cory/tildefriends
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More message size fixing. Need to find the end of it.

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git-svn-id: https://www.unprompted.com/svn/projects/tildefriends/trunk@4120 ed5197a5-7fde-0310-b194-c3ffbd925b24
This commit is contained in:
Cory McWilliams 2023-01-14 13:27:19 +00:00
parent f6ae15c4dc
commit 7cd925feca
1 changed files with 37 additions and 38 deletions
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35
src/ssb.c
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@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ typedef enum {
enum {
k_connections_changed_callbacks_max = 8,
k_tf_ssb_rpc_message_body_length_max = 64 * 1024,
k_tf_ssb_rpc_message_body_length_max = 1 * 1024 * 1024,
};
typedef struct _tf_ssb_broadcast_t tf_ssb_broadcast_t;
@ -245,6 +245,9 @@ typedef struct _tf_ssb_connection_t
uint8_t pad;
size_t rpc_recv_size;
uint8_t box_stream_buf[16 + k_tf_ssb_rpc_message_body_length_max];
uint8_t secretbox_buf[k_tf_ssb_rpc_message_body_length_max];
uint32_t send_request_number;
tf_ssb_connection_t* next;
@ -430,7 +433,11 @@ static void _tf_ssb_nonce_inc(uint8_t* nonce)
static void _tf_ssb_connection_box_stream_send(tf_ssb_connection_t* connection, const uint8_t* message, size_t size)
{
uint8_t* message_enc = tf_malloc(size + 34);
const size_t k_send_max = 65535;
for (size_t offset = 0; offset < size; offset += k_send_max)
{
size_t send_size = size - offset > k_send_max ? k_send_max : size - offset;
uint8_t* message_enc = tf_malloc(send_size + 34);
uint8_t nonce1[crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES];
memcpy(nonce1, connection->send_nonce, sizeof(nonce1));
@ -439,22 +446,15 @@ static void _tf_ssb_connection_box_stream_send(tf_ssb_connection_t* connection,
memcpy(nonce2, connection->send_nonce, sizeof(nonce2));
_tf_ssb_nonce_inc(connection->send_nonce);
if (crypto_secretbox_easy(message_enc + 34 - 16, message, size, nonce2, connection->c_to_s_box_key) != 0)
if (crypto_secretbox_easy(message_enc + 34 - 16, message + offset, send_size, nonce2, connection->c_to_s_box_key) != 0)
{
_tf_ssb_connection_close(connection, "unable to secretbox message");
tf_free(message_enc);
return;
}
if (size > 65535)
{
_tf_ssb_connection_close(connection, "sending message that is too big");
tf_free(message_enc);
return;
}
uint8_t header[18];
*(uint16_t*)header = htons((uint16_t)size);
*(uint16_t*)header = htons((uint16_t)send_size);
memcpy(header + sizeof(uint16_t), message_enc + 34 - 16, 16);
if (crypto_secretbox_easy(message_enc, header, sizeof(header), nonce1, connection->c_to_s_box_key) != 0)
{
@ -463,8 +463,9 @@ static void _tf_ssb_connection_box_stream_send(tf_ssb_connection_t* connection,
return;
}
_tf_ssb_write(connection, message_enc, size + 34);
_tf_ssb_write(connection, message_enc, send_size + 34);
tf_free(message_enc);
}
}
static int _request_compare(const void* a, const void* b)
@ -1460,18 +1461,16 @@ static bool _tf_ssb_connection_box_stream_recv(tf_ssb_connection_t* connection)
if (connection->body_len)
{
uint8_t buf[16 + k_tf_ssb_rpc_message_body_length_max];
memcpy(buf, connection->body_auth_tag, sizeof(connection->body_auth_tag));
if (_tf_ssb_connection_recv_pop(connection, buf + 16, connection->body_len))
memcpy(connection->box_stream_buf, connection->body_auth_tag, sizeof(connection->body_auth_tag));
if (_tf_ssb_connection_recv_pop(connection, connection->box_stream_buf + 16, connection->body_len))
{
uint8_t body[k_tf_ssb_rpc_message_body_length_max];
if (crypto_secretbox_open_easy(body, buf, 16 + connection->body_len, connection->nonce, connection->s_to_c_box_key) != 0)
if (crypto_secretbox_open_easy(connection->secretbox_buf, connection->box_stream_buf, 16 + connection->body_len, connection->nonce, connection->s_to_c_box_key) != 0)
{
_tf_ssb_connection_close(connection, "failed to open secret box");
return false;
}
_tf_ssb_nonce_inc(connection->nonce);
_tf_ssb_connection_rpc_recv_push(connection, body, connection->body_len);
_tf_ssb_connection_rpc_recv_push(connection, connection->secretbox_buf, connection->body_len);
connection->body_len = 0;
}
else