
||||
#define UNDERSCORES
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef __DJGPP__
|
||||
#define UNDERSCORES
|
||||
#define ALIGN_LOG
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef UNDERSCORES
|
||||
#define _BF_body_r __BF_body_r
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef ALIGN_LOG
|
||||
#define DO_ALIGN(log) .align (log)
|
||||
#elif defined(DUMBAS)
|
||||
#define DO_ALIGN(log) .align 1 << log
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#define DO_ALIGN(log) .align (1 << (log))
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#define BF_FRAME 0x200
|
||||
#define ctx %esp
|
||||
|
||||
#define BF_ptr (ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
#define S(N, r) N+BF_FRAME(ctx,r,4)
|
||||
#ifdef DUMBAS
|
||||
#define P(N) 0x1000+N+N+N+N+BF_FRAME(ctx)
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#define P(N) 0x1000+4*N+BF_FRAME(ctx)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This version of the assembly code is optimized primarily for the original
|
||||
* Intel Pentium but is also careful to avoid partial register stalls on the
|
||||
* Pentium Pro family of processors (tested up to Pentium III Coppermine).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* It is possible to do 15% faster on the Pentium Pro family and probably on
|
||||
* many non-Intel x86 processors, but, unfortunately, that would make things
|
||||
* twice slower for the original Pentium.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* An additional 2% speedup may be achieved with non-reentrant code.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#define L %esi
|
||||
#define R %edi
|
||||
#define tmp1 %eax
|
||||
#define tmp1_lo %al
|
||||
#define tmp2 %ecx
|
||||
#define tmp2_hi %ch
|
||||
#define tmp3 %edx
|
||||
#define tmp3_lo %dl
|
||||
#define tmp4 %ebx
|
||||
#define tmp4_hi %bh
|
||||
#define tmp5 %ebp
|
||||
|
||||
.text
|
||||
|
||||
#define BF_ROUND(L, R, N) \
|
||||
xorl L,tmp2; \
|
||||
xorl tmp1,tmp1; \
|
||||
movl tmp2,L; \
|
||||
shrl $16,tmp2; \
|
||||
movl L,tmp4; \
|
||||
movb tmp2_hi,tmp1_lo; \
|
||||
andl $0xFF,tmp2; \
|
||||
movb tmp4_hi,tmp3_lo; \
|
||||
andl $0xFF,tmp4; \
|
||||
movl S(0,tmp1),tmp1; \
|
||||
movl S(0x400,tmp2),tmp5; \
|
||||
addl tmp5,tmp1; \
|
||||
movl S(0x800,tmp3),tmp5; \
|
||||
xorl tmp5,tmp1; \
|
||||
movl S(0xC00,tmp4),tmp5; \
|
||||
addl tmp1,tmp5; \
|
||||
movl 4+P(N),tmp2; \
|
||||
xorl tmp5,R
|
||||
|
||||
#define BF_ENCRYPT_START \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(L, R, 0); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(R, L, 1); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(L, R, 2); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(R, L, 3); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(L, R, 4); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(R, L, 5); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(L, R, 6); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(R, L, 7); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(L, R, 8); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(R, L, 9); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(L, R, 10); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(R, L, 11); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(L, R, 12); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(R, L, 13); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(L, R, 14); \
|
||||
BF_ROUND(R, L, 15); \
|
||||
movl BF_ptr,tmp5; \
|
||||
xorl L,tmp2; \
|
||||
movl P(17),L
|
||||
|
||||
#define BF_ENCRYPT_END \
|
||||
xorl R,L; \
|
||||
movl tmp2,R
|
||||
|
||||
DO_ALIGN(5)
|
||||
.globl _BF_body_r
|
||||
_BF_body_r:
|
||||
movl 4(%esp),%eax
|
||||
pushl %ebp
|
||||
pushl %ebx
|
||||
pushl %esi
|
||||
pushl %edi
|
||||
subl $BF_FRAME-8,%eax
|
||||
xorl L,L
|
||||
cmpl %esp,%eax
|
||||
ja BF_die
|
||||
xchgl %eax,%esp
|
||||
xorl R,R
|
||||
pushl %eax
|
||||
leal 0x1000+BF_FRAME-4(ctx),%eax
|
||||
movl 0x1000+BF_FRAME-4(ctx),tmp2
|
||||
pushl %eax
|
||||
xorl tmp3,tmp3
|
||||
BF_loop_P:
|
||||
BF_ENCRYPT_START
|
||||
addl $8,tmp5
|
||||
BF_ENCRYPT_END
|
||||
leal 0x1000+18*4+BF_FRAME(ctx),tmp1
|
||||
movl tmp5,BF_ptr
|
||||
cmpl tmp5,tmp1
|
||||
movl L,-8(tmp5)
|
||||
movl R,-4(tmp5)
|
||||
movl P(0),tmp2
|
||||
ja BF_loop_P
|
||||
leal BF_FRAME(ctx),tmp5
|
||||
xorl tmp3,tmp3
|
||||
movl tmp5,BF_ptr
|
||||
BF_loop_S:
|
||||
BF_ENCRYPT_START
|
||||
BF_ENCRYPT_END
|
||||
movl P(0),tmp2
|
||||
movl L,(tmp5)
|
||||
movl R,4(tmp5)
|
||||
BF_ENCRYPT_START
|
||||
BF_ENCRYPT_END
|
||||
movl P(0),tmp2
|
||||
movl L,8(tmp5)
|
||||
movl R,12(tmp5)
|
||||
BF_ENCRYPT_START
|
||||
BF_ENCRYPT_END
|
||||
movl P(0),tmp2
|
||||
movl L,16(tmp5)
|
||||
movl R,20(tmp5)
|
||||
BF_ENCRYPT_START
|
||||
addl $32,tmp5
|
||||
BF_ENCRYPT_END
|
||||
leal 0x1000+BF_FRAME(ctx),tmp1
|
||||
movl tmp5,BF_ptr
|
||||
cmpl tmp5,tmp1
|
||||
movl P(0),tmp2
|
||||
movl L,-8(tmp5)
|
||||
movl R,-4(tmp5)
|
||||
ja BF_loop_S
|
||||
movl 4(%esp),%esp
|
||||
popl %edi
|
||||
popl %esi
|
||||
popl %ebx
|
||||
popl %ebp
|
||||
ret
|
||||
|
||||
BF_die:
|
||||
/* Oops, need to re-compile with a larger BF_FRAME. */
|
||||
hlt
|
||||
jmp BF_die
|
||||
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(__ELF__) && defined(__linux__)
|
||||
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",@progbits
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user