From a4b324127a537b8cdd00205c3eb82ded44d7b198 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tasia Iso Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 01:05:29 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] remove crypt_blowfish --- deps/crypt_blowfish/LINKS | 29 - deps/crypt_blowfish/Makefile | 77 -- deps/crypt_blowfish/PERFORMANCE | 30 - deps/crypt_blowfish/README | 68 -- deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt.3 | 575 ------------- deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt.h | 24 - deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.c | 907 --------------------- deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.h | 27 - deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_gensalt.c | 124 --- deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_gensalt.h | 30 - deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.1.3-crypt.diff | 53 -- deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.14-crypt.diff | 55 -- deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.3.6-crypt.diff | 52 -- deps/crypt_blowfish/ow-crypt.h | 43 - deps/crypt_blowfish/wrapper.c | 551 ------------- deps/crypt_blowfish/x86.S | 203 ----- 16 files changed, 2848 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 deps/crypt_blowfish/LINKS delete mode 100644 deps/crypt_blowfish/Makefile delete mode 100644 deps/crypt_blowfish/PERFORMANCE delete mode 100644 deps/crypt_blowfish/README delete mode 100644 deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt.3 delete mode 100644 deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt.h delete mode 100644 deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.c delete mode 100644 deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.h delete mode 100644 deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_gensalt.c delete mode 100644 deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_gensalt.h delete mode 100644 deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.1.3-crypt.diff delete mode 100644 deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.14-crypt.diff delete mode 100644 deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.3.6-crypt.diff delete mode 100644 deps/crypt_blowfish/ow-crypt.h delete mode 100644 deps/crypt_blowfish/wrapper.c delete mode 100644 deps/crypt_blowfish/x86.S diff --git a/deps/crypt_blowfish/LINKS b/deps/crypt_blowfish/LINKS deleted file mode 100644 index a6cb7e1c..00000000 --- a/deps/crypt_blowfish/LINKS +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -New versions of this package (crypt_blowfish): - - http://www.openwall.com/crypt/ - -A paper on the algorithm that explains its design decisions: - - http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/provos.html - -Unix Seventh Edition Manual, Volume 2: the password scheme (1978): - - http://plan9.bell-labs.com/7thEdMan/vol2/password - -The Openwall GNU/*/Linux (Owl) tcb suite implementing the alternative -password shadowing scheme. This includes a PAM module which -supersedes pam_unix and uses the password hashing framework provided -with crypt_blowfish when setting new passwords. - - http://www.openwall.com/tcb/ - -pam_passwdqc, a password strength checking and policy enforcement -module for PAM-aware password changing programs: - - http://www.openwall.com/passwdqc/ - -John the Ripper password cracker: - - http://www.openwall.com/john/ - -$Owl: Owl/packages/glibc/crypt_blowfish/LINKS,v 1.4 2005/11/16 13:09:47 solar Exp $ diff --git a/deps/crypt_blowfish/Makefile b/deps/crypt_blowfish/Makefile deleted file mode 100644 index c162adc4..00000000 --- a/deps/crypt_blowfish/Makefile +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -# -# Written and revised by Solar Designer in 2000-2011. -# No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public -# domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software -# in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is -# Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the -# general public under the following terms: -# -# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -# modification, are permitted. -# -# There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. -# -# See crypt_blowfish.c for more information. -# - -CC = gcc -AS = $(CC) -LD = $(CC) -RM = rm -f -CFLAGS = -W -Wall -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wcast-qual -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wshadow -Wundef -Wpointer-arith -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -funroll-loops -ASFLAGS = -c -LDFLAGS = -s - -BLOWFISH_OBJS = \ - crypt_blowfish.o x86.o - -CRYPT_OBJS = \ - $(BLOWFISH_OBJS) crypt_gensalt.o wrapper.o - -TEST_OBJS = \ - $(BLOWFISH_OBJS) crypt_gensalt.o crypt_test.o - -TEST_THREADS_OBJS = \ - $(BLOWFISH_OBJS) crypt_gensalt.o crypt_test_threads.o - -EXTRA_MANS = \ - crypt_r.3 crypt_rn.3 crypt_ra.3 \ - crypt_gensalt.3 crypt_gensalt_rn.3 crypt_gensalt_ra.3 - -all: $(CRYPT_OBJS) man - -check: crypt_test - ./crypt_test - -crypt_test: $(TEST_OBJS) - $(LD) $(LDFLAGS) $(TEST_OBJS) -o $@ - -crypt_test.o: wrapper.c ow-crypt.h crypt_blowfish.h crypt_gensalt.h - $(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) wrapper.c -DTEST -o $@ - -check_threads: crypt_test_threads - ./crypt_test_threads - -crypt_test_threads: $(TEST_THREADS_OBJS) - $(LD) $(LDFLAGS) $(TEST_THREADS_OBJS) -lpthread -o $@ - -crypt_test_threads.o: wrapper.c ow-crypt.h crypt_blowfish.h crypt_gensalt.h - $(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) wrapper.c -DTEST -DTEST_THREADS=4 -o $@ - -man: $(EXTRA_MANS) - -$(EXTRA_MANS): - echo '.so man3/crypt.3' > $@ - -crypt_blowfish.o: crypt_blowfish.h -crypt_gensalt.o: crypt_gensalt.h -wrapper.o: crypt.h ow-crypt.h crypt_blowfish.h crypt_gensalt.h - -.c.o: - $(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) $*.c - -.S.o: - $(AS) $(ASFLAGS) $*.S - -clean: - $(RM) crypt_test crypt_test_threads *.o $(EXTRA_MANS) core diff --git a/deps/crypt_blowfish/PERFORMANCE b/deps/crypt_blowfish/PERFORMANCE deleted file mode 100644 index 9d6fe4ef..00000000 --- a/deps/crypt_blowfish/PERFORMANCE +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -These numbers are for 32 iterations ("$2a$05"): - - OpenBSD 3.0 bcrypt(*) crypt_blowfish 0.4.4 -Pentium III, 840 MHz 99 c/s 121 c/s (+22%) -Alpha 21164PC, 533 MHz 55.5 c/s 76.9 c/s (+38%) -UltraSparc IIi, 400 MHz 49.9 c/s 52.5 c/s (+5%) -Pentium, 120 MHz 8.8 c/s 20.1 c/s (+128%) -PA-RISC 7100LC, 80 MHz 8.5 c/s 16.3 c/s (+92%) - -(*) built with -fomit-frame-pointer -funroll-loops, which I don't -think happens for libcrypt. - -Starting with version 1.1 released in June 2011, default builds of -crypt_blowfish invoke a quick self-test on every hash computation. -This has roughly a 4.8% performance impact at "$2a$05", but only a 0.6% -impact at a more typical setting of "$2a$08". - -The large speedup for the original Pentium is due to the assembly -code and the weird optimizations this processor requires. - -The numbers for password cracking are 2 to 10% higher than those for -crypt_blowfish as certain things may be done out of the loop and the -code doesn't need to be reentrant. - -Recent versions of John the Ripper (1.6.25-dev and newer) achieve an -additional 15% speedup on the Pentium Pro family of processors (which -includes Pentium III) with a separate version of the assembly code and -run-time CPU detection. - -$Owl: Owl/packages/glibc/crypt_blowfish/PERFORMANCE,v 1.6 2011/06/21 12:09:20 solar Exp $ diff --git a/deps/crypt_blowfish/README b/deps/crypt_blowfish/README deleted file mode 100644 index e95da230..00000000 --- a/deps/crypt_blowfish/README +++ /dev/null @@ -1,68 +0,0 @@ -This is an implementation of a password hashing method, provided via the -crypt(3) and a reentrant interface. It is fully compatible with -OpenBSD's bcrypt.c for prefix "$2b$", originally by Niels Provos and -David Mazieres. (Please refer to the included crypt(3) man page for -information on minor compatibility issues for other bcrypt prefixes.) - -I've placed this code in the public domain, with fallback to a -permissive license. Please see the comment in crypt_blowfish.c for -more information. - -You can use the provided routines in your own packages, or link them -into a C library. I've provided hooks for linking into GNU libc, but -it shouldn't be too hard to get this into another C library. Note -that simply adding this code into your libc is probably not enough to -make your system use the new password hashing algorithm. Changes to -passwd(1), PAM modules, or whatever else your system uses will likely -be needed as well. These are not a part of this package, but see -LINKS for a pointer to our tcb suite. - -Instructions on using the routines in one of the two common ways are -given below. It is recommended that you test the routines on your -system before you start. Type "make check" or "make check_threads" -(if you have the POSIX threads library), then "make clean". - - -1. Using the routines in your programs. - -The available interfaces are in ow-crypt.h, and this is the file you -should include. You won't need crypt.h. When linking, add all of the -C files and x86.S (you can compile and link it even on a non-x86, it -will produce no code in this case). - - -2. Building the routines into GNU C library. - -For versions 2.13 and 2.14 (and likely other nearby ones), extract the -library sources as usual. Apply the patch for glibc 2.14 provided in -this package. Enter crypt/ and rename crypt.h to gnu-crypt.h within -that directory. Copy the C sources, header, and assembly (x86.S) files -from this package in there as well (but be sure you don't overwrite the -Makefile). Configure, build, and install the library as usual. - -For versions 2.2 to 2.3.6 (and likely also for some newer ones), -extract the library sources and maybe its optional add-ons as usual. -Apply the patch for glibc 2.3.6 provided in this package. Enter -crypt/ and rename crypt.h to gnu-crypt.h within that directory. Copy -the C sources, header, and assembly (x86.S) files from this package in -there as well (but be sure you don't overwrite the Makefile). -Configure, build, and install the library as usual. - -For versions 2.1 to 2.1.3, extract the library sources and the crypt -and linuxthreads add-ons as usual. Apply the patch for glibc 2.1.3 -provided in this package. Enter crypt/sysdeps/unix/, and rename -crypt.h to gnu-crypt.h within that directory. Copy C sources, header, -and assembly (x86.S) files from this package in there as well (but be -sure you don't overwrite the Makefile). Configure, build, and install -the library as usual. - -Programs that want to use the provided interfaces will need to include -crypt.h (but not ow-crypt.h directly). By default, prototypes for the -new routines aren't defined (but the extra functionality of crypt(3) -is indeed available). You need to define _OW_SOURCE to obtain the new -routines as well. - --- -Solar Designer - -$Owl: Owl/packages/glibc/crypt_blowfish/README,v 1.10 2014/07/07 15:19:04 solar Exp $ diff --git a/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt.3 b/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt.3 deleted file mode 100644 index b4c08954..00000000 --- a/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt.3 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,575 +0,0 @@ -.\" Written and revised by Solar Designer in 2000-2011. -.\" No copyright is claimed, and this man page is hereby placed in the public -.\" domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the man page -.\" in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the man page is -.\" Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the -.\" general public under the following terms: -.\" -.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -.\" modification, are permitted. -.\" -.\" There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. -.\" -.\" This manual page in its current form is intended for use on systems -.\" based on the GNU C Library with crypt_blowfish patched into libcrypt. -.\" -.TH CRYPT 3 "July 7, 2014" "Openwall Project" "Library functions" -.ad l -.\" No macros in NAME to keep makewhatis happy. -.SH NAME -\fBcrypt\fR, \fBcrypt_r\fR, \fBcrypt_rn\fR, \fBcrypt_ra\fR, -\fBcrypt_gensalt\fR, \fBcrypt_gensalt_rn\fR, \fBcrypt_gensalt_ra\fR -\- password hashing -.SH SYNOPSIS -.B #define _XOPEN_SOURCE -.br -.B #include -.sp -.in +8 -.ti -8 -.BI "char *crypt(const char *" key ", const char *" setting ); -.in -8 -.sp -.B #define _GNU_SOURCE -.br -.B #include -.sp -.in +8 -.ti -8 -.BI "char *crypt_r(const char *" key ", const char *" setting ", struct crypt_data *" data ); -.in -8 -.sp -.B #define _OW_SOURCE -.br -.B #include -.sp -.in +8 -.ti -8 -.BI "char *crypt_rn(const char *" key ", const char *" setting ", void *" data ", int " size ); -.ti -8 -.BI "char *crypt_ra(const char *" key ", const char *" setting ", void **" data ", int *" size ); -.ti -8 -.BI "char *crypt_gensalt(const char *" prefix ", unsigned long " count ", const char *" input ", int " size ); -.ti -8 -.BI "char *crypt_gensalt_rn(const char *" prefix ", unsigned long " count ", const char *" input ", int " size ", char *" output ", int " output_size ); -.ti -8 -.BI "char *crypt_gensalt_ra(const char *" prefix ", unsigned long " count ", const char *" input ", int " size ); -.ad b -.de crypt -.BR crypt , -.BR crypt_r , -.BR crypt_rn ", \\$1" -.ie "\\$2"" .B crypt_ra -.el .BR crypt_ra "\\$2" -.. -.de crypt_gensalt -.BR crypt_gensalt , -.BR crypt_gensalt_rn ", \\$1" -.ie "\\$2"" .B crypt_gensalt_ra -.el .BR crypt_gensalt_ra "\\$2" -.. -.SH DESCRIPTION -The -.crypt and -functions calculate a cryptographic hash function of -.I key -with one of a number of supported methods as requested with -.IR setting , -which is also used to pass a salt and possibly other parameters to -the chosen method. -The hashing methods are explained below. -.PP -Unlike -.BR crypt , -the functions -.BR crypt_r , -.BR crypt_rn " and" -.B crypt_ra -are reentrant. -They place their result and possibly their private data in a -.I data -area of -.I size -bytes as passed to them by an application and/or in memory they -allocate dynamically. Some hashing algorithms may use the data area to -cache precomputed intermediate values across calls. Thus, applications -must properly initialize the data area before its first use. -.B crypt_r -requires that only -.I data->initialized -be reset to zero; -.BR crypt_rn " and " crypt_ra -require that either the entire data area is zeroed or, in the case of -.BR crypt_ra , -.I *data -is NULL. When called with a NULL -.I *data -or insufficient -.I *size -for the requested hashing algorithm, -.B crypt_ra -uses -.BR realloc (3) -to allocate the required amount of memory dynamically. Thus, -.B crypt_ra -has the additional requirement that -.IR *data , -when non-NULL, must point to an area allocated either with a previous -call to -.B crypt_ra -or with a -.BR malloc (3) -family call. -The memory allocated by -.B crypt_ra -should be freed with -.BR free "(3)." -.PP -The -.crypt_gensalt and -functions compile a string for use as -.I setting -\- with the given -.I prefix -(used to choose a hashing method), the iteration -.I count -(if supported by the chosen method) and up to -.I size -cryptographically random -.I input -bytes for use as the actual salt. -If -.I count -is 0, a low default will be picked. -The random bytes may be obtained from -.BR /dev/urandom . -Unlike -.BR crypt_gensalt , -the functions -.BR crypt_gensalt_rn " and " crypt_gensalt_ra -are reentrant. -.B crypt_gensalt_rn -places its result in the -.I output -buffer of -.I output_size -bytes. -.B crypt_gensalt_ra -allocates memory for its result dynamically. The memory should be -freed with -.BR free "(3)." -.SH RETURN VALUE -Upon successful completion, the functions -.crypt and -return a pointer to a string containing the setting that was actually used -and a printable encoding of the hash function value. -The entire string is directly usable as -.I setting -with other calls to -.crypt and -and as -.I prefix -with calls to -.crypt_gensalt and . -.PP -The behavior of -.B crypt -on errors isn't well standardized. Some implementations simply can't fail -(unless the process dies, in which case they obviously can't return), -others return NULL or a fixed string. Most implementations don't set -.IR errno , -but some do. SUSv2 specifies only returning NULL and setting -.I errno -as a valid behavior, and defines only one possible error -.RB "(" ENOSYS , -"The functionality is not supported on this implementation.") -Unfortunately, most existing applications aren't prepared to handle -NULL returns from -.BR crypt . -The description below corresponds to this implementation of -.BR crypt " and " crypt_r -only, and to -.BR crypt_rn " and " crypt_ra . -The behavior may change to match standards, other implementations or -existing applications. -.PP -.BR crypt " and " crypt_r -may only fail (and return) when passed an invalid or unsupported -.IR setting , -in which case they return a pointer to a magic string that is -shorter than 13 characters and is guaranteed to differ from -.IR setting . -This behavior is safe for older applications which assume that -.B crypt -can't fail, when both setting new passwords and authenticating against -existing password hashes. -.BR crypt_rn " and " crypt_ra -return NULL to indicate failure. All four functions set -.I errno -when they fail. -.PP -The functions -.crypt_gensalt and -return a pointer to the compiled string for -.IR setting , -or NULL on error in which case -.I errno -is set. -.SH ERRORS -.TP -.B EINVAL -.crypt "" : -.I setting -is invalid or not supported by this implementation; -.sp -.crypt_gensalt "" : -.I prefix -is invalid or not supported by this implementation; -.I count -is invalid for the requested -.IR prefix ; -the input -.I size -is insufficient for the smallest valid salt with the requested -.IR prefix ; -.I input -is NULL. -.TP -.B ERANGE -.BR crypt_rn : -the provided data area -.I size -is insufficient for the requested hashing algorithm; -.sp -.BR crypt_gensalt_rn : -.I output_size -is too small to hold the compiled -.I setting -string. -.TP -.B ENOMEM -.B crypt -(original glibc only): -failed to allocate memory for the output buffer (which subsequent calls -would re-use); -.sp -.BR crypt_ra : -.I *data -is NULL or -.I *size -is insufficient for the requested hashing algorithm and -.BR realloc (3) -failed; -.sp -.BR crypt_gensalt_ra : -failed to allocate memory for the compiled -.I setting -string. -.TP -.B ENOSYS -.B crypt -(SUSv2): -the functionality is not supported on this implementation; -.sp -.BR crypt , -.B crypt_r -(glibc 2.0 to 2.0.1 only): -.de no-crypt-add-on -the crypt add-on is not compiled in and -.I setting -requests something other than the MD5-based algorithm. -.. -.no-crypt-add-on -.TP -.B EOPNOTSUPP -.BR crypt , -.B crypt_r -(glibc 2.0.2 to 2.1.3 only): -.no-crypt-add-on -.SH HASHING METHODS -The implemented hashing methods are intended specifically for processing -user passwords for storage and authentication; -they are at best inefficient for most other purposes. -.PP -It is important to understand that password hashing is not a replacement -for strong passwords. -It is always possible for an attacker with access to password hashes -to try guessing candidate passwords against the hashes. -There are, however, certain properties a password hashing method may have -which make these key search attacks somewhat harder. -.PP -All of the hashing methods use salts such that the same -.I key -may produce many possible hashes. -Proper use of salts may defeat a number of attacks, including: -.TP -1. -The ability to try candidate passwords against multiple hashes at the -price of one. -.TP -2. -The use of pre-hashed lists of candidate passwords. -.TP -3. -The ability to determine whether two users (or two accounts of one user) -have the same or different passwords without actually having to guess -one of the passwords. -.PP -The key search attacks depend on computing hashes of large numbers of -candidate passwords. -Thus, the computational cost of a good password hashing method must be -high \- but of course not too high to render it impractical. -.PP -All hashing methods implemented within the -.crypt and -interfaces use multiple iterations of an underlying cryptographic -primitive specifically in order to increase the cost of trying a -candidate password. -Unfortunately, due to hardware improvements, the hashing methods which -have a fixed cost become increasingly less secure over time. -.PP -In addition to salts, modern password hashing methods accept a variable -iteration -.IR count . -This makes it possible to adapt their cost to the hardware improvements -while still maintaining compatibility. -.PP -The following hashing methods are or may be implemented within the -described interfaces: -.PP -.de hash -.ad l -.TP -.I prefix -.ie "\\$1"" \{\ -"" (empty string); -.br -a string matching ^[./0-9A-Za-z]{2} (see -.BR regex (7)) -.\} -.el "\\$1" -.TP -.B Encoding syntax -\\$2 -.TP -.B Maximum password length -\\$3 (uses \\$4-bit characters) -.TP -.B Effective key size -.ie "\\$5"" limited by the hash size only -.el up to \\$5 bits -.TP -.B Hash size -\\$6 bits -.TP -.B Salt size -\\$7 bits -.TP -.B Iteration count -\\$8 -.ad b -.. -.ti -2 -.B Traditional DES-based -.br -This method is supported by almost all implementations of -.BR crypt . -Unfortunately, it no longer offers adequate security because of its many -limitations. -Thus, it should not be used for new passwords unless you absolutely have -to be able to migrate the password hashes to other systems. -.hash "" "[./0-9A-Za-z]{13}" 8 7 56 64 12 25 -.PP -.ti -2 -.B Extended BSDI-style DES-based -.br -This method is used on BSDI and is also available on at least NetBSD, -OpenBSD, and FreeBSD due to the use of David Burren's FreeSec library. -.hash _ "_[./0-9A-Za-z]{19}" unlimited 7 56 64 24 "1 to 2**24-1 (must be odd)" -.PP -.ti -2 -.B FreeBSD-style MD5-based -.br -This is Poul-Henning Kamp's MD5-based password hashing method originally -developed for FreeBSD. -It is currently supported on many free Unix-like systems, on Solaris 10 -and newer, and it is part of the official glibc. -Its main disadvantage is the fixed iteration count, which is already -too low for the currently available hardware. -.hash "$1$" "\e$1\e$[^$]{1,8}\e$[./0-9A-Za-z]{22}" unlimited 8 "" 128 "6 to 48" 1000 -.PP -.ti -2 -.BR "OpenBSD-style Blowfish-based" " (" bcrypt ) -.br -.B bcrypt -was originally developed by Niels Provos and David Mazieres for OpenBSD -and is also supported on recent versions of FreeBSD and NetBSD, -on Solaris 10 and newer, and on several GNU/*/Linux distributions. -It is, however, not part of the official glibc. -.PP -While both -.B bcrypt -and the BSDI-style DES-based hashing offer a variable iteration count, -.B bcrypt -may scale to even faster hardware, doesn't allow for certain optimizations -specific to password cracking only, doesn't have the effective key size -limitation, and uses 8-bit characters in passwords. -.hash "$2b$" "\e$2[abxy]\e$[0-9]{2}\e$[./A-Za-z0-9]{53}" 72 8 "" 184 128 "2**4 to 2**99 (current implementations are limited to 2**31 iterations)" -.PP -With -.BR bcrypt , -the -.I count -passed to -.crypt_gensalt and -is the base-2 logarithm of the actual iteration count. -.PP -.B bcrypt -hashes used the "$2a$" prefix since 1997. -However, in 2011 an implementation bug was discovered in crypt_blowfish -(versions up to 1.0.4 inclusive) affecting handling of password characters with -the 8th bit set. -Besides fixing the bug, -to provide for upgrade strategies for existing systems, two new prefixes were -introduced: "$2x$", which fully re-introduces the bug, and "$2y$", which -guarantees correct handling of both 7- and 8-bit characters. -OpenBSD 5.5 introduced the "$2b$" prefix for behavior that exactly matches -crypt_blowfish's "$2y$", and current crypt_blowfish supports it as well. -Unfortunately, the behavior of "$2a$" on password characters with the 8th bit -set has to be considered system-specific. -When generating new password hashes, the "$2b$" or "$2y$" prefix should be used. -(If such hashes ever need to be migrated to a system that does not yet support -these new prefixes, the prefix in migrated copies of the already-generated -hashes may be changed to "$2a$".) -.PP -.crypt_gensalt and -support the "$2b$", "$2y$", and "$2a$" prefixes (the latter for legacy programs -or configurations), but not "$2x$" (which must not be used for new hashes). -.crypt and -support all four of these prefixes. -.SH PORTABILITY NOTES -Programs using any of these functions on a glibc 2.x system must be -linked against -.BR libcrypt . -However, many Unix-like operating systems and older versions of the -GNU C Library include the -.BR crypt " function in " libc . -.PP -The -.BR crypt_r , -.BR crypt_rn , -.BR crypt_ra , -.crypt_gensalt and -functions are very non-portable. -.PP -The set of supported hashing methods is implementation-dependent. -.SH CONFORMING TO -The -.B crypt -function conforms to SVID, X/OPEN, and is available on BSD 4.3. -The strings returned by -.B crypt -are not required to be portable among conformant systems. -.PP -.B crypt_r -is a GNU extension. -There's also a -.B crypt_r -function on HP-UX and MKS Toolkit, but the prototypes and semantics differ. -.PP -.B crypt_gensalt -is an Openwall extension. -There's also a -.B crypt_gensalt -function on Solaris 10 and newer, but the prototypes and semantics differ. -.PP -.BR crypt_rn , -.BR crypt_ra , -.BR crypt_gensalt_rn , -and -.B crypt_gensalt_ra -are Openwall extensions. -.SH HISTORY -A rotor-based -.B crypt -function appeared in Version 6 AT&T UNIX. -The "traditional" -.B crypt -first appeared in Version 7 AT&T UNIX. -.PP -The -.B crypt_r -function was introduced during glibc 2.0 development. -.SH BUGS -The return values of -.BR crypt " and " crypt_gensalt -point to static buffers that are overwritten by subsequent calls. -These functions are not thread-safe. -.RB ( crypt -on recent versions of Solaris uses thread-specific data and actually is -thread-safe.) -.PP -The strings returned by certain other implementations of -.B crypt -on error may be stored in read-only locations or only initialized once, -which makes it unsafe to always attempt to zero out the buffer normally -pointed to by the -.B crypt -return value as it would otherwise be preferable for security reasons. -The problem could be avoided with the use of -.BR crypt_r , -.BR crypt_rn , -or -.B crypt_ra -where the application has full control over output buffers of these functions -(and often over some of their private data as well). -Unfortunately, the functions aren't (yet?) available on platforms where -.B crypt -has this undesired property. -.PP -Applications using the thread-safe -.B crypt_r -need to allocate address space for the large (over 128 KB) -.I struct crypt_data -structure. Each thread needs a separate instance of the structure. The -.B crypt_r -interface makes it impossible to implement a hashing algorithm which -would need to keep an even larger amount of private data, without breaking -binary compatibility. -.B crypt_ra -allows for dynamically increasing the allocation size as required by the -hashing algorithm that is actually used. Unfortunately, -.B crypt_ra -is even more non-portable than -.BR crypt_r . -.PP -Multi-threaded applications or library functions which are meant to be -thread-safe should use -.BR crypt_gensalt_rn " or " crypt_gensalt_ra -rather than -.BR crypt_gensalt . -.SH SEE ALSO -.BR login (1), -.BR passwd (1), -.BR crypto (3), -.BR encrypt (3), -.BR free (3), -.BR getpass (3), -.BR getpwent (3), -.BR malloc (3), -.BR realloc (3), -.BR shadow (3), -.BR passwd (5), -.BR shadow (5), -.BR regex (7), -.BR pam (8) -.sp -Niels Provos and David Mazieres. A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme. -Proceedings of the 1999 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, June 1999. -.br -http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/provos.html -.sp -Robert Morris and Ken Thompson. Password Security: A Case History. -Unix Seventh Edition Manual, Volume 2, April 1978. -.br -http://plan9.bell-labs.com/7thEdMan/vol2/password diff --git a/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt.h b/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt.h deleted file mode 100644 index 12e67055..00000000 --- a/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Written by Solar Designer in 2000-2002. - * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public - * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software - * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is - * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the - * general public under the following terms: - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted. - * - * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. - * - * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information. - */ - -#include - -#if defined(_OW_SOURCE) || defined(__USE_OW) -#define __SKIP_GNU -#undef __SKIP_OW -#include -#undef __SKIP_GNU -#endif diff --git a/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.c b/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.c deleted file mode 100644 index 9d3f3be8..00000000 --- a/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,907 +0,0 @@ -/* - * The crypt_blowfish homepage is: - * - * http://www.openwall.com/crypt/ - * - * This code comes from John the Ripper password cracker, with reentrant - * and crypt(3) interfaces added, but optimizations specific to password - * cracking removed. - * - * Written by Solar Designer in 1998-2014. - * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public - * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software - * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is - * Copyright (c) 1998-2014 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the - * general public under the following terms: - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted. - * - * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. - * - * It is my intent that you should be able to use this on your system, - * as part of a software package, or anywhere else to improve security, - * ensure compatibility, or for any other purpose. I would appreciate - * it if you give credit where it is due and keep your modifications in - * the public domain as well, but I don't require that in order to let - * you place this code and any modifications you make under a license - * of your choice. - * - * This implementation is fully compatible with OpenBSD's bcrypt.c for prefix - * "$2b$", originally by Niels Provos , and it uses - * some of his ideas. The password hashing algorithm was designed by David - * Mazieres . For information on the level of - * compatibility for bcrypt hash prefixes other than "$2b$", please refer to - * the comments in BF_set_key() below and to the included crypt(3) man page. - * - * There's a paper on the algorithm that explains its design decisions: - * - * http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/provos.html - * - * Some of the tricks in BF_ROUND might be inspired by Eric Young's - * Blowfish library (I can't be sure if I would think of something if I - * hadn't seen his code). - */ - -#include - -#include -#ifndef __set_errno -#define __set_errno(val) errno = (val) -#endif - -/* Just to make sure the prototypes match the actual definitions */ -#include "crypt_blowfish.h" - -#ifdef __i386__ -#define BF_ASM 1 -#define BF_SCALE 1 -#elif defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__alpha__) || defined(__hppa__) -#define BF_ASM 0 -#define BF_SCALE 1 -#else -#define BF_ASM 0 -#define BF_SCALE 0 -#endif - -typedef unsigned int BF_word; -typedef signed int BF_word_signed; - -/* Number of Blowfish rounds, this is also hardcoded into a few places */ -#define BF_N 16 - -typedef BF_word BF_key[BF_N + 2]; - -typedef struct { - BF_word S[4][0x100]; - BF_key P; -} BF_ctx; - -/* - * Magic IV for 64 Blowfish encryptions that we do at the end. - * The string is "OrpheanBeholderScryDoubt" on big-endian. - */ -static BF_word BF_magic_w[6] = { - 0x4F727068, 0x65616E42, 0x65686F6C, - 0x64657253, 0x63727944, 0x6F756274 -}; - -/* - * P-box and S-box tables initialized with digits of Pi. - */ -static BF_ctx BF_init_state = { - { - { - 0xd1310ba6, 0x98dfb5ac, 0x2ffd72db, 0xd01adfb7, - 0xb8e1afed, 0x6a267e96, 0xba7c9045, 0xf12c7f99, - 0x24a19947, 0xb3916cf7, 0x0801f2e2, 0x858efc16, - 0x636920d8, 0x71574e69, 0xa458fea3, 0xf4933d7e, - 0x0d95748f, 0x728eb658, 0x718bcd58, 0x82154aee, - 0x7b54a41d, 0xc25a59b5, 0x9c30d539, 0x2af26013, - 0xc5d1b023, 0x286085f0, 0xca417918, 0xb8db38ef, - 0x8e79dcb0, 0x603a180e, 0x6c9e0e8b, 0xb01e8a3e, - 0xd71577c1, 0xbd314b27, 0x78af2fda, 0x55605c60, - 0xe65525f3, 0xaa55ab94, 0x57489862, 0x63e81440, - 0x55ca396a, 0x2aab10b6, 0xb4cc5c34, 0x1141e8ce, - 0xa15486af, 0x7c72e993, 0xb3ee1411, 0x636fbc2a, - 0x2ba9c55d, 0x741831f6, 0xce5c3e16, 0x9b87931e, - 0xafd6ba33, 0x6c24cf5c, 0x7a325381, 0x28958677, - 0x3b8f4898, 0x6b4bb9af, 0xc4bfe81b, 0x66282193, - 0x61d809cc, 0xfb21a991, 0x487cac60, 0x5dec8032, - 0xef845d5d, 0xe98575b1, 0xdc262302, 0xeb651b88, - 0x23893e81, 0xd396acc5, 0x0f6d6ff3, 0x83f44239, - 0x2e0b4482, 0xa4842004, 0x69c8f04a, 0x9e1f9b5e, - 0x21c66842, 0xf6e96c9a, 0x670c9c61, 0xabd388f0, - 0x6a51a0d2, 0xd8542f68, 0x960fa728, 0xab5133a3, - 0x6eef0b6c, 0x137a3be4, 0xba3bf050, 0x7efb2a98, - 0xa1f1651d, 0x39af0176, 0x66ca593e, 0x82430e88, - 0x8cee8619, 0x456f9fb4, 0x7d84a5c3, 0x3b8b5ebe, - 0xe06f75d8, 0x85c12073, 0x401a449f, 0x56c16aa6, - 0x4ed3aa62, 0x363f7706, 0x1bfedf72, 0x429b023d, - 0x37d0d724, 0xd00a1248, 0xdb0fead3, 0x49f1c09b, - 0x075372c9, 0x80991b7b, 0x25d479d8, 0xf6e8def7, - 0xe3fe501a, 0xb6794c3b, 0x976ce0bd, 0x04c006ba, - 0xc1a94fb6, 0x409f60c4, 0x5e5c9ec2, 0x196a2463, - 0x68fb6faf, 0x3e6c53b5, 0x1339b2eb, 0x3b52ec6f, - 0x6dfc511f, 0x9b30952c, 0xcc814544, 0xaf5ebd09, - 0xbee3d004, 0xde334afd, 0x660f2807, 0x192e4bb3, - 0xc0cba857, 0x45c8740f, 0xd20b5f39, 0xb9d3fbdb, - 0x5579c0bd, 0x1a60320a, 0xd6a100c6, 0x402c7279, - 0x679f25fe, 0xfb1fa3cc, 0x8ea5e9f8, 0xdb3222f8, - 0x3c7516df, 0xfd616b15, 0x2f501ec8, 0xad0552ab, - 0x323db5fa, 0xfd238760, 0x53317b48, 0x3e00df82, - 0x9e5c57bb, 0xca6f8ca0, 0x1a87562e, 0xdf1769db, - 0xd542a8f6, 0x287effc3, 0xac6732c6, 0x8c4f5573, - 0x695b27b0, 0xbbca58c8, 0xe1ffa35d, 0xb8f011a0, - 0x10fa3d98, 0xfd2183b8, 0x4afcb56c, 0x2dd1d35b, - 0x9a53e479, 0xb6f84565, 0xd28e49bc, 0x4bfb9790, - 0xe1ddf2da, 0xa4cb7e33, 0x62fb1341, 0xcee4c6e8, - 0xef20cada, 0x36774c01, 0xd07e9efe, 0x2bf11fb4, - 0x95dbda4d, 0xae909198, 0xeaad8e71, 0x6b93d5a0, - 0xd08ed1d0, 0xafc725e0, 0x8e3c5b2f, 0x8e7594b7, - 0x8ff6e2fb, 0xf2122b64, 0x8888b812, 0x900df01c, - 0x4fad5ea0, 0x688fc31c, 0xd1cff191, 0xb3a8c1ad, - 0x2f2f2218, 0xbe0e1777, 0xea752dfe, 0x8b021fa1, - 0xe5a0cc0f, 0xb56f74e8, 0x18acf3d6, 0xce89e299, - 0xb4a84fe0, 0xfd13e0b7, 0x7cc43b81, 0xd2ada8d9, - 0x165fa266, 0x80957705, 0x93cc7314, 0x211a1477, - 0xe6ad2065, 0x77b5fa86, 0xc75442f5, 0xfb9d35cf, - 0xebcdaf0c, 0x7b3e89a0, 0xd6411bd3, 0xae1e7e49, - 0x00250e2d, 0x2071b35e, 0x226800bb, 0x57b8e0af, - 0x2464369b, 0xf009b91e, 0x5563911d, 0x59dfa6aa, - 0x78c14389, 0xd95a537f, 0x207d5ba2, 0x02e5b9c5, - 0x83260376, 0x6295cfa9, 0x11c81968, 0x4e734a41, - 0xb3472dca, 0x7b14a94a, 0x1b510052, 0x9a532915, - 0xd60f573f, 0xbc9bc6e4, 0x2b60a476, 0x81e67400, - 0x08ba6fb5, 0x571be91f, 0xf296ec6b, 0x2a0dd915, - 0xb6636521, 0xe7b9f9b6, 0xff34052e, 0xc5855664, - 0x53b02d5d, 0xa99f8fa1, 0x08ba4799, 0x6e85076a - }, { - 0x4b7a70e9, 0xb5b32944, 0xdb75092e, 0xc4192623, - 0xad6ea6b0, 0x49a7df7d, 0x9cee60b8, 0x8fedb266, - 0xecaa8c71, 0x699a17ff, 0x5664526c, 0xc2b19ee1, - 0x193602a5, 0x75094c29, 0xa0591340, 0xe4183a3e, - 0x3f54989a, 0x5b429d65, 0x6b8fe4d6, 0x99f73fd6, - 0xa1d29c07, 0xefe830f5, 0x4d2d38e6, 0xf0255dc1, - 0x4cdd2086, 0x8470eb26, 0x6382e9c6, 0x021ecc5e, - 0x09686b3f, 0x3ebaefc9, 0x3c971814, 0x6b6a70a1, - 0x687f3584, 0x52a0e286, 0xb79c5305, 0xaa500737, - 0x3e07841c, 0x7fdeae5c, 0x8e7d44ec, 0x5716f2b8, - 0xb03ada37, 0xf0500c0d, 0xf01c1f04, 0x0200b3ff, - 0xae0cf51a, 0x3cb574b2, 0x25837a58, 0xdc0921bd, - 0xd19113f9, 0x7ca92ff6, 0x94324773, 0x22f54701, - 0x3ae5e581, 0x37c2dadc, 0xc8b57634, 0x9af3dda7, - 0xa9446146, 0x0fd0030e, 0xecc8c73e, 0xa4751e41, - 0xe238cd99, 0x3bea0e2f, 0x3280bba1, 0x183eb331, - 0x4e548b38, 0x4f6db908, 0x6f420d03, 0xf60a04bf, - 0x2cb81290, 0x24977c79, 0x5679b072, 0xbcaf89af, - 0xde9a771f, 0xd9930810, 0xb38bae12, 0xdccf3f2e, - 0x5512721f, 0x2e6b7124, 0x501adde6, 0x9f84cd87, - 0x7a584718, 0x7408da17, 0xbc9f9abc, 0xe94b7d8c, - 0xec7aec3a, 0xdb851dfa, 0x63094366, 0xc464c3d2, - 0xef1c1847, 0x3215d908, 0xdd433b37, 0x24c2ba16, - 0x12a14d43, 0x2a65c451, 0x50940002, 0x133ae4dd, - 0x71dff89e, 0x10314e55, 0x81ac77d6, 0x5f11199b, - 0x043556f1, 0xd7a3c76b, 0x3c11183b, 0x5924a509, - 0xf28fe6ed, 0x97f1fbfa, 0x9ebabf2c, 0x1e153c6e, - 0x86e34570, 0xeae96fb1, 0x860e5e0a, 0x5a3e2ab3, - 0x771fe71c, 0x4e3d06fa, 0x2965dcb9, 0x99e71d0f, - 0x803e89d6, 0x5266c825, 0x2e4cc978, 0x9c10b36a, - 0xc6150eba, 0x94e2ea78, 0xa5fc3c53, 0x1e0a2df4, - 0xf2f74ea7, 0x361d2b3d, 0x1939260f, 0x19c27960, - 0x5223a708, 0xf71312b6, 0xebadfe6e, 0xeac31f66, - 0xe3bc4595, 0xa67bc883, 0xb17f37d1, 0x018cff28, - 0xc332ddef, 0xbe6c5aa5, 0x65582185, 0x68ab9802, - 0xeecea50f, 0xdb2f953b, 0x2aef7dad, 0x5b6e2f84, - 0x1521b628, 0x29076170, 0xecdd4775, 0x619f1510, - 0x13cca830, 0xeb61bd96, 0x0334fe1e, 0xaa0363cf, - 0xb5735c90, 0x4c70a239, 0xd59e9e0b, 0xcbaade14, - 0xeecc86bc, 0x60622ca7, 0x9cab5cab, 0xb2f3846e, - 0x648b1eaf, 0x19bdf0ca, 0xa02369b9, 0x655abb50, - 0x40685a32, 0x3c2ab4b3, 0x319ee9d5, 0xc021b8f7, - 0x9b540b19, 0x875fa099, 0x95f7997e, 0x623d7da8, - 0xf837889a, 0x97e32d77, 0x11ed935f, 0x16681281, - 0x0e358829, 0xc7e61fd6, 0x96dedfa1, 0x7858ba99, - 0x57f584a5, 0x1b227263, 0x9b83c3ff, 0x1ac24696, - 0xcdb30aeb, 0x532e3054, 0x8fd948e4, 0x6dbc3128, - 0x58ebf2ef, 0x34c6ffea, 0xfe28ed61, 0xee7c3c73, - 0x5d4a14d9, 0xe864b7e3, 0x42105d14, 0x203e13e0, - 0x45eee2b6, 0xa3aaabea, 0xdb6c4f15, 0xfacb4fd0, - 0xc742f442, 0xef6abbb5, 0x654f3b1d, 0x41cd2105, - 0xd81e799e, 0x86854dc7, 0xe44b476a, 0x3d816250, - 0xcf62a1f2, 0x5b8d2646, 0xfc8883a0, 0xc1c7b6a3, - 0x7f1524c3, 0x69cb7492, 0x47848a0b, 0x5692b285, - 0x095bbf00, 0xad19489d, 0x1462b174, 0x23820e00, - 0x58428d2a, 0x0c55f5ea, 0x1dadf43e, 0x233f7061, - 0x3372f092, 0x8d937e41, 0xd65fecf1, 0x6c223bdb, - 0x7cde3759, 0xcbee7460, 0x4085f2a7, 0xce77326e, - 0xa6078084, 0x19f8509e, 0xe8efd855, 0x61d99735, - 0xa969a7aa, 0xc50c06c2, 0x5a04abfc, 0x800bcadc, - 0x9e447a2e, 0xc3453484, 0xfdd56705, 0x0e1e9ec9, - 0xdb73dbd3, 0x105588cd, 0x675fda79, 0xe3674340, - 0xc5c43465, 0x713e38d8, 0x3d28f89e, 0xf16dff20, - 0x153e21e7, 0x8fb03d4a, 0xe6e39f2b, 0xdb83adf7 - }, { - 0xe93d5a68, 0x948140f7, 0xf64c261c, 0x94692934, - 0x411520f7, 0x7602d4f7, 0xbcf46b2e, 0xd4a20068, - 0xd4082471, 0x3320f46a, 0x43b7d4b7, 0x500061af, - 0x1e39f62e, 0x97244546, 0x14214f74, 0xbf8b8840, - 0x4d95fc1d, 0x96b591af, 0x70f4ddd3, 0x66a02f45, - 0xbfbc09ec, 0x03bd9785, 0x7fac6dd0, 0x31cb8504, - 0x96eb27b3, 0x55fd3941, 0xda2547e6, 0xabca0a9a, - 0x28507825, 0x530429f4, 0x0a2c86da, 0xe9b66dfb, - 0x68dc1462, 0xd7486900, 0x680ec0a4, 0x27a18dee, - 0x4f3ffea2, 0xe887ad8c, 0xb58ce006, 0x7af4d6b6, - 0xaace1e7c, 0xd3375fec, 0xce78a399, 0x406b2a42, - 0x20fe9e35, 0xd9f385b9, 0xee39d7ab, 0x3b124e8b, - 0x1dc9faf7, 0x4b6d1856, 0x26a36631, 0xeae397b2, - 0x3a6efa74, 0xdd5b4332, 0x6841e7f7, 0xca7820fb, - 0xfb0af54e, 0xd8feb397, 0x454056ac, 0xba489527, - 0x55533a3a, 0x20838d87, 0xfe6ba9b7, 0xd096954b, - 0x55a867bc, 0xa1159a58, 0xcca92963, 0x99e1db33, - 0xa62a4a56, 0x3f3125f9, 0x5ef47e1c, 0x9029317c, - 0xfdf8e802, 0x04272f70, 0x80bb155c, 0x05282ce3, - 0x95c11548, 0xe4c66d22, 0x48c1133f, 0xc70f86dc, - 0x07f9c9ee, 0x41041f0f, 0x404779a4, 0x5d886e17, - 0x325f51eb, 0xd59bc0d1, 0xf2bcc18f, 0x41113564, - 0x257b7834, 0x602a9c60, 0xdff8e8a3, 0x1f636c1b, - 0x0e12b4c2, 0x02e1329e, 0xaf664fd1, 0xcad18115, - 0x6b2395e0, 0x333e92e1, 0x3b240b62, 0xeebeb922, - 0x85b2a20e, 0xe6ba0d99, 0xde720c8c, 0x2da2f728, - 0xd0127845, 0x95b794fd, 0x647d0862, 0xe7ccf5f0, - 0x5449a36f, 0x877d48fa, 0xc39dfd27, 0xf33e8d1e, - 0x0a476341, 0x992eff74, 0x3a6f6eab, 0xf4f8fd37, - 0xa812dc60, 0xa1ebddf8, 0x991be14c, 0xdb6e6b0d, - 0xc67b5510, 0x6d672c37, 0x2765d43b, 0xdcd0e804, - 0xf1290dc7, 0xcc00ffa3, 0xb5390f92, 0x690fed0b, - 0x667b9ffb, 0xcedb7d9c, 0xa091cf0b, 0xd9155ea3, - 0xbb132f88, 0x515bad24, 0x7b9479bf, 0x763bd6eb, - 0x37392eb3, 0xcc115979, 0x8026e297, 0xf42e312d, - 0x6842ada7, 0xc66a2b3b, 0x12754ccc, 0x782ef11c, - 0x6a124237, 0xb79251e7, 0x06a1bbe6, 0x4bfb6350, - 0x1a6b1018, 0x11caedfa, 0x3d25bdd8, 0xe2e1c3c9, - 0x44421659, 0x0a121386, 0xd90cec6e, 0xd5abea2a, - 0x64af674e, 0xda86a85f, 0xbebfe988, 0x64e4c3fe, - 0x9dbc8057, 0xf0f7c086, 0x60787bf8, 0x6003604d, - 0xd1fd8346, 0xf6381fb0, 0x7745ae04, 0xd736fccc, - 0x83426b33, 0xf01eab71, 0xb0804187, 0x3c005e5f, - 0x77a057be, 0xbde8ae24, 0x55464299, 0xbf582e61, - 0x4e58f48f, 0xf2ddfda2, 0xf474ef38, 0x8789bdc2, - 0x5366f9c3, 0xc8b38e74, 0xb475f255, 0x46fcd9b9, - 0x7aeb2661, 0x8b1ddf84, 0x846a0e79, 0x915f95e2, - 0x466e598e, 0x20b45770, 0x8cd55591, 0xc902de4c, - 0xb90bace1, 0xbb8205d0, 0x11a86248, 0x7574a99e, - 0xb77f19b6, 0xe0a9dc09, 0x662d09a1, 0xc4324633, - 0xe85a1f02, 0x09f0be8c, 0x4a99a025, 0x1d6efe10, - 0x1ab93d1d, 0x0ba5a4df, 0xa186f20f, 0x2868f169, - 0xdcb7da83, 0x573906fe, 0xa1e2ce9b, 0x4fcd7f52, - 0x50115e01, 0xa70683fa, 0xa002b5c4, 0x0de6d027, - 0x9af88c27, 0x773f8641, 0xc3604c06, 0x61a806b5, - 0xf0177a28, 0xc0f586e0, 0x006058aa, 0x30dc7d62, - 0x11e69ed7, 0x2338ea63, 0x53c2dd94, 0xc2c21634, - 0xbbcbee56, 0x90bcb6de, 0xebfc7da1, 0xce591d76, - 0x6f05e409, 0x4b7c0188, 0x39720a3d, 0x7c927c24, - 0x86e3725f, 0x724d9db9, 0x1ac15bb4, 0xd39eb8fc, - 0xed545578, 0x08fca5b5, 0xd83d7cd3, 0x4dad0fc4, - 0x1e50ef5e, 0xb161e6f8, 0xa28514d9, 0x6c51133c, - 0x6fd5c7e7, 0x56e14ec4, 0x362abfce, 0xddc6c837, - 0xd79a3234, 0x92638212, 0x670efa8e, 0x406000e0 - }, { - 0x3a39ce37, 0xd3faf5cf, 0xabc27737, 0x5ac52d1b, - 0x5cb0679e, 0x4fa33742, 0xd3822740, 0x99bc9bbe, - 0xd5118e9d, 0xbf0f7315, 0xd62d1c7e, 0xc700c47b, - 0xb78c1b6b, 0x21a19045, 0xb26eb1be, 0x6a366eb4, - 0x5748ab2f, 0xbc946e79, 0xc6a376d2, 0x6549c2c8, - 0x530ff8ee, 0x468dde7d, 0xd5730a1d, 0x4cd04dc6, - 0x2939bbdb, 0xa9ba4650, 0xac9526e8, 0xbe5ee304, - 0xa1fad5f0, 0x6a2d519a, 0x63ef8ce2, 0x9a86ee22, - 0xc089c2b8, 0x43242ef6, 0xa51e03aa, 0x9cf2d0a4, - 0x83c061ba, 0x9be96a4d, 0x8fe51550, 0xba645bd6, - 0x2826a2f9, 0xa73a3ae1, 0x4ba99586, 0xef5562e9, - 0xc72fefd3, 0xf752f7da, 0x3f046f69, 0x77fa0a59, - 0x80e4a915, 0x87b08601, 0x9b09e6ad, 0x3b3ee593, - 0xe990fd5a, 0x9e34d797, 0x2cf0b7d9, 0x022b8b51, - 0x96d5ac3a, 0x017da67d, 0xd1cf3ed6, 0x7c7d2d28, - 0x1f9f25cf, 0xadf2b89b, 0x5ad6b472, 0x5a88f54c, - 0xe029ac71, 0xe019a5e6, 0x47b0acfd, 0xed93fa9b, - 0xe8d3c48d, 0x283b57cc, 0xf8d56629, 0x79132e28, - 0x785f0191, 0xed756055, 0xf7960e44, 0xe3d35e8c, - 0x15056dd4, 0x88f46dba, 0x03a16125, 0x0564f0bd, - 0xc3eb9e15, 0x3c9057a2, 0x97271aec, 0xa93a072a, - 0x1b3f6d9b, 0x1e6321f5, 0xf59c66fb, 0x26dcf319, - 0x7533d928, 0xb155fdf5, 0x03563482, 0x8aba3cbb, - 0x28517711, 0xc20ad9f8, 0xabcc5167, 0xccad925f, - 0x4de81751, 0x3830dc8e, 0x379d5862, 0x9320f991, - 0xea7a90c2, 0xfb3e7bce, 0x5121ce64, 0x774fbe32, - 0xa8b6e37e, 0xc3293d46, 0x48de5369, 0x6413e680, - 0xa2ae0810, 0xdd6db224, 0x69852dfd, 0x09072166, - 0xb39a460a, 0x6445c0dd, 0x586cdecf, 0x1c20c8ae, - 0x5bbef7dd, 0x1b588d40, 0xccd2017f, 0x6bb4e3bb, - 0xdda26a7e, 0x3a59ff45, 0x3e350a44, 0xbcb4cdd5, - 0x72eacea8, 0xfa6484bb, 0x8d6612ae, 0xbf3c6f47, - 0xd29be463, 0x542f5d9e, 0xaec2771b, 0xf64e6370, - 0x740e0d8d, 0xe75b1357, 0xf8721671, 0xaf537d5d, - 0x4040cb08, 0x4eb4e2cc, 0x34d2466a, 0x0115af84, - 0xe1b00428, 0x95983a1d, 0x06b89fb4, 0xce6ea048, - 0x6f3f3b82, 0x3520ab82, 0x011a1d4b, 0x277227f8, - 0x611560b1, 0xe7933fdc, 0xbb3a792b, 0x344525bd, - 0xa08839e1, 0x51ce794b, 0x2f32c9b7, 0xa01fbac9, - 0xe01cc87e, 0xbcc7d1f6, 0xcf0111c3, 0xa1e8aac7, - 0x1a908749, 0xd44fbd9a, 0xd0dadecb, 0xd50ada38, - 0x0339c32a, 0xc6913667, 0x8df9317c, 0xe0b12b4f, - 0xf79e59b7, 0x43f5bb3a, 0xf2d519ff, 0x27d9459c, - 0xbf97222c, 0x15e6fc2a, 0x0f91fc71, 0x9b941525, - 0xfae59361, 0xceb69ceb, 0xc2a86459, 0x12baa8d1, - 0xb6c1075e, 0xe3056a0c, 0x10d25065, 0xcb03a442, - 0xe0ec6e0e, 0x1698db3b, 0x4c98a0be, 0x3278e964, - 0x9f1f9532, 0xe0d392df, 0xd3a0342b, 0x8971f21e, - 0x1b0a7441, 0x4ba3348c, 0xc5be7120, 0xc37632d8, - 0xdf359f8d, 0x9b992f2e, 0xe60b6f47, 0x0fe3f11d, - 0xe54cda54, 0x1edad891, 0xce6279cf, 0xcd3e7e6f, - 0x1618b166, 0xfd2c1d05, 0x848fd2c5, 0xf6fb2299, - 0xf523f357, 0xa6327623, 0x93a83531, 0x56cccd02, - 0xacf08162, 0x5a75ebb5, 0x6e163697, 0x88d273cc, - 0xde966292, 0x81b949d0, 0x4c50901b, 0x71c65614, - 0xe6c6c7bd, 0x327a140a, 0x45e1d006, 0xc3f27b9a, - 0xc9aa53fd, 0x62a80f00, 0xbb25bfe2, 0x35bdd2f6, - 0x71126905, 0xb2040222, 0xb6cbcf7c, 0xcd769c2b, - 0x53113ec0, 0x1640e3d3, 0x38abbd60, 0x2547adf0, - 0xba38209c, 0xf746ce76, 0x77afa1c5, 0x20756060, - 0x85cbfe4e, 0x8ae88dd8, 0x7aaaf9b0, 0x4cf9aa7e, - 0x1948c25c, 0x02fb8a8c, 0x01c36ae4, 0xd6ebe1f9, - 0x90d4f869, 0xa65cdea0, 0x3f09252d, 0xc208e69f, - 0xb74e6132, 0xce77e25b, 0x578fdfe3, 0x3ac372e6 - } - }, { - 0x243f6a88, 0x85a308d3, 0x13198a2e, 0x03707344, - 0xa4093822, 0x299f31d0, 0x082efa98, 0xec4e6c89, - 0x452821e6, 0x38d01377, 0xbe5466cf, 0x34e90c6c, - 0xc0ac29b7, 0xc97c50dd, 0x3f84d5b5, 0xb5470917, - 0x9216d5d9, 0x8979fb1b - } -}; - -static unsigned char BF_itoa64[64 + 1] = - "./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"; - -static unsigned char BF_atoi64[0x60] = { - 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 0, 1, - 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, - 64, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, - 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, - 64, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, - 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64 -}; - -#define BF_safe_atoi64(dst, src) \ -{ \ - tmp = (unsigned char)(src); \ - if ((unsigned int)(tmp -= 0x20) >= 0x60) return -1; \ - tmp = BF_atoi64[tmp]; \ - if (tmp > 63) return -1; \ - (dst) = tmp; \ -} - -static int BF_decode(BF_word *dst, const char *src, int size) -{ - unsigned char *dptr = (unsigned char *)dst; - unsigned char *end = dptr + size; - const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *)src; - unsigned int tmp, c1, c2, c3, c4; - - do { - BF_safe_atoi64(c1, *sptr++); - BF_safe_atoi64(c2, *sptr++); - *dptr++ = (c1 << 2) | ((c2 & 0x30) >> 4); - if (dptr >= end) break; - - BF_safe_atoi64(c3, *sptr++); - *dptr++ = ((c2 & 0x0F) << 4) | ((c3 & 0x3C) >> 2); - if (dptr >= end) break; - - BF_safe_atoi64(c4, *sptr++); - *dptr++ = ((c3 & 0x03) << 6) | c4; - } while (dptr < end); - - return 0; -} - -static void BF_encode(char *dst, const BF_word *src, int size) -{ - const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *)src; - const unsigned char *end = sptr + size; - unsigned char *dptr = (unsigned char *)dst; - unsigned int c1, c2; - - do { - c1 = *sptr++; - *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1 >> 2]; - c1 = (c1 & 0x03) << 4; - if (sptr >= end) { - *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1]; - break; - } - - c2 = *sptr++; - c1 |= c2 >> 4; - *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1]; - c1 = (c2 & 0x0f) << 2; - if (sptr >= end) { - *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1]; - break; - } - - c2 = *sptr++; - c1 |= c2 >> 6; - *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1]; - *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c2 & 0x3f]; - } while (sptr < end); -} - -static void BF_swap(BF_word *x, int count) -{ - static int endianness_check = 1; - char *is_little_endian = (char *)&endianness_check; - BF_word tmp; - - if (*is_little_endian) - do { - tmp = *x; - tmp = (tmp << 16) | (tmp >> 16); - *x++ = ((tmp & 0x00FF00FF) << 8) | ((tmp >> 8) & 0x00FF00FF); - } while (--count); -} - -#if BF_SCALE -/* Architectures which can shift addresses left by 2 bits with no extra cost */ -#define BF_ROUND(L, R, N) \ - tmp1 = L & 0xFF; \ - tmp2 = L >> 8; \ - tmp2 &= 0xFF; \ - tmp3 = L >> 16; \ - tmp3 &= 0xFF; \ - tmp4 = L >> 24; \ - tmp1 = data.ctx.S[3][tmp1]; \ - tmp2 = data.ctx.S[2][tmp2]; \ - tmp3 = data.ctx.S[1][tmp3]; \ - tmp3 += data.ctx.S[0][tmp4]; \ - tmp3 ^= tmp2; \ - R ^= data.ctx.P[N + 1]; \ - tmp3 += tmp1; \ - R ^= tmp3; -#else -/* Architectures with no complicated addressing modes supported */ -#define BF_INDEX(S, i) \ - (*((BF_word *)(((unsigned char *)S) + (i)))) -#define BF_ROUND(L, R, N) \ - tmp1 = L & 0xFF; \ - tmp1 <<= 2; \ - tmp2 = L >> 6; \ - tmp2 &= 0x3FC; \ - tmp3 = L >> 14; \ - tmp3 &= 0x3FC; \ - tmp4 = L >> 22; \ - tmp4 &= 0x3FC; \ - tmp1 = BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[3], tmp1); \ - tmp2 = BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[2], tmp2); \ - tmp3 = BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[1], tmp3); \ - tmp3 += BF_INDEX(data.ctx.S[0], tmp4); \ - tmp3 ^= tmp2; \ - R ^= data.ctx.P[N + 1]; \ - tmp3 += tmp1; \ - R ^= tmp3; -#endif - -/* - * Encrypt one block, BF_N is hardcoded here. - */ -#define BF_ENCRYPT \ - L ^= data.ctx.P[0]; \ - BF_ROUND(L, R, 0); \ - BF_ROUND(R, L, 1); \ - BF_ROUND(L, R, 2); \ - BF_ROUND(R, L, 3); \ - BF_ROUND(L, R, 4); \ - BF_ROUND(R, L, 5); \ - BF_ROUND(L, R, 6); \ - BF_ROUND(R, L, 7); \ - BF_ROUND(L, R, 8); \ - BF_ROUND(R, L, 9); \ - BF_ROUND(L, R, 10); \ - BF_ROUND(R, L, 11); \ - BF_ROUND(L, R, 12); \ - BF_ROUND(R, L, 13); \ - BF_ROUND(L, R, 14); \ - BF_ROUND(R, L, 15); \ - tmp4 = R; \ - R = L; \ - L = tmp4 ^ data.ctx.P[BF_N + 1]; - -#if BF_ASM -#define BF_body() \ - _BF_body_r(&data.ctx); -#else -#define BF_body() \ - L = R = 0; \ - ptr = data.ctx.P; \ - do { \ - ptr += 2; \ - BF_ENCRYPT; \ - *(ptr - 2) = L; \ - *(ptr - 1) = R; \ - } while (ptr < &data.ctx.P[BF_N + 2]); \ -\ - ptr = data.ctx.S[0]; \ - do { \ - ptr += 2; \ - BF_ENCRYPT; \ - *(ptr - 2) = L; \ - *(ptr - 1) = R; \ - } while (ptr < &data.ctx.S[3][0xFF]); -#endif - -static void BF_set_key(const char *key, BF_key expanded, BF_key initial, - unsigned char flags) -{ - const char *ptr = key; - unsigned int bug, i, j; - BF_word safety, sign, diff, tmp[2]; - -/* - * There was a sign extension bug in older revisions of this function. While - * we would have liked to simply fix the bug and move on, we have to provide - * a backwards compatibility feature (essentially the bug) for some systems and - * a safety measure for some others. The latter is needed because for certain - * multiple inputs to the buggy algorithm there exist easily found inputs to - * the correct algorithm that produce the same hash. Thus, we optionally - * deviate from the correct algorithm just enough to avoid such collisions. - * While the bug itself affected the majority of passwords containing - * characters with the 8th bit set (although only a percentage of those in a - * collision-producing way), the anti-collision safety measure affects - * only a subset of passwords containing the '\xff' character (not even all of - * those passwords, just some of them). This character is not found in valid - * UTF-8 sequences and is rarely used in popular 8-bit character encodings. - * Thus, the safety measure is unlikely to cause much annoyance, and is a - * reasonable tradeoff to use when authenticating against existing hashes that - * are not reliably known to have been computed with the correct algorithm. - * - * We use an approach that tries to minimize side-channel leaks of password - * information - that is, we mostly use fixed-cost bitwise operations instead - * of branches or table lookups. (One conditional branch based on password - * length remains. It is not part of the bug aftermath, though, and is - * difficult and possibly unreasonable to avoid given the use of C strings by - * the caller, which results in similar timing leaks anyway.) - * - * For actual implementation, we set an array index in the variable "bug" - * (0 means no bug, 1 means sign extension bug emulation) and a flag in the - * variable "safety" (bit 16 is set when the safety measure is requested). - * Valid combinations of settings are: - * - * Prefix "$2a$": bug = 0, safety = 0x10000 - * Prefix "$2b$": bug = 0, safety = 0 - * Prefix "$2x$": bug = 1, safety = 0 - * Prefix "$2y$": bug = 0, safety = 0 - */ - bug = (unsigned int)flags & 1; - safety = ((BF_word)flags & 2) << 15; - - sign = diff = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i++) { - tmp[0] = tmp[1] = 0; - for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { - tmp[0] <<= 8; - tmp[0] |= (unsigned char)*ptr; /* correct */ - tmp[1] <<= 8; - tmp[1] |= (BF_word_signed)(signed char)*ptr; /* bug */ -/* - * Sign extension in the first char has no effect - nothing to overwrite yet, - * and those extra 24 bits will be fully shifted out of the 32-bit word. For - * chars 2, 3, 4 in each four-char block, we set bit 7 of "sign" if sign - * extension in tmp[1] occurs. Once this flag is set, it remains set. - */ - if (j) - sign |= tmp[1] & 0x80; - if (!*ptr) - ptr = key; - else - ptr++; - } - diff |= tmp[0] ^ tmp[1]; /* Non-zero on any differences */ - - expanded[i] = tmp[bug]; - initial[i] = BF_init_state.P[i] ^ tmp[bug]; - } - -/* - * At this point, "diff" is zero iff the correct and buggy algorithms produced - * exactly the same result. If so and if "sign" is non-zero, which indicates - * that there was a non-benign sign extension, this means that we have a - * collision between the correctly computed hash for this password and a set of - * passwords that could be supplied to the buggy algorithm. Our safety measure - * is meant to protect from such many-buggy to one-correct collisions, by - * deviating from the correct algorithm in such cases. Let's check for this. - */ - diff |= diff >> 16; /* still zero iff exact match */ - diff &= 0xffff; /* ditto */ - diff += 0xffff; /* bit 16 set iff "diff" was non-zero (on non-match) */ - sign <<= 9; /* move the non-benign sign extension flag to bit 16 */ - sign &= ~diff & safety; /* action needed? */ - -/* - * If we have determined that we need to deviate from the correct algorithm, - * flip bit 16 in initial expanded key. (The choice of 16 is arbitrary, but - * let's stick to it now. It came out of the approach we used above, and it's - * not any worse than any other choice we could make.) - * - * It is crucial that we don't do the same to the expanded key used in the main - * Eksblowfish loop. By doing it to only one of these two, we deviate from a - * state that could be directly specified by a password to the buggy algorithm - * (and to the fully correct one as well, but that's a side-effect). - */ - initial[0] ^= sign; -} - -static const unsigned char flags_by_subtype[26] = - {2, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 4, 0}; - -static char *BF_crypt(const char *key, const char *setting, - char *output, int size, - BF_word min) -{ -#if BF_ASM - extern void _BF_body_r(BF_ctx *ctx); -#endif - struct { - BF_ctx ctx; - BF_key expanded_key; - union { - BF_word salt[4]; - BF_word output[6]; - } binary; - } data; - BF_word L, R; - BF_word tmp1, tmp2, tmp3, tmp4; - BF_word *ptr; - BF_word count; - int i; - - if (size < 7 + 22 + 31 + 1) { - __set_errno(ERANGE); - return NULL; - } - - if (setting[0] != '$' || - setting[1] != '2' || - setting[2] < 'a' || setting[2] > 'z' || - !flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a'] || - setting[3] != '$' || - setting[4] < '0' || setting[4] > '3' || - setting[5] < '0' || setting[5] > '9' || - (setting[4] == '3' && setting[5] > '1') || - setting[6] != '$') { - __set_errno(EINVAL); - return NULL; - } - - count = (BF_word)1 << ((setting[4] - '0') * 10 + (setting[5] - '0')); - if (count < min || BF_decode(data.binary.salt, &setting[7], 16)) { - __set_errno(EINVAL); - return NULL; - } - BF_swap(data.binary.salt, 4); - - BF_set_key(key, data.expanded_key, data.ctx.P, - flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a']); - - memcpy(data.ctx.S, BF_init_state.S, sizeof(data.ctx.S)); - - L = R = 0; - for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i += 2) { - L ^= data.binary.salt[i & 2]; - R ^= data.binary.salt[(i & 2) + 1]; - BF_ENCRYPT; - data.ctx.P[i] = L; - data.ctx.P[i + 1] = R; - } - - ptr = data.ctx.S[0]; - do { - ptr += 4; - L ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 2) & 3]; - R ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 3) & 3]; - BF_ENCRYPT; - *(ptr - 4) = L; - *(ptr - 3) = R; - - L ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 4) & 3]; - R ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 5) & 3]; - BF_ENCRYPT; - *(ptr - 2) = L; - *(ptr - 1) = R; - } while (ptr < &data.ctx.S[3][0xFF]); - - do { - int done; - - for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i += 2) { - data.ctx.P[i] ^= data.expanded_key[i]; - data.ctx.P[i + 1] ^= data.expanded_key[i + 1]; - } - - done = 0; - do { - BF_body(); - if (done) - break; - done = 1; - - tmp1 = data.binary.salt[0]; - tmp2 = data.binary.salt[1]; - tmp3 = data.binary.salt[2]; - tmp4 = data.binary.salt[3]; - for (i = 0; i < BF_N; i += 4) { - data.ctx.P[i] ^= tmp1; - data.ctx.P[i + 1] ^= tmp2; - data.ctx.P[i + 2] ^= tmp3; - data.ctx.P[i + 3] ^= tmp4; - } - data.ctx.P[16] ^= tmp1; - data.ctx.P[17] ^= tmp2; - } while (1); - } while (--count); - - for (i = 0; i < 6; i += 2) { - L = BF_magic_w[i]; - R = BF_magic_w[i + 1]; - - count = 64; - do { - BF_ENCRYPT; - } while (--count); - - data.binary.output[i] = L; - data.binary.output[i + 1] = R; - } - - memcpy(output, setting, 7 + 22 - 1); - output[7 + 22 - 1] = BF_itoa64[(int) - BF_atoi64[(int)setting[7 + 22 - 1] - 0x20] & 0x30]; - -/* This has to be bug-compatible with the original implementation, so - * only encode 23 of the 24 bytes. :-) */ - BF_swap(data.binary.output, 6); - BF_encode(&output[7 + 22], data.binary.output, 23); - output[7 + 22 + 31] = '\0'; - - return output; -} - -int _crypt_output_magic(const char *setting, char *output, int size) -{ - if (size < 3) - return -1; - - output[0] = '*'; - output[1] = '0'; - output[2] = '\0'; - - if (setting[0] == '*' && setting[1] == '0') - output[1] = '1'; - - return 0; -} - -/* - * Please preserve the runtime self-test. It serves two purposes at once: - * - * 1. We really can't afford the risk of producing incompatible hashes e.g. - * when there's something like gcc bug 26587 again, whereas an application or - * library integrating this code might not also integrate our external tests or - * it might not run them after every build. Even if it does, the miscompile - * might only occur on the production build, but not on a testing build (such - * as because of different optimization settings). It is painful to recover - * from incorrectly-computed hashes - merely fixing whatever broke is not - * enough. Thus, a proactive measure like this self-test is needed. - * - * 2. We don't want to leave sensitive data from our actual password hash - * computation on the stack or in registers. Previous revisions of the code - * would do explicit cleanups, but simply running the self-test after hash - * computation is more reliable. - * - * The performance cost of this quick self-test is around 0.6% at the "$2a$08" - * setting. - */ -char *_crypt_blowfish_rn(const char *key, const char *setting, - char *output, int size) -{ - const char *test_key = "8b \xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8"; - const char *test_setting = "$2a$00$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuu"; - static const char * const test_hashes[2] = - {"i1D709vfamulimlGcq0qq3UvuUasvEa\0\x55", /* 'a', 'b', 'y' */ - "VUrPmXD6q/nVSSp7pNDhCR9071IfIRe\0\x55"}; /* 'x' */ - const char *test_hash = test_hashes[0]; - char *retval; - const char *p; - int save_errno, ok; - struct { - char s[7 + 22 + 1]; - char o[7 + 22 + 31 + 1 + 1 + 1]; - } buf; - -/* Hash the supplied password */ - _crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size); - retval = BF_crypt(key, setting, output, size, 16); - save_errno = errno; - -/* - * Do a quick self-test. It is important that we make both calls to BF_crypt() - * from the same scope such that they likely use the same stack locations, - * which makes the second call overwrite the first call's sensitive data on the - * stack and makes it more likely that any alignment related issues would be - * detected by the self-test. - */ - memcpy(buf.s, test_setting, sizeof(buf.s)); - if (retval) { - unsigned int flags = flags_by_subtype[ - (unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a']; - test_hash = test_hashes[flags & 1]; - buf.s[2] = setting[2]; - } - memset(buf.o, 0x55, sizeof(buf.o)); - buf.o[sizeof(buf.o) - 1] = 0; - p = BF_crypt(test_key, buf.s, buf.o, sizeof(buf.o) - (1 + 1), 1); - - ok = (p == buf.o && - !memcmp(p, buf.s, 7 + 22) && - !memcmp(p + (7 + 22), test_hash, 31 + 1 + 1 + 1)); - - { - const char *k = "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"; - BF_key ae, ai, ye, yi; - BF_set_key(k, ae, ai, 2); /* $2a$ */ - BF_set_key(k, ye, yi, 4); /* $2y$ */ - ai[0] ^= 0x10000; /* undo the safety (for comparison) */ - ok = ok && ai[0] == 0xdb9c59bc && ye[17] == 0x33343500 && - !memcmp(ae, ye, sizeof(ae)) && - !memcmp(ai, yi, sizeof(ai)); - } - - __set_errno(save_errno); - if (ok) - return retval; - -/* Should not happen */ - _crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size); - __set_errno(EINVAL); /* pretend we don't support this hash type */ - return NULL; -} - -char *_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count, - const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size) -{ - if (size < 16 || output_size < 7 + 22 + 1 || - (count && (count < 4 || count > 31)) || - prefix[0] != '$' || prefix[1] != '2' || - (prefix[2] != 'a' && prefix[2] != 'b' && prefix[2] != 'y')) { - if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0'; - __set_errno((output_size < 7 + 22 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL); - return NULL; - } - - if (!count) count = 5; - - output[0] = '$'; - output[1] = '2'; - output[2] = prefix[2]; - output[3] = '$'; - output[4] = '0' + count / 10; - output[5] = '0' + count % 10; - output[6] = '$'; - - BF_encode(&output[7], (const BF_word *)input, 16); - output[7 + 22] = '\0'; - - return output; -} diff --git a/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.h b/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.h deleted file mode 100644 index 2ee0d8c1..00000000 --- a/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Written by Solar Designer in 2000-2011. - * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public - * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software - * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is - * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the - * general public under the following terms: - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted. - * - * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. - * - * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information. - */ - -#ifndef _CRYPT_BLOWFISH_H -#define _CRYPT_BLOWFISH_H - -extern int _crypt_output_magic(const char *setting, char *output, int size); -extern char *_crypt_blowfish_rn(const char *key, const char *setting, - char *output, int size); -extern char *_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(const char *prefix, - unsigned long count, - const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size); - -#endif diff --git a/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_gensalt.c b/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_gensalt.c deleted file mode 100644 index 73c15a1a..00000000 --- a/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_gensalt.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,124 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Written by Solar Designer in 2000-2011. - * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public - * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software - * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is - * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the - * general public under the following terms: - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted. - * - * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. - * - * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information. - * - * This file contains salt generation functions for the traditional and - * other common crypt(3) algorithms, except for bcrypt which is defined - * entirely in crypt_blowfish.c. - */ - -#include - -#include -#ifndef __set_errno -#define __set_errno(val) errno = (val) -#endif - -/* Just to make sure the prototypes match the actual definitions */ -#include "crypt_gensalt.h" - -unsigned char _crypt_itoa64[64 + 1] = - "./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"; - -char *_crypt_gensalt_traditional_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count, - const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size) -{ - (void) prefix; - - if (size < 2 || output_size < 2 + 1 || (count && count != 25)) { - if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0'; - __set_errno((output_size < 2 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL); - return NULL; - } - - output[0] = _crypt_itoa64[(unsigned int)input[0] & 0x3f]; - output[1] = _crypt_itoa64[(unsigned int)input[1] & 0x3f]; - output[2] = '\0'; - - return output; -} - -char *_crypt_gensalt_extended_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count, - const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size) -{ - unsigned long value; - - (void) prefix; - -/* Even iteration counts make it easier to detect weak DES keys from a look - * at the hash, so they should be avoided */ - if (size < 3 || output_size < 1 + 4 + 4 + 1 || - (count && (count > 0xffffff || !(count & 1)))) { - if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0'; - __set_errno((output_size < 1 + 4 + 4 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL); - return NULL; - } - - if (!count) count = 725; - - output[0] = '_'; - output[1] = _crypt_itoa64[count & 0x3f]; - output[2] = _crypt_itoa64[(count >> 6) & 0x3f]; - output[3] = _crypt_itoa64[(count >> 12) & 0x3f]; - output[4] = _crypt_itoa64[(count >> 18) & 0x3f]; - value = (unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[0] | - ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[1] << 8) | - ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[2] << 16); - output[5] = _crypt_itoa64[value & 0x3f]; - output[6] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 6) & 0x3f]; - output[7] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 12) & 0x3f]; - output[8] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 18) & 0x3f]; - output[9] = '\0'; - - return output; -} - -char *_crypt_gensalt_md5_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count, - const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size) -{ - unsigned long value; - - (void) prefix; - - if (size < 3 || output_size < 3 + 4 + 1 || (count && count != 1000)) { - if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0'; - __set_errno((output_size < 3 + 4 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL); - return NULL; - } - - output[0] = '$'; - output[1] = '1'; - output[2] = '$'; - value = (unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[0] | - ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[1] << 8) | - ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[2] << 16); - output[3] = _crypt_itoa64[value & 0x3f]; - output[4] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 6) & 0x3f]; - output[5] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 12) & 0x3f]; - output[6] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 18) & 0x3f]; - output[7] = '\0'; - - if (size >= 6 && output_size >= 3 + 4 + 4 + 1) { - value = (unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[3] | - ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[4] << 8) | - ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)input[5] << 16); - output[7] = _crypt_itoa64[value & 0x3f]; - output[8] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 6) & 0x3f]; - output[9] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 12) & 0x3f]; - output[10] = _crypt_itoa64[(value >> 18) & 0x3f]; - output[11] = '\0'; - } - - return output; -} diff --git a/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_gensalt.h b/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_gensalt.h deleted file mode 100644 index 457bbfe2..00000000 --- a/deps/crypt_blowfish/crypt_gensalt.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Written by Solar Designer in 2000-2011. - * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public - * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software - * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is - * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the - * general public under the following terms: - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted. - * - * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. - * - * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information. - */ - -#ifndef _CRYPT_GENSALT_H -#define _CRYPT_GENSALT_H - -extern unsigned char _crypt_itoa64[]; -extern char *_crypt_gensalt_traditional_rn(const char *prefix, - unsigned long count, - const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size); -extern char *_crypt_gensalt_extended_rn(const char *prefix, - unsigned long count, - const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size); -extern char *_crypt_gensalt_md5_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count, - const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size); - -#endif diff --git a/deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.1.3-crypt.diff b/deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.1.3-crypt.diff deleted file mode 100644 index 415e5b44..00000000 --- a/deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.1.3-crypt.diff +++ /dev/null @@ -1,53 +0,0 @@ ---- glibc-2.1.3.orig/crypt/sysdeps/unix/Makefile 1997-03-05 00:33:59 +0000 -+++ glibc-2.1.3/crypt/sysdeps/unix/Makefile 2000-06-11 03:13:41 +0000 -@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ - ifeq ($(subdir),md5-crypt) --libcrypt-routines += crypt crypt_util --dont_distribute += crypt.c crypt_util.c -+libcrypt-routines += crypt crypt_util crypt_blowfish x86 crypt_gensalt wrapper -+dont_distribute += crypt.c crypt_util.c crypt_blowfish.c x86.S crypt_gensalt.c wrapper.c - endif ---- glibc-2.1.3.orig/crypt/sysdeps/unix/crypt-entry.c 1998-12-10 12:49:04 +0000 -+++ glibc-2.1.3/crypt/sysdeps/unix/crypt-entry.c 2000-06-11 03:14:57 +0000 -@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ extern struct crypt_data _ufc_foobar; - */ - - char * --__crypt_r (key, salt, data) -+__des_crypt_r (key, salt, data) - const char *key; - const char *salt; - struct crypt_data * __restrict data; -@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ __crypt_r (key, salt, data) - _ufc_output_conversion_r (res[0], res[1], salt, data); - return data->crypt_3_buf; - } -+#if 0 - weak_alias (__crypt_r, crypt_r) - - char * -@@ -147,3 +148,4 @@ __fcrypt (key, salt) - return crypt (key, salt); - } - #endif -+#endif ---- glibc-2.1.3.orig/md5-crypt/Makefile 1998-07-02 22:46:47 +0000 -+++ glibc-2.1.3/md5-crypt/Makefile 2000-06-11 03:12:34 +0000 -@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ - # - subdir := md5-crypt - --headers := crypt.h -+headers := crypt.h gnu-crypt.h ow-crypt.h - - distribute := md5.h - ---- glibc-2.1.3.orig/md5-crypt/Versions 1998-07-02 22:32:07 +0000 -+++ glibc-2.1.3/md5-crypt/Versions 2000-06-11 09:11:03 +0000 -@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ - libcrypt { - GLIBC_2.0 { - crypt; crypt_r; encrypt; encrypt_r; fcrypt; setkey; setkey_r; -+ crypt_rn; crypt_ra; crypt_gensalt; crypt_gensalt_rn; crypt_gensalt_ra; - } - } diff --git a/deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.14-crypt.diff b/deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.14-crypt.diff deleted file mode 100644 index bacd12ed..00000000 --- a/deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.14-crypt.diff +++ /dev/null @@ -1,55 +0,0 @@ -diff -urp glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/Makefile glibc-2.14/crypt/Makefile ---- glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/Makefile 2011-05-31 04:12:33 +0000 -+++ glibc-2.14/crypt/Makefile 2011-07-16 21:40:56 +0000 -@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ - subdir := crypt - - headers := crypt.h -+headers += gnu-crypt.h ow-crypt.h - - extra-libs := libcrypt - extra-libs-others := $(extra-libs) -@@ -29,6 +30,8 @@ extra-libs-others := $(extra-libs) - libcrypt-routines := crypt-entry md5-crypt sha256-crypt sha512-crypt crypt \ - crypt_util - -+libcrypt-routines += crypt_blowfish x86 crypt_gensalt wrapper -+ - tests := cert md5c-test sha256c-test sha512c-test - - distribute := ufc-crypt.h crypt-private.h ufc.c speeds.c README.ufc-crypt \ -diff -urp glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/Versions glibc-2.14/crypt/Versions ---- glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/Versions 2011-05-31 04:12:33 +0000 -+++ glibc-2.14/crypt/Versions 2011-07-16 21:40:56 +0000 -@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ - libcrypt { - GLIBC_2.0 { - crypt; crypt_r; encrypt; encrypt_r; fcrypt; setkey; setkey_r; -+ crypt_rn; crypt_ra; crypt_gensalt; crypt_gensalt_rn; crypt_gensalt_ra; - } - } -diff -urp glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/crypt-entry.c glibc-2.14/crypt/crypt-entry.c ---- glibc-2.14.orig/crypt/crypt-entry.c 2011-05-31 04:12:33 +0000 -+++ glibc-2.14/crypt/crypt-entry.c 2011-07-16 21:40:56 +0000 -@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ extern struct crypt_data _ufc_foobar; - */ - - char * --__crypt_r (key, salt, data) -+__des_crypt_r (key, salt, data) - const char *key; - const char *salt; - struct crypt_data * __restrict data; -@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ __crypt_r (key, salt, data) - _ufc_output_conversion_r (res[0], res[1], salt, data); - return data->crypt_3_buf; - } -+#if 0 - weak_alias (__crypt_r, crypt_r) - - char * -@@ -177,3 +178,4 @@ __fcrypt (key, salt) - return crypt (key, salt); - } - #endif -+#endif diff --git a/deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.3.6-crypt.diff b/deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.3.6-crypt.diff deleted file mode 100644 index 4471054b..00000000 --- a/deps/crypt_blowfish/glibc-2.3.6-crypt.diff +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ ---- glibc-2.3.6.orig/crypt/Makefile 2001-07-06 04:54:45 +0000 -+++ glibc-2.3.6/crypt/Makefile 2004-02-27 00:23:48 +0000 -@@ -21,14 +21,14 @@ - # - subdir := crypt - --headers := crypt.h -+headers := crypt.h gnu-crypt.h ow-crypt.h - - distribute := md5.h - - extra-libs := libcrypt - extra-libs-others := $(extra-libs) - --libcrypt-routines := crypt-entry md5-crypt md5 crypt crypt_util -+libcrypt-routines := crypt-entry md5-crypt md5 crypt crypt_util crypt_blowfish x86 crypt_gensalt wrapper - - tests = cert md5test md5c-test - ---- glibc-2.3.6.orig/crypt/Versions 2000-03-04 00:47:30 +0000 -+++ glibc-2.3.6/crypt/Versions 2004-02-27 00:25:15 +0000 -@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ - libcrypt { - GLIBC_2.0 { - crypt; crypt_r; encrypt; encrypt_r; fcrypt; setkey; setkey_r; -+ crypt_rn; crypt_ra; crypt_gensalt; crypt_gensalt_rn; crypt_gensalt_ra; - } - } ---- glibc-2.3.6.orig/crypt/crypt-entry.c 2001-07-06 05:18:49 +0000 -+++ glibc-2.3.6/crypt/crypt-entry.c 2004-02-27 00:12:32 +0000 -@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ extern struct crypt_data _ufc_foobar; - */ - - char * --__crypt_r (key, salt, data) -+__des_crypt_r (key, salt, data) - const char *key; - const char *salt; - struct crypt_data * __restrict data; -@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ __crypt_r (key, salt, data) - _ufc_output_conversion_r (res[0], res[1], salt, data); - return data->crypt_3_buf; - } -+#if 0 - weak_alias (__crypt_r, crypt_r) - - char * -@@ -147,3 +148,4 @@ __fcrypt (key, salt) - return crypt (key, salt); - } - #endif -+#endif diff --git a/deps/crypt_blowfish/ow-crypt.h b/deps/crypt_blowfish/ow-crypt.h deleted file mode 100644 index 2e487942..00000000 --- a/deps/crypt_blowfish/ow-crypt.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Written by Solar Designer in 2000-2011. - * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public - * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software - * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is - * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the - * general public under the following terms: - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted. - * - * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. - * - * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information. - */ - -#ifndef _OW_CRYPT_H -#define _OW_CRYPT_H - -#ifndef __GNUC__ -#undef __const -#define __const const -#endif - -#ifndef __SKIP_GNU -extern char *crypt(__const char *key, __const char *setting); -extern char *crypt_r(__const char *key, __const char *setting, void *data); -#endif - -#ifndef __SKIP_OW -extern char *crypt_rn(__const char *key, __const char *setting, - void *data, int size); -extern char *crypt_ra(__const char *key, __const char *setting, - void **data, int *size); -extern char *crypt_gensalt(__const char *prefix, unsigned long count, - __const char *input, int size); -extern char *crypt_gensalt_rn(__const char *prefix, unsigned long count, - __const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size); -extern char *crypt_gensalt_ra(__const char *prefix, unsigned long count, - __const char *input, int size); -#endif - -#endif diff --git a/deps/crypt_blowfish/wrapper.c b/deps/crypt_blowfish/wrapper.c deleted file mode 100644 index 1e49c90d..00000000 --- a/deps/crypt_blowfish/wrapper.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,551 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Written by Solar Designer in 2000-2014. - * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public - * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software - * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is - * Copyright (c) 2000-2014 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the - * general public under the following terms: - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted. - * - * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. - * - * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information. - */ - -#include -#include - -#include -#ifndef __set_errno -#define __set_errno(val) errno = (val) -#endif - -#ifdef TEST -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#ifdef TEST_THREADS -#include -#endif -#endif - -#define CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE (7 + 22 + 31 + 1) -#define CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE (7 + 22 + 1) - -#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC) -#define __SKIP_GNU -#endif -#include "ow-crypt.h" - -#include "crypt_blowfish.h" -#include "crypt_gensalt.h" - -#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC) -/* crypt.h from glibc-crypt-2.1 will define struct crypt_data for us */ -#include "crypt.h" -extern char *__md5_crypt_r(const char *key, const char *salt, - char *buffer, int buflen); -/* crypt-entry.c needs to be patched to define __des_crypt_r rather than - * __crypt_r, and not define crypt_r and crypt at all */ -extern char *__des_crypt_r(const char *key, const char *salt, - struct crypt_data *data); -extern struct crypt_data _ufc_foobar; -#endif - -static int _crypt_data_alloc(void **data, int *size, int need) -{ - void *updated; - - if (*data && *size >= need) return 0; - - updated = realloc(*data, need); - - if (!updated) { -#ifndef __GLIBC__ - /* realloc(3) on glibc sets errno, so we don't need to bother */ - __set_errno(ENOMEM); -#endif - return -1; - } - -#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC) - if (need >= sizeof(struct crypt_data)) - ((struct crypt_data *)updated)->initialized = 0; -#endif - - *data = updated; - *size = need; - - return 0; -} - -static char *_crypt_retval_magic(char *retval, const char *setting, - char *output, int size) -{ - if (retval) - return retval; - - if (_crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size)) - return NULL; /* shouldn't happen */ - - return output; -} - -#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC) -/* - * Applications may re-use the same instance of struct crypt_data without - * resetting the initialized field in order to let crypt_r() skip some of - * its initialization code. Thus, it is important that our multiple hashing - * algorithms either don't conflict with each other in their use of the - * data area or reset the initialized field themselves whenever required. - * Currently, the hashing algorithms simply have no conflicts: the first - * field of struct crypt_data is the 128-byte large DES key schedule which - * __des_crypt_r() calculates each time it is called while the two other - * hashing algorithms use less than 128 bytes of the data area. - */ - -char *__crypt_rn(__const char *key, __const char *setting, - void *data, int size) -{ - if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '2') - return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)data, size); - if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '1') - return __md5_crypt_r(key, setting, (char *)data, size); - if (setting[0] == '$' || setting[0] == '_') { - __set_errno(EINVAL); - return NULL; - } - if (size >= sizeof(struct crypt_data)) - return __des_crypt_r(key, setting, (struct crypt_data *)data); - __set_errno(ERANGE); - return NULL; -} - -char *__crypt_ra(__const char *key, __const char *setting, - void **data, int *size) -{ - if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '2') { - if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE)) - return NULL; - return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)*data, *size); - } - if (setting[0] == '$' && setting[1] == '1') { - if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE)) - return NULL; - return __md5_crypt_r(key, setting, (char *)*data, *size); - } - if (setting[0] == '$' || setting[0] == '_') { - __set_errno(EINVAL); - return NULL; - } - if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, sizeof(struct crypt_data))) - return NULL; - return __des_crypt_r(key, setting, (struct crypt_data *)*data); -} - -char *__crypt_r(__const char *key, __const char *setting, - struct crypt_data *data) -{ - return _crypt_retval_magic( - __crypt_rn(key, setting, data, sizeof(*data)), - setting, (char *)data, sizeof(*data)); -} - -char *__crypt(__const char *key, __const char *setting) -{ - return _crypt_retval_magic( - __crypt_rn(key, setting, &_ufc_foobar, sizeof(_ufc_foobar)), - setting, (char *)&_ufc_foobar, sizeof(_ufc_foobar)); -} -#else -char *crypt_rn(const char *key, const char *setting, void *data, int size) -{ - return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)data, size); -} - -char *crypt_ra(const char *key, const char *setting, - void **data, int *size) -{ - if (_crypt_data_alloc(data, size, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE)) - return NULL; - return _crypt_blowfish_rn(key, setting, (char *)*data, *size); -} - -char *crypt_r(const char *key, const char *setting, void *data) -{ - return _crypt_retval_magic( - crypt_rn(key, setting, data, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE), - setting, (char *)data, CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE); -} - -char *crypt(const char *key, const char *setting) -{ - static char output[CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE]; - - return _crypt_retval_magic( - crypt_rn(key, setting, output, sizeof(output)), - setting, output, sizeof(output)); -} - -#define __crypt_gensalt_rn crypt_gensalt_rn -#define __crypt_gensalt_ra crypt_gensalt_ra -#define __crypt_gensalt crypt_gensalt -#endif - -char *__crypt_gensalt_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count, - const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size) -{ - char *(*use)(const char *_prefix, unsigned long _count, - const char *_input, int _size, - char *_output, int _output_size); - - /* This may be supported on some platforms in the future */ - if (!input) { - __set_errno(EINVAL); - return NULL; - } - - if (!strncmp(prefix, "$2a$", 4) || !strncmp(prefix, "$2b$", 4) || - !strncmp(prefix, "$2y$", 4)) - use = _crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn; - else - if (!strncmp(prefix, "$1$", 3)) - use = _crypt_gensalt_md5_rn; - else - if (prefix[0] == '_') - use = _crypt_gensalt_extended_rn; - else - if (!prefix[0] || - (prefix[0] && prefix[1] && - memchr(_crypt_itoa64, prefix[0], 64) && - memchr(_crypt_itoa64, prefix[1], 64))) - use = _crypt_gensalt_traditional_rn; - else { - __set_errno(EINVAL); - return NULL; - } - - return use(prefix, count, input, size, output, output_size); -} - -char *__crypt_gensalt_ra(const char *prefix, unsigned long count, - const char *input, int size) -{ - char output[CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE]; - char *retval; - - retval = __crypt_gensalt_rn(prefix, count, - input, size, output, sizeof(output)); - - if (retval) { - retval = strdup(retval); -#ifndef __GLIBC__ - /* strdup(3) on glibc sets errno, so we don't need to bother */ - if (!retval) - __set_errno(ENOMEM); -#endif - } - - return retval; -} - -char *__crypt_gensalt(const char *prefix, unsigned long count, - const char *input, int size) -{ - static char output[CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE]; - - return __crypt_gensalt_rn(prefix, count, - input, size, output, sizeof(output)); -} - -#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(_LIBC) -weak_alias(__crypt_rn, crypt_rn) -weak_alias(__crypt_ra, crypt_ra) -weak_alias(__crypt_r, crypt_r) -weak_alias(__crypt, crypt) -weak_alias(__crypt_gensalt_rn, crypt_gensalt_rn) -weak_alias(__crypt_gensalt_ra, crypt_gensalt_ra) -weak_alias(__crypt_gensalt, crypt_gensalt) -weak_alias(crypt, fcrypt) -#endif - -#ifdef TEST -static const char *tests[][3] = { - {"$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.E5YPO9kmyuRGyh0XouQYb4YMJKvyOeW", - "U*U"}, - {"$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.VGOzA784oUp/Z0DY336zx7pLYAy0lwK", - "U*U*"}, - {"$2a$05$XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXOAcXxm9kjPGEMsLznoKqmqw7tc8WCx4a", - "U*U*U"}, - {"$2a$05$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuu5s2v8.iXieOjg/.AySBTTZIIVFJeBui", - "0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" - "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789" - "chars after 72 are ignored"}, - {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e", - "\xa3"}, - {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e", - "\xff\xff\xa3"}, - {"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e", - "\xff\xff\xa3"}, - {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nqd1wy.pTMdcvrRWxyiGL2eMz.2a85.", - "\xff\xff\xa3"}, - {"$2b$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.CE5elHaaO4EbggVDjb8P19RukzXSM3e", - "\xff\xff\xa3"}, - {"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.Sa7shbm4.OzKpvFnX1pQLmQW96oUlCq", - "\xa3"}, - {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.Sa7shbm4.OzKpvFnX1pQLmQW96oUlCq", - "\xa3"}, - {"$2b$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.Sa7shbm4.OzKpvFnX1pQLmQW96oUlCq", - "\xa3"}, - {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi", - "1\xa3" "345"}, - {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi", - "\xff\xa3" "345"}, - {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi", - "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"}, - {"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.o./n25XVfn6oAPaUvHe.Csk4zRfsYPi", - "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"}, - {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.ZC1JEJ8Z4gPfpe1JOr/oyPXTWl9EFd.", - "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"}, - {"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nRht2l/HRhr6zmCp9vYUvvsqynflf9e", - "\xff\xa3" "345"}, - {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.nRht2l/HRhr6zmCp9vYUvvsqynflf9e", - "\xff\xa3" "345"}, - {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS", - "\xa3" "ab"}, - {"$2x$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS", - "\xa3" "ab"}, - {"$2y$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.6IflQkJytoRVc1yuaNtHfiuq.FRlSIS", - "\xa3" "ab"}, - {"$2x$05$6bNw2HLQYeqHYyBfLMsv/OiwqTymGIGzFsA4hOTWebfehXHNprcAS", - "\xd1\x91"}, - {"$2x$05$6bNw2HLQYeqHYyBfLMsv/O9LIGgn8OMzuDoHfof8AQimSGfcSWxnS", - "\xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8"}, - {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.swQOIzjOiJ9GHEPuhEkvqrUyvWhEMx6", - "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa" - "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa" - "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa" - "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa" - "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa" - "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa" - "chars after 72 are ignored as usual"}, - {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.R9xrDjiycxMbQE2bp.vgqlYpW5wx2yy", - "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55" - "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55" - "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55" - "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55" - "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55" - "\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55\xaa\x55"}, - {"$2a$05$/OK.fbVrR/bpIqNJ5ianF.9tQZzcJfm3uj2NvJ/n5xkhpqLrMpWCe", - "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff" - "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff" - "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff" - "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff" - "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff" - "\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff\x55\xaa\xff"}, - {"$2a$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC.7uG0VCzI2bS7j6ymqJi9CdcdxiRTWNy", - ""}, - {"*0", "", "$2a$03$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."}, - {"*0", "", "$2a$32$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."}, - {"*0", "", "$2c$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."}, - {"*0", "", "$2z$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."}, - {"*0", "", "$2`$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."}, - {"*0", "", "$2{$05$CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC."}, - {"*1", "", "*0"}, - {NULL} -}; - -#define which tests[0] - -static volatile sig_atomic_t running; - -static void handle_timer(int signum) -{ - (void) signum; - running = 0; -} - -static void *run(void *arg) -{ - unsigned long count = 0; - int i = 0; - void *data = NULL; - int size = 0x12345678; - - do { - const char *hash = tests[i][0]; - const char *key = tests[i][1]; - const char *setting = tests[i][2]; - - if (!tests[++i][0]) - i = 0; - - if (setting && strlen(hash) < 30) /* not for benchmark */ - continue; - - if (strcmp(crypt_ra(key, hash, &data, &size), hash)) { - printf("%d: FAILED (crypt_ra/%d/%lu)\n", - (int)((char *)arg - (char *)0), i, count); - free(data); - return NULL; - } - count++; - } while (running); - - free(data); - return count + (char *)0; -} - -int main(void) -{ - struct itimerval it; - struct tms buf; - clock_t clk_tck, start_real, start_virtual, end_real, end_virtual; - unsigned long count; - void *data; - int size; - char *setting1, *setting2; - int i; -#ifdef TEST_THREADS - pthread_t t[TEST_THREADS]; - void *t_retval; -#endif - - data = NULL; - size = 0x12345678; - - for (i = 0; tests[i][0]; i++) { - const char *hash = tests[i][0]; - const char *key = tests[i][1]; - const char *setting = tests[i][2]; - const char *p; - int ok = !setting || strlen(hash) >= 30; - int o_size; - char s_buf[30], o_buf[61]; - if (!setting) { - memcpy(s_buf, hash, sizeof(s_buf) - 1); - s_buf[sizeof(s_buf) - 1] = 0; - setting = s_buf; - } - - __set_errno(0); - p = crypt(key, setting); - if ((!ok && !errno) || strcmp(p, hash)) { - printf("FAILED (crypt/%d)\n", i); - return 1; - } - - if (ok && strcmp(crypt(key, hash), hash)) { - printf("FAILED (crypt/%d)\n", i); - return 1; - } - - for (o_size = -1; o_size <= (int)sizeof(o_buf); o_size++) { - int ok_n = ok && o_size == (int)sizeof(o_buf); - const char *x = "abc"; - strcpy(o_buf, x); - if (o_size >= 3) { - x = "*0"; - if (setting[0] == '*' && setting[1] == '0') - x = "*1"; - } - __set_errno(0); - p = crypt_rn(key, setting, o_buf, o_size); - if ((ok_n && (!p || strcmp(p, hash))) || - (!ok_n && (!errno || p || strcmp(o_buf, x)))) { - printf("FAILED (crypt_rn/%d)\n", i); - return 1; - } - } - - __set_errno(0); - p = crypt_ra(key, setting, &data, &size); - if ((ok && (!p || strcmp(p, hash))) || - (!ok && (!errno || p || strcmp((char *)data, hash)))) { - printf("FAILED (crypt_ra/%d)\n", i); - return 1; - } - } - - setting1 = crypt_gensalt(which[0], 12, data, size); - if (!setting1 || strncmp(setting1, "$2a$12$", 7)) { - puts("FAILED (crypt_gensalt)\n"); - return 1; - } - - setting2 = crypt_gensalt_ra(setting1, 12, data, size); - if (strcmp(setting1, setting2)) { - puts("FAILED (crypt_gensalt_ra/1)\n"); - return 1; - } - - (*(char *)data)++; - setting1 = crypt_gensalt_ra(setting2, 12, data, size); - if (!strcmp(setting1, setting2)) { - puts("FAILED (crypt_gensalt_ra/2)\n"); - return 1; - } - - free(setting1); - free(setting2); - free(data); - -#if defined(_SC_CLK_TCK) || !defined(CLK_TCK) - clk_tck = sysconf(_SC_CLK_TCK); -#else - clk_tck = CLK_TCK; -#endif - - running = 1; - signal(SIGALRM, handle_timer); - - memset(&it, 0, sizeof(it)); - it.it_value.tv_sec = 5; - setitimer(ITIMER_REAL, &it, NULL); - - start_real = times(&buf); - start_virtual = buf.tms_utime + buf.tms_stime; - - count = (char *)run((char *)0) - (char *)0; - - end_real = times(&buf); - end_virtual = buf.tms_utime + buf.tms_stime; - if (end_virtual == start_virtual) end_virtual++; - - printf("%.1f c/s real, %.1f c/s virtual\n", - (float)count * clk_tck / (end_real - start_real), - (float)count * clk_tck / (end_virtual - start_virtual)); - -#ifdef TEST_THREADS - running = 1; - it.it_value.tv_sec = 60; - setitimer(ITIMER_REAL, &it, NULL); - start_real = times(&buf); - - for (i = 0; i < TEST_THREADS; i++) - if (pthread_create(&t[i], NULL, run, i + (char *)0)) { - perror("pthread_create"); - return 1; - } - - for (i = 0; i < TEST_THREADS; i++) { - if (pthread_join(t[i], &t_retval)) { - perror("pthread_join"); - continue; - } - if (!t_retval) continue; - count = (char *)t_retval - (char *)0; - end_real = times(&buf); - printf("%d: %.1f c/s real\n", i, - (float)count * clk_tck / (end_real - start_real)); - } -#endif - - return 0; -} -#endif diff --git a/deps/crypt_blowfish/x86.S b/deps/crypt_blowfish/x86.S deleted file mode 100644 index b0f1cd2e..00000000 --- a/deps/crypt_blowfish/x86.S +++ /dev/null @@ -1,203 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Written by Solar Designer in 1998-2010. - * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public - * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software - * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is - * Copyright (c) 1998-2010 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the - * general public under the following terms: - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted. - * - * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. - * - * See crypt_blowfish.c for more information. - */ - -#ifdef __i386__ - -#if defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__ELF__) -#define UNDERSCORES -#define ALIGN_LOG -#endif - -#if defined(__CYGWIN32__) || defined(__MINGW32__) -#define UNDERSCORES -#endif - -#ifdef __DJGPP__ -#define UNDERSCORES -#define ALIGN_LOG -#endif - -#ifdef UNDERSCORES -#define _BF_body_r __BF_body_r -#endif - -#ifdef ALIGN_LOG -#define DO_ALIGN(log) .align (log) -#elif defined(DUMBAS) -#define DO_ALIGN(log) .align 1 << log -#else -#define DO_ALIGN(log) .align (1 << (log)) -#endif - -#define BF_FRAME 0x200 -#define ctx %esp - -#define BF_ptr (ctx) - -#define S(N, r) N+BF_FRAME(ctx,r,4) -#ifdef DUMBAS -#define P(N) 0x1000+N+N+N+N+BF_FRAME(ctx) -#else -#define P(N) 0x1000+4*N+BF_FRAME(ctx) -#endif - -/* - * This version of the assembly code is optimized primarily for the original - * Intel Pentium but is also careful to avoid partial register stalls on the - * Pentium Pro family of processors (tested up to Pentium III Coppermine). - * - * It is possible to do 15% faster on the Pentium Pro family and probably on - * many non-Intel x86 processors, but, unfortunately, that would make things - * twice slower for the original Pentium. - * - * An additional 2% speedup may be achieved with non-reentrant code. - */ - -#define L %esi -#define R %edi -#define tmp1 %eax -#define tmp1_lo %al -#define tmp2 %ecx -#define tmp2_hi %ch -#define tmp3 %edx -#define tmp3_lo %dl -#define tmp4 %ebx -#define tmp4_hi %bh -#define tmp5 %ebp - -.text - -#define BF_ROUND(L, R, N) \ - xorl L,tmp2; \ - xorl tmp1,tmp1; \ - movl tmp2,L; \ - shrl $16,tmp2; \ - movl L,tmp4; \ - movb tmp2_hi,tmp1_lo; \ - andl $0xFF,tmp2; \ - movb tmp4_hi,tmp3_lo; \ - andl $0xFF,tmp4; \ - movl S(0,tmp1),tmp1; \ - movl S(0x400,tmp2),tmp5; \ - addl tmp5,tmp1; \ - movl S(0x800,tmp3),tmp5; \ - xorl tmp5,tmp1; \ - movl S(0xC00,tmp4),tmp5; \ - addl tmp1,tmp5; \ - movl 4+P(N),tmp2; \ - xorl tmp5,R - -#define BF_ENCRYPT_START \ - BF_ROUND(L, R, 0); \ - BF_ROUND(R, L, 1); \ - BF_ROUND(L, R, 2); \ - BF_ROUND(R, L, 3); \ - BF_ROUND(L, R, 4); \ - BF_ROUND(R, L, 5); \ - BF_ROUND(L, R, 6); \ - BF_ROUND(R, L, 7); \ - BF_ROUND(L, R, 8); \ - BF_ROUND(R, L, 9); \ - BF_ROUND(L, R, 10); \ - BF_ROUND(R, L, 11); \ - BF_ROUND(L, R, 12); \ - BF_ROUND(R, L, 13); \ - BF_ROUND(L, R, 14); \ - BF_ROUND(R, L, 15); \ - movl BF_ptr,tmp5; \ - xorl L,tmp2; \ - movl P(17),L - -#define BF_ENCRYPT_END \ - xorl R,L; \ - movl tmp2,R - -DO_ALIGN(5) -.globl _BF_body_r -_BF_body_r: - movl 4(%esp),%eax - pushl %ebp - pushl %ebx - pushl %esi - pushl %edi - subl $BF_FRAME-8,%eax - xorl L,L - cmpl %esp,%eax - ja BF_die - xchgl %eax,%esp - xorl R,R - pushl %eax - leal 0x1000+BF_FRAME-4(ctx),%eax - movl 0x1000+BF_FRAME-4(ctx),tmp2 - pushl %eax - xorl tmp3,tmp3 -BF_loop_P: - BF_ENCRYPT_START - addl $8,tmp5 - BF_ENCRYPT_END - leal 0x1000+18*4+BF_FRAME(ctx),tmp1 - movl tmp5,BF_ptr - cmpl tmp5,tmp1 - movl L,-8(tmp5) - movl R,-4(tmp5) - movl P(0),tmp2 - ja BF_loop_P - leal BF_FRAME(ctx),tmp5 - xorl tmp3,tmp3 - movl tmp5,BF_ptr -BF_loop_S: - BF_ENCRYPT_START - BF_ENCRYPT_END - movl P(0),tmp2 - movl L,(tmp5) - movl R,4(tmp5) - BF_ENCRYPT_START - BF_ENCRYPT_END - movl P(0),tmp2 - movl L,8(tmp5) - movl R,12(tmp5) - BF_ENCRYPT_START - BF_ENCRYPT_END - movl P(0),tmp2 - movl L,16(tmp5) - movl R,20(tmp5) - BF_ENCRYPT_START - addl $32,tmp5 - BF_ENCRYPT_END - leal 0x1000+BF_FRAME(ctx),tmp1 - movl tmp5,BF_ptr - cmpl tmp5,tmp1 - movl P(0),tmp2 - movl L,-8(tmp5) - movl R,-4(tmp5) - ja BF_loop_S - movl 4(%esp),%esp - popl %edi - popl %esi - popl %ebx - popl %ebp - ret - -BF_die: -/* Oops, need to re-compile with a larger BF_FRAME. */ - hlt - jmp BF_die - -#endif - -#if defined(__ELF__) && defined(__linux__) -.section .note.GNU-stack,"",@progbits -#endif